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Abstract 
This study examines the rise of legalization and its consequences in the trade 
regime centred on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). 
It observes a continued move to a higher level of legalization in the GATT/WTO 
over the past sixty years, although the ongoing expansion of legalization is uneven and 
imbalanced in many aspects. 
It also observes that the consequences of legalization are complicated. In 
particular, this study analyzes two aspects of the consequences of legalization, namely 1) 
the move to a higher degree of legalization in a particular subject area of the GATT/WTO 
corresponds to major changes on domestic legislations and practices in that subject area; 
and 2) a higher degree of legalization provides stronger incentives for WTO Members to 
build up institutional and legal capacity to more effectively utilize the GATT/WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism (DSM). Nevertheless, this study notes that the impact of 
legalization has limitations and legalization is only one of the many factors that shape the 
domestic systems and the strategic behaviour of trading parties. 
To exemplify the rise of legalization and its complicated consequences, this study 
empirically examines the pragmatic process of legalization and its consequences in a 
particular field of the GATT/W`I'O law - Anti-dumping (AD). It sketches the development of legalization in the multilateral AD framework by identifying increased 
obligation, greater precision and stronger delegation in the regime. It also explores the 
impact of international legalization on the European AD regime and China's AD-related 
dispute settlement activities. 
This study concludes that the evolution of the GATTIWTO system is an 
illustrative example of the phenomenal rise of legalization in international organizations. 
The consequences of the proliferation of legalization in the GATT/WTO are however 
complicated. 
Effort has been made to update the law and cases to 1 January 2008. For the 
integrity of the discussion, afew materials dated later than I January 2008 are included. 
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Chapter I 
Chapter I Introduction 
When addressing before the European Society of International Law on 19 May 
2006, Director General Pascal Lamy did not hesitated to express his view that "the WTO 
is a unique system within the international legal order". ' ffis speech raises two interesting 
points: first, after more than 60 years' evolution, the WTO comprises a "true legal order", 
which is "integrated and distinctive! '; and second, the WTO system is a legal system 
"within the international legal order" and it is "both a product and a vehicle" of the 
evolution of the international legal order. 2 
Both points raised by DG Lamy are critical in understanding the WTO as a 
gradually "legalized" international institution based on a treaty network and a dispute 
settlement mechanism (DSM). With respect to the first point, it is widely observed that 
the proliferation of the GATT/WTO is associated with a phenomenal rise of legalization 
in the system, even though a consensus on the exact meaning of legalization is lacking. 
Numerous literatures in the field documented that although lacking of an explicitly 
mentioned judicial organ to oversee the implementation and enforcement of Agreements 
and agreed understandings, technocrats and experts of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) developed, gradually, a "legal" system to operate the Agreements. 
This "legal" system distinguished "normal" legitimate domestic policies from "cheating" 
on the trade liberalization bargain and used the collective power of the system to punish 
the "bad boys", regardless of the powerfulness of trading partners. 3 After the 
establishment of the WTO, the WTO system has been intensively examined as an 
existing "true legal order" and a large number of trade law literature focuses on "two 
essential attributes" of the WTO legal system, i. e. the valid WTO rules and the 
enforcement mechaniSMS. 4 
1 Pascal Lamy 'The Place and Role of the WTO (WTO Law) in the International Legal Order' (Address before the 
European Society of Intemational Law, 19 May 2006, Sorbonne, Paris) 
<http: //www. wto. orglenglish/newsý-etsppLetspp126_e. htm> accessed 14 June 2006 ('The place and role of the WTO'). 
2 Ibid. 
3R Howse 'From Politics to Technocracy - And Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime', (2002) 96 
The American Journal of International Law 94,98. ('Politics to Technocracy') 
4 For a summary of recent academic developments, I Damme 'Seventh Annual WTO Conference: An Overview' (2008) 
11 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL) 155 ('7th AITO Conference') and M Raisch 'Book Survey 2007' 
(2008) 11 BEL 217. ('Book Survey 2007') 
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On the second point, many scholars examined the link between the WTO legal 
system and general international law, particularly with a view to exploring how WTO law 
relates to rules and principles depriving from other sources of international law. 5 
However, one aspect of the second point addressed in DG Lamy's speech has not 
been adequately discussed - the intensive institutionalization in the GATT/WTO system 
in a broader context of legalization of international organizations. 6 Defined as a 
distinctive form of institutionalization, the process of legalization arguably has been 
7 
observed in many international organizations, including the GATTAVTO . The 
"legalized" GATT/WTO rules and the quasi-judicial DSM have been widely discussed, 
but the phenomenon of legalization itself has been rarely systematically analyzed under a 
theoretical framework which is also used to analyze similar experiences of other 
international organizations. 
One approach to analyze the phenomenal institutionalization in the trade regime is to 
examine the gradually "legalized" GATTIWTO system under the theoretical framework 
of legalization and promote the understanding of the GATT/Y; TO as one of the ever- 
evolving international organizations that are experiencing a move to law, while at the 
same time focusing on the uniqueness of the path of evolution of the GATT/WTO. This 
study adopts this approach to examine the phenomenon of legalization and its 
consequences in the trade regime. 
The theme of this study is three-fold: first, it depicts the proliferation of legalization, 
a special form of institutionalization, in the trade regime in the past sixty years. Second, it 
analyzes the uneven expansion of legalization with a view to providing a full picture of 
the legalization process in the GATT/WTO. Third, it investigates two aspects of the 
complicated consequences of legalization. It first examines the impact of legalization on 
formal legal institutions at domestic level, by identifying the correlation between a higher 
5 For example, L Bartels 'Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings' (2001) 35 Journal of World Trade 
(IWT) 499. ('Applicable Law'); J Pauwelyn Conflicts of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Related to 
Other Rules of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003). ('Conflicts of Norms') ; and I Hu 'The Role of 
International Law in the Development of the WTO Law' (20(g) 7 JIEL 143 ('The Role of International Law'). Most 
recently, from a slightly different perspective, A Mitchell 'Ile Legal Basis for Using Legal Principles in WTO 
Disputes' (2007) JIEL 795. ('Legal Basis for Using Legal Principles') 
6K Abbott, R Keohane, A Moravcsik, A Slaughter and D Snidal 'The Concept of Legalization' (2000) 54 International 
Organization 401 ('Concept of Legalization'). 
71 Goldstein, M Kahler, R Keohane and A Slaughter 'Introduction: Legalization and World Politics' (2000) 54 
International Organization 385,385. ('Introduction') 
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degree of legalization in a particular subject area of GATT/WTO law and corresponding 
changes in the domestic policy-making, policy administration, and judicial review in that 
particular subject area. It then examines the impact of legalization on the less formal 
process of legal capacity building and the utilization of the DSM to settle disputes in 
particular subject areas. 
It has to be noted that this study cannot be understood in isolation from the broader 
debate of "constitutionalization" in international economic law literature. It also relates 
to other works which examine the phenomenon of "judicialization" in the GATT/WrO 
dispute settlement process. Nevertheless, this study narrows its scope to explore the 
institutionalization of the GATr/WTO from a specific perspective, namely focusing on 
formal institutions at international level and the consequences of institutionalization at 
domestic level. 
The theoretical framework adopted by this study can provides a useful research tool 
to examine the GATT/WTO since it offers, first, a coherent set of identifiable attributes 
which could be used to characterize the institutional evolution of the GATT/WFO and 
second, the theoretical foundation to discuss the consequences of legalization on 
domestic systems and the strategic behaviour of WTO Members. By adopting a 
theoretical framework established in the field of International Relations which was also 
used to analyze other international institutions, this study intends to provide a fresh 
perspective to examine the evolution of the GAT7/WTO with particular focuses on the 
process of legalization in the formal GATT/WTO institutions at international level and 
the impacts of such process on domestic systems and the strategic berhaviour of trading 
partenrs. This study is therefore aiming to complement the existing literature rather than 
to claim a comprehensive new theory to explain all aspects of the evolution of the 
GATT/WTO and the relationship between GATT/WTO law and domestic laws. 
For the purpose of this introduction, the term "consitutionalization" is used to refer 
to a collection of ongoing debates which discuss not only institutional arrangements of 
the GATT/WTO, but also the foundations of the trade regime. 8 The ongoing debates that 
8 In general legal theory, "constitutionalisai" refers to the principle that a legal system is based on and legitimated by a 
system of legal or law-like principles that stand outside the law-making system itself. It includes both the practical 
arrangements of political institutions within the system, and the idea of a system of supreme law that defines 
fundamental rights. See, H Kritzer (eds) Legal Systems of the World -A Political, Social, and Culture Encyclopaedia 
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may fall under the umbrella of "constitutionalization" include, but not limit on, good 
governance of the Wr09, global regulatory legitimacylo, the WTO and human rights, 
democracy and rules of law". In each sub-category, various literature approaches the 
debate from different angles. For example, in the discussion of good governance of the 
WTO, recent scholarship focuses on institutional reforms of the WT012, the elements of 
good governance in the WTO 13 , and the culture of the NW014. 
Although situating itself in the larger debate of constitutionalization, this study 
exclusively analyzes the phenomenon of legalization, a special form of 
institutionalization, and distinguishes itself from other works discussing normative 
aspects of "constitutionalization" of the GATT/WTO. This study does not engage in 
discussions such as whether legalization, or more controversially constitutionalization, is 
normatively positive for the trade regime and it does not take a normative stance to judge 
different views presented in the "constitutionalization" debate. Instead, it observes the 
particular phenomenon of legalization and adopts a theoretical framework from 
International Relations to analyze the phenomenon and its consequences. 
It is possible that some discussions in this study cross-refer to certain topics in 
ongoing academic debates such as the institutional reform of the WTO. Nevertheless, this 
study approaches these topics from a particular angle, i. e. to describe current 
characteristics of WrO institutions along with the three-factor theoretical framework of 
legalization and to examine whether those institutional settings indicate the uneven 
expansion of legalization. In the parts where substantive WTO rules, namely AD rules, 
(ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara 2002) 353. Two books significantly contribute to the "constitutionalization" debate of the 
WTO: J Jackson Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2006) and D Cass The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization: Legitimacy, 
Democracy, and Community in the International Trading System (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005). 
9 For example, D Esty 'Good Governance at the World Trade Organization: Building a Foundation of Administrative 
Law' (2007) 10 JIEL 509. ('Good Governance') 
10 For a summary of the "global regulatory legitimacy" discussion, Damme (n 4) 163. ('7th WTO Conference') Also, J 
Trachtman 'Regulatory Jurisdiction and the WTO' (2007) 10 JIEL 63 1. ('Regulatory Jurisdiction') Earlier literature in 
this subject includes D Esty 'The World Trade Organization's Legitimacy Crisis' (2002) 1 World Trade Review 1, A 
Guzman 'Global Governance and the WTO' (2004) 45 Harvard International Law Journal 303 and J Trachtman 'The 
World Trading System, the International Legal System and Multilevel Choice' (2006) 12 European Law Journal 469, 
etc. 
" For example, E Petersmann 'Multilevel Judicial Governance of International Trade Requires a Common Conception 
of Rule of Law and Justice' (2007) 10 JIEL 529; S Picciotto 'The WTO as a Node of Global Governance: Economic 
Regulations and Human Rights Discourses' (2007)1 Law, Social Justice & Global Development Journal (LGD). 
<http: //go. warwick. ac. uk/lgd/2007-1/picciotto> 
12 For a summary of the "global regulatory legitimacy" discussion, Damme (n 4) 162-163. ('7'ý WTO Conference') 
13 Esty (n 9) ('Good Governance'). 
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are discussed, discussions do not engage in normative debates such as the rationale of AD 
laws or the welfare effect of AD rules. 
This study also relates to, but at the same time differentiates from, works which 
analyze the phenomenon of "judicialization" in the GATT/WTO dispute settlement 
process. The phenomenon of legalization examined by this study includes judicialization, 
but it does not limit on the judicial branch of the GATT/WrO. Instead, the analysis in 
this study covers the process of legalization of the GATT/WTO treaty system, its DSM 
and the consequences of legalization of the GATT/WTO at domestic level. In this sense, 
this study analyzes more comptransively the phenomenon of legalization, its discourse, 
its dynamics and its effects on the trade regime with empirical examples. 
The rest of this study proceeds as follow. Serving as the theoretical framework of 
this study, chapter II introduces the theoretical framework of legalization developed by 
International Relations scholars and adopts it to analyze the GATT/WTO system, with 
special focuses on elements of legalization, the uneven expansion of legalization and 
consequences of legalization in the trade regime. 
Chapter III describes the development of legalization in the GATT/WTO from a 
historical perspective. It demonstrates the evolution of the whole system from a 
"diplomatic" treaty network to a "legalized" framework, on the one hand, and the uneven 
and imbalanced expansion of legalization on the other. 
Chapter IV, V and VI advances the research by examining the legalization process 
of GATT/WTO AD rules and its impacts on the EC AD regime and China's AD-related 
WTO activities. Chapter IV sketches the development of legalization in the multilateral 
AD framework by identifying increased obligation, greater precision and stronger 
delegation in the regime. Chapter V explores the impact of multilateral legalization on the 
EC AD regime. Chapter VI demonstrates the impact of legalization on the utilization of 
the DSM by WTO Members, in particular in terms of the efforts WTO Members made to 
build up their institutional and legal capacity to effectively utilize the DSM, as 
exemplified by the AD-related dispute settlement activities of China. 
Chapter VII concludes the study by summarizing the key findings of this study. 
14 D Steger '77ie Culture of the WTO: My It Needs to Change'(2007) 10 REL 483. 
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Chapter H Conceptualizing Legalization in the WTO System 
1. Introduction 
The process of "legalization" in many issue areas of international politics has 
particularly interested international lawyers and International Relations scholars in recent 
years. ' Many claimed that a growing number of international institutions are gradually 
legalized and the phenomenon of "legalization" has been commonly observed. 2 Others, 
however, posed serious doubts not only on the empirical evidence of "legalization", but 
also on what it really means, whether it should be happening and whether it goes down 
the path that international lawyers predicted. 3 Consequently, instead of debating only on 
the dichotomy between law or no law or whether hard law is better than soft law in 
international organizations, in-depth theoretical inquiries of legalization involve 
interlinked questions such as how to conceptualise "legalization", what is the discourse of 
legalization in a particular subject area or region and what are the effects of legalization. 
Among legal and International Relations literature which analyzes the phenomenon 
of legalization, a special issue of International Organization in 2000 ("the special issue") 
presented a theoretical framework and several case studies of legalization which are of 
special interest to this study. 4 The special issue developed an analytical framework to 
explain the common ground of the move to law in various international/regional 
institutions and explore the consequences of legalization in various subject areas and 
regions. In order to analyze the highly diversified phenomenon of legalization in different 
subject areas and regions, authors of the special issue set forth and elaborated a definition 
IK Abbott, R Keohane, A Moravcsik, A Slaughter and D Snidal 'The Concept of Legalization' (2000) 54 International 
Organization 401 ('Concept of Legalization'). One special volume of International Organization was devoted to 
"legalization and world politics" in 2000. Also, K Abbott 'The Many Faces of International Legalization', (1998) 92 
American Society of International Law Proceedings 57 ('Many faces of Legalization') and the presentations in the 
Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 'The Legalization of International 
Relations' (2002) 96 American Society of International Law Proceeding 291 ('The Legalization of International 
Relations'). 
2j Goldstein, M Kahler, R Keohane and A Slaughter ' Introduction: Legalization and World Politics' (2000) 54 
International Organization 385,385. ('Introduction') 
3 Presentation of Professor Friedrich Kratochwil and other speakers in the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the 
American Society of International Law, 'rhe Legalization of International Relations' (n 1) 296. 
'The whole summer 2000 issue of International Organization is devoted to "Legalization". International Organization 
volume 54, issue 3, summer 2000. 
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of legalization, which was used as "a classificatory structure for comparative analysis" in 
case studies in the special issue. 5 Deploying this conceptual framework of legalization, 
contributors examined the status of legalization in different regional/international 
organizations and institutional arrangements in specific issue areas. Three articles 
examined the pattern of legalization and its effect on participants and policies in three 
regions: Europe 6, North America7 and Asia-Pacific8, whereas the rest three contributors 
focused on legalization in international monetary affair9, tradelo and human rights. " 
Despite great efforts of the contributors of the special issue to cover divergent 
phenomena of legalization in various regional/intemational institutions and issue-areas, it 
is clearly stated that the purpose of the special issue is not to provide a coherent new 
theory to explain legalization in all institutions and issue-areas. To the contrary, the 
principle interest of the special issue is to "open some conceptual and analytical doors to 
a more sustained and explicitly theoretical analysis of the connections between law and 
politics in contemporary world politiCS". 12 This study is one of those researches which 
intends to follow the theoretical framework of the special issue and empirically analyzes 
the evolution of the GATT/WTO in general and the AD regime in particular. 
On three grounds this study considers that the theoretical framework established in 
the special issue can be useful to analyze the GAI7/W70 system: first, the definition of 
legalization in the special issue provides a coherent set of identifiable attributes which 
can sufficiently characterize the evolution of the GATT/WTO, not only in terms of the 
development of dispute resolution, but also in terms of the evolution of the treaty network 
and the administration of the GATF/WTO as an international organization. The existing 
literature largely focuses on one or another function of the GATr/WFO, as an institution 
5 Goldstein (n 2) 385. ('Introduction') 
6K Alter 'The European Union's Legal System and Domestic Policy: Spillover or Backlash? ' (2000) 54 International 
Organization 489. ('European Union's Legal System and Domestic Policy') 
7F Abbott 'NAFrA and the Legalization of World Politics: A Case Study' (2000) 54 International Organization 519. 
('NAFrA and the Legalization') 
8M Kahler 'Legalization as Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case' (2000) 54 International Organization 549. ('Legalization 
as Strategy') 
9B Simmons 'ne Legalization of International Monetary Affairs' (2000) 54 International Organization 573. 
('Legalization of International Monetary Affairs') 
10 J Goldstein and L Martin 'Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note' (2000) 54 
International Organization 603. ('Trade Liberalization and Domestic Politics') 
11 E Lutz and K Sikkink 'International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America' (2000) 54 International 
Organization 633. ('International Human Rights Law') 
12 Goldstein (n 2) 399. ('Introduction') 
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of negotiation or surveillance or adjudication. The theoretical framework, however, 
allows examinations of institutional arrangements of different parts of the GATT/WTO 
under a uniform theoretical framework. It also allows this study to depict the status of 
legalization of the GATT/WrO at a given point of time by describing three elements of 
legalization and to demonstrate the trend of legalization by linking these points together. 
The theoretical framework hence facilitates the demonstration of the process of 
legalization by allowing meaningful comparisons of three elements of legalization at 
different points of time. 
Second, the special issue laid the theoretical foundation for this study to discuss the 
consequence of intensive institutional changes in the GATT/WrO at domestic level. In 
the special issue, contributors addressed not only what is "legalization" and what are the 
variations of legalization, but also the consequences of legalization, namely, how 
legalization, "in creating a new institutional form, mobilizes different political actors and 
shapes their behaviour in particular ways". 13 Although the particular angles chosen by 
this study are different with those in the special issue, this study benefits from the articles 
in the special issue. In particular, three articles help this stydy to build up its arugments 
by exploring the interaction between the increase of legalization in the trade regime and 
the trade-related interests of domestic actors 14 , the correlation between the degree of 
legalization in dispute resolution mechanisms and state behaviour in dispute resolution 
processes 15 and the interaction between the process of legalization in 
international/regional organizations and domestic policies 16 . 
Finally, the theoretical framework of legalization puts the "legalized' evolution of 
the GATT/VV70 in a broader context. By using a uniform framework to analyze strongly 
variable institutions across issue-areas and regions, the dynamic process of legalization of 
a particular institution such as the GATT/WTO could be better explained. Indeed, even 
though the GATT/WrO has developed in a rather unique manner, it shares common 
grounds with the development of many other international organizations. When national 
13 M Kahler 'Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization' (2000) 54 International Organization 661, 
661. ('Conclusion'). 
14 Goldstein and Martin (n 10). ('Trade Liberalization and Domestic Politics') 
15 R Keohane, A Moravcsik and A Slaughter 'Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational' (2000) 54 
International Organization 457,457. ('Legalized Dispute Resolution') 
16 Alter (n 6). ('European Union's Legal System and Domestic Policy') 
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governments negotiate trade agreements and make institutional choices for the 
GATT/WTO, they face similar constraints imposed by their political environments as 
they do in many other issue-areas. It is therefore helpful to analyze the GATr/V; TO 
system under a framework which can explain the commonality among the processes of 
legalization in different international organizations as long as this framework also reflects 
the divergence between systems. 
The limited scope and the distinctive approach followed by this study however have 
to be noted at the outset. First, it is not the intention of this study to either compare or link 
the process of legalization in the GATFAVTO system with similar processes in other 
international/regional institutions discussed in the special issue. Although adopting the 
same theoretical framework, this study treats the GATT/WTO system as a distinctive 
legal order and avoids engaging in discussions in connection to discrepancies among the 
processes of legalization in different international institutions. 
Second, among the working hypotheses of the special issue, this study identifies two 
aspects which are most relevant in analyzing the GATr/WTO system, namely the uneven 
expansion of legalization and the complicated consequences of legalization. It restrains 
its discussion on these two aspects. Other working hypotheses are not discussed in this 
study. In particular, this study has no intention to seek the explanation of why a particular 
institutional form appears in the GATT/WTO under a particular circumstance -a key 
research question intensively discussed in the special issue. Instead, this study describes 
the status of legalization in the trade regime as it was at a given point of time and tries to 
demonstrate the trend by linking these points together. In other words, this study is 
working under the assumption that over a particular period of time, the "legalized 
institutional settings of the trade regime are "frozen" until the next institutional change 
occurs. The discussions in the following chapters therefore have been put in specific time 
frames and coincidences of time between changes of status of legalization at international 
level and changes of institutions and legislations at domestic level are identified to the 
extent possible in the analysis. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the definition of 
legalization in the special issue and indicators for each element of legalization. It 
summarizes the discussion of two features of legalization, namely the uneven expansion 
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of legalization and the complicated consequences of legalization in the special issue. It 
also discusses criticisms of the theoretical framework and whether these criticisms 
undermine the analysis of the GATT/Y; TO system in this study. Section 3 adopts the 
theoretical framework to examine the current status of legalization in the WI'O system, 
the uneven expansion of legalization in the WTO system and the consequences of 
legalization at domestic level. Section 4 concludes the chapter. 
2. Defining Legalization in International Relations 
2.1 Elements of Legalization 
In the first article of the special issue, "The Concept of Legalization", legalization is 
posited as a particular fon-n of institutionalisation characterized by three components: 
obligation, precision and delegation. 17 Obligation refers to a rule or cornmitment or a set 
of rules or commitments by which states or other actors are legally bound, i. e. their 
behaviour becomes "subject to scrutiny under the general rules, procedures, and 
discourse of international law". 18 Precision means that "rules or commitments 
unambiguously define the conduct they require, authorize or proscribe", i. e. definiteness 
of legal rules and their elaborations. 19 Delegation is defined as whether third parties have 
been granted authority "to implement, interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve disputes 
and (possibly) to make future rules". 20 Put differently, delegation refers to the acceptance 
of third-party authorities for rule making, rule interpretation and dispute resolution. 
In order to better explain variations of legalization in different international 
institutions or in different portions of an international institution/instrument, the special 
issue, in addition to above definitions, identifies several indictors of each element of 
legalization. It first formulates obligations as commitments ranging from "coercion, 
comity to morality". 21 Commitments made by states can vary widely from "unconditional 
obligations with language and other indicia of intent to be legally bound" to "instruments 
17 Abbott etc (n 1) 401. ('Concept of Legalization') 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Abbott (n 1) 60. ('Many Faces of Legalization') 
21 Abbott etc (a 1) 408. ('Concept of Legalization'). 
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that explicitly negate any intent to create legal obligations". 22 In between, there are 
obligations with implicit conditions, contingent obligations and escape clauses. The 
article argues that the contrasting legal forms of obligations have distinctive implications 
on their discourse in the international legal system. 23 The breach of unconditional 
obligations may result in other states to "assert legal claims, engage in legal discourse, 
invoke legal procedures and resort to legal remedies". 24 The breach of obligations in non- 
binding instruments, however, can only result in normative claims, normative discourse 
and political resorts. 
The indicator of precision is whether the scope of "reasonable interpretations" can 
25 be narrowed. The more precise a set of rules, the clearer and more unambiguous what is 
expected of states or other actors under particular circumstances. Precision implies not 
only that each rule in the package is clear and unambiguous, but also that the set of rules, 
as a whole, creates a framework within which "coherent and non-contradictory 
interpretations can be carried out in each case". 26 Normally, high precision is represented 
by elaborated "rules" with detailed conditions of application, required or proscribed 
behaviour and a narrow scope of interpretation. Rules which have lower precision range 
from rules with a substantial but limited scope of interpretation, rules contained broader 
areas of discretion, "standards" which are "meaningful only with reference to specific 
situations to rules which are impossible to determine what conduct complies". " It is 
possible that in a highly developed legal system, "precise" rules can be formulated as 
relatively general "standards" without detailed conditions and open to interpretation. 
However, the more "standard-like" a rule, the more ex post interpretations by courts or 
tribunals are needed. To enable "standard-like" rules to be operated as a precise rule, the 
institutional context has to be sufficiently thick to allow courts or tribunals to determine 
the acceptableness of a particular behaviour in a specific situation. 28 
The indicators of delegation describe the extent to which states and other actors 
delegate authority to designated third parties, including courts, arbitrators or 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid, 412. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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administrative organizations, to implement agreements. 29 The most characteristic forms 
of high delegation are third-party dispute resolutions, where "third parties are authorized 
to interpret rules and apply them to a particular set of facts". 30 In this regard, indicators of 
delegation of dispute resolution constitute a spectrum from most highly legalized dispute 
settlement mechanisms where parties agree to binding third-party decisions, to least 
legalized dispute settlement mechanisms which involve political bargaining between 
parties. Yet, the delegation of legal authority is not confined to dispute settlement. It also 
includes the delegation to administrative institutions in elaborating imprecise legal 
norms, implementing agreed rules and facilitating enforcements. The indicators of 
delegation in this respect range from institutions which are authorized to elaborate agreed 
norms and implement them to institutional arrangements purely for the purpose of 
negotiation and consultation. 
In addition to the definition and indicators of each element of legalization, "The 
Concept of Legalization" discussed three central assumptions of this definition of 
legalization. First, each of the three elements is a reflective criterion of different types of 
legalization and can vary independently. For different international institutions, 
legalization can be a continuum that ranges from the absence of law, where none of the 
three elements exists, through various forms of "quasi-" or "soft" legal institutions, to 
"hard" law, in which all three indicators are maximized .31 The special issue takes laws 
and regulations in a highly developed national legal system as the prototypical of hard 
legalization. 32 It argues that while generally speaking international institutions are less 
legalized than institutions in domestic rule-of-law states, most international institutions, 
such as the WTO, can be located in the middle of this continuum. Where to precisely 
locate a particular international institution in the continuum requires a more detailed 
specification of obligation, precision and delegation. Second, three elements of 
legalization characterize the special form of instititionalization in terms of rules and 
procedures, but not in terms of effects. One example discussed in the special issue is that 
although the definition of legalization includes the delegation of legal authority to 
29 Ibid, 413. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid, 402. 
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international courts or the equivalent agencies, the factor "delegation" as described in the 
definition does not include "the degree to which rules are actually implemented or to 
which states comply with them". 33 
This study agrees with these three assumptions of the special issue and takes them as 
the assumptions of the analytical work of this study. 
Thirdly, the special issue understands that the substantive content of rules and the 
degree that rules have been legalized are distinct matters. It argues that as the process of 
legalization does not necessarily bear a normative stance, higher degree of legalization 
may not justify the substantive content of a particular law from a normative standpoint. 
Similarly, although a non-binding declaration could have "exactly the same substantive 
content as a binding treaty", they are very different instruments in terms of legalization. 34 
Based on this definition of legalization, the special issue continues to discuss two 
most prominent features of the legalization process in contemporary world politics, i. e. 
the uneven expansion of legalization and the complicated consequences of legalization. 
The following two sub-sections summarize the discussion of these two features in the 
special issue and present the link between the discussion in the special issue and the 
analytical work of this study. 
2.2 The Uneven Expansion of Legalization 
The expansion of legalization into new domains and the unevenness of that 
expansion is one of the key themes of the special issue. 35 The discussion in the special 
issue has been focusing on two aspects: first, the existence of variations of legalization 
across subject areas and regions and second, the reasons that among available 
institutional forms, legalized institutions are preferred in some circumstances and not in 
others. The two aspects are interrelated in the sense that the existence of variations of 
legalization is in fact a result of the choices governments make under difference 
circumstances. Under the broadly defined functionalist approach promoted by the special 
issue, legalized institutional arrangements will be selected only if they provide "superior 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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net benefits" to governments in comparison to non-legalized or less legalized institutional 
alternatives. 36 
These two aspects of the discussion are however different in the sense that the first 
aspect examines what is the status of legalization, namely the combination of three 
factors of legalization, at a particular point of time in a particular institution, while the 
second aspect explores the rationale behind the choice of the institutional solution at that 
time. 
This study, although agreeing on the general comment that legalization is a complex 
rather than a uniformed process, has no attempt to engage in the discussion of the second 
aspect of the uneven expansion of legalization and approaches the first aspect in a 
different manner. Instead of focusing on the horizontal comparison of the degree of 
legalization among different international/regional institutions, this study exclusively 
depicts the uneven expansion of legalization in different parts of the GATT/WTO at 
different points of time. 
2.3 Consequences of Legalization 
The special issue examines three frequently discussed consequences of legalization 
in International Relations. As summarized in the "Conclusion: The Course and 
Consequence of Legalization", these three consequences are effects of legalization on 
state behaviour, effects of legalization on the evolution of international norms and the 
spread and retrenchment of legalization. 37 Although all three consequences are very 
important in understanding legalization processes across issue-areas and regions, the 
limited scope of this study narrows the focus to the effects of legalization on the 
institution changes of domestic regimes and dispute settlement activities of states. 'Ibis 
study therefore particularly benefits from three articles in the special issue which conduct 
in-depth investigations of the impact of legalization on the international dispute 
38 39 resolution , the mobilization of domestic actors and the change of national policies 
by 
a legalized region institution4o. 
35 Goldstein (n 2) 388. ('Introduction') 
36 Kahler (n 13) 663. ('Conclusion') 
37 Ibid. 
38 Keohane etc (n 15) 457-488. ('Legalized Dispute Resolution') 
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In the article "Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational", 
Keohane, Moravcsik and Slaughter analyze the dynamics of international dispute 
resolution process by constructing two ideal types of legalized dispute resolution, 
interstate and transnational. They examine these two types of legalized dispute resolution 
along the dimensions of independence, access, and embeddedness, and use the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the 
GATTIWTO DSM as examples. 41 They argue that although the contrasting experiences 
of the ICJ and the ECJ suggest "the distinction between the two ideal types appears to be 
associated with variation in the size of dockets and levels of compliance with decisions", 
the experience of the GATT/WTO DSM does not reflect the two ideal types of legalized 
dispute resolution faithfully. 42 Since the caseload of the GATT/VV`T0 DSM and the 
effectiveness of their decisions "increased without higher formal levels of access or 
embeddedness", the GATT/WTO DSM exemplifies, as argued, "legal form does not 
necessarily determine political procesStt. 43 
The article "Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary 
Note" examines another aspect of the consequence of legalization, i. e. "how increases in 
the legalization of the international trade regime interact with the trade-related interests of 
domestic actors". 44 It argues that although it is generally true that increased legalization 
has a positive impact on trade liberalization by "reducing incentives for an individual 
nation to behave opportunistically and renege on trade agreements", certain unintended 
effects of legalization on the activities of domestic economic actors could interfere with 
45 the pursuit of trade liberalization at international level. The authors particularly examine 
three issues which implicated by legalization at international level: firstly, whether 
"greater precision at the time of negotiating treaties changes the incentives of antitrade 
groups to mobilize', 46 ; secondly, whether greater legalization provides the incentives to 
exporters to mobilize in order to maintain agreements already in force; and finally to 
39 Goldstein and Martin (n 10) 603-632. ('Trade Liberalization and Domestic Politics') 
40 Alter (n 6). ('European Union's Legal System and Domestic Policy') 
41 Keohane etc (n 15) 487. ('Legalized Dispute Resolution') 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Goldstein and Martin (n 10) 603. ('Trade Liberalization and Domestic Politics') 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid, 630. 
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what extent a system of highly deterministic penalties on domestic actors. 71be authors 
argue that "the prediction about the effects of changes in the information environment 
varies, depending upon whether we are considering the expansion of trade liberalization 
or compliance with enacted treaties". 47 Therefore, they conclude that it is a need to 
"carefully examine the trend toward increasing legalization, weighting both its benefits 
and its CoStS". 48 They admit that they cannot demonstrate that legalization in the trade 
regime has gone so far to be a threat of trade liberalization, they however wish to make a 
caution note on the potential impact of legalization on the mobilization of domestic 
protectionist groups. 
Finally, Alter's work "The European Union's Legal System and Domestic Policy: 
Spillover or Backlash? " examines how domestic actors utilize the legal system of the 
European Union (EU) to influence national policies of Member States (MSS). 49 She 
argues that by offering a powerful tool, the preliminary reference, to private litigants, EU 
law can be used to force changes in national policies once certain thresholds are met. The 
availability of this European law tool shapes the behaviour and expectations of domestic 
groups. Indeed, it has been observed that private litigants tend to use EU litigation 
strategies "whenever a potential benefit exiStS,,. 50 Consequently, "the pursuit of self- 
interest leads litigants and national courts to challenge national policies and advance 
European integration". 51 In this context, Alter investigates "the factors shaping each step 
of litigation process" and reveals many factors that "keep private litigants and national 
courts from facilitating the expansion of European law". 52 She however also observed 
that "the very factors that have led to the success of the EU legal process in expanding 
and penetrating the national order have provoked national courts and European 
governments to create limits on the legal process and to repatriate powers back to the 
1 53 national level' . As a result, "the dynamic expansion created by the ECJ may well have 
provoked a backlash that contributed to disintegration". 54 
47 Ibid, 63 1. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Alter (n 6) 489-518. ('European Union's Legal System and Domestic Policy') 
50 Ibid, 490. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
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These three articles in the special issue closely relate to the analytical work of this 
study in different ways. The first article provides useful insights on how the institutional 
differences between international courts and tribunals significantly impact on the dispute 
settlement process and, more generally, legalization process. This study, however, 
examines the effects of legalization on state behavior in trade disputes from a different 
perspective. In the WTO system, the DSM is institutionalized by the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), an agreement which is part of the single undertaking of the 
55 Uruguay Round. Once a WTO member chooses to use the WTO DSM to settle a trade 
dispute, the variable of institution is fixed. Hence, other variables, such as obligation and 
precision of the covered agreement to be applied in the dispute settlement process, 
instead of institutional arrangement of the tribunal itself, determine state behavior in a 
trade dispute under the framework of the WTO. This study focuses on these other 
variables, inter alia, the incentives provided by the "legalized" DSM to WTO Members to 
build up legal and institutional capacity to effectively utilize the DSM. 
The discussion of the consequences of legalization at domestic level in this study 
benefits from the analysis in the second and the third article. The second article argues 
"when exporters know that they are likely targets of retaliation, they are more motivated 
to organize in support of the trade regime than those subject to an imprecise threat of 
retaliation". 56 This study agrees with this comment and exemplifies it by examining the 
mobilization of Chinese export-dependent industries in AD cases targeting China. The 
moves of Chinese industries in those AD cases, including pushing their government to 
more effectively utilize the WTO DSM, epiton-dze Goldstein and Martin's argument that 
the rise of legalization which results in "greater precision, better transparency, stronger 
delegation of monitoring and dispute-resolution to centralized organizational agency and 
more certain penalties for rule violation", provides better information to domestic pro- 
trade industries and gives them stronger incentives to mobilize. 57 This study however 
does not particularly address two other issues discussed in the second article, namely the 
55 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (15 April 1994) LTIMA-2/DSfU/I 
httpJ/docsoline. wto. org. ('DSU') 
56 Goldstein and Martin (n 10) 63 1. ('Trade Liberalization and Domestic Politics') 
57 Ibid. 
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impact of increasing legalization on trade negotiations and whether the WTO laws should 
allow more flexibility. 
In the context of the GAT7/WFO system, this study also observes, as Alter does in 
the third article, that the expansion of legalization heavily influenced the evolution of 
domestic systems. Yet, legalization at international level provoked national governments 
and other stakeholders to create various domestic law vehicles to limit the legalization 
process and to retain power at their hands. Nevertheless, the discussion in this study 
cover the impact of legalization on trade legislations, the administration of trade policies 
and the adjudication of trade politics at domestic courts, as exemplified by the EC AD 
regime. The focus of this study is therefore not on a particular legal tool. Instead, it is the 
intention of this study intends to conduct a comprehensive investigation on how 
legalization at international level influences domestic trade policy-making, administration 
and adjudication and the mobilization of domestic groups. 
2.4 A Richer View of Legalization? 
One year after the publication of the special issue, International Organization 
published Finnemore and Toope's article "Alternatives to 'Legalization': Richer Views 
of Law and Politics", in which the authors criticized the theoretical framework promoted 
in the special issue. Finnemore and Toope particularly consider that the theoretical 
framework of legalization is not adequate and useful for two reasons: firstly, "the framers 
of the legalization concept are not explicit, however, about their limited view of law or 
about alternative views of law that might yield different understandings of their cases", 
and secondly, Ahey have not adequately theorized their definition of legalization so as to 
provide clear help to the empirical researchers seeking to apply the concept". 58 This 
section analyzes the criticisms of the theoretical framework and examines whether these 
criticisms undennine the theoretical foundation of the analytical work of this study. 
On the first account, Finnemore and Toope argue that the view of law, as presented 
by the definition of legalization in the special issue, "though important, is limited". In 
their view, in the special issue, "law is constructed primarily through cases and courts, or 
58 M Finnemore and S Toope 'Alternatives to Tegalization': Picher Views of Law and Politics' (2001) 55 
International Organization 743,756. ('Alternatives to Legalization') 
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through formal treaty negotiation" and "the processes of law are viewed overwhelmingly 
as processes of dispute resolution, mostly within formal institutionalized contexts". 59 To 
further elaborate their arguments, the authors discuss '1hree interrelated features of 
international law neglected in the volume", namely custom, defining characteristics of 
law and law as process. 60 They first claim that the narrow framing of legalization fails to 
engage in customary international law completely. 6 1 They also argue that since imprecise 
norms and the absence of delegation are found in a number of well-established areas of 
international law, to select precision and delegation as the defining characteristics of 
legalization is problematic. 62 Moreover, the special issue did not explore the relationship 
among the three characteristics of legalization. Finally, the authors criticize the way the 
special issue treated law, which "equates legalization with three features of the form of an 
artefact' 'and claim that "law, and by implication legalization, may be more about process 
than about form or prodUCf '. 63 
To demonstrate their second criticism, Finnemore and Toope analyze three articles 
in the special issue which apply the concept of legalization to different issue-areas and 
conclude that "the concept provides little help to these researchers, not only because it 
contains a narrow notion of law but also because it is inadequately theorized". 64 
Although this study agrees with Finnemore and Toope's general comment that the 
specific legalization phenomenon analyzed in the special issue is among law's many 
influences in politics and this formalized legalization "interacts with other work law does 
in the world", it disagrees with them that by focusing on formal institutions, the 
theoretical framework in the special issue cannot be helpful to empirical researches. 
Moreover, this study considers that the points raised by them are either not relevant to the 
analytical work of this study or have been addressed in this study. 
This study sets the limited scope of its discussion from the outset, namely it analyzes 
only the special form of institutionalization presented by the GATT/WTO and focus 
exclusively on the development of formal institutions in the trade regime. It never denies 
59 Ibid 745. 
60 Ibid 746 - 75 1. 61 Ibid 746. 
62 Ibid 747. 
153 Ibid. 
64 Ibid, 75 1. 
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that the evolution of the trade regime does not limit on the formalized and 
institutionalized developments, yet it considers this special form of institutionalization is 
one of the most important features of the trade regime and worth an in-depth research. 
This is the reason that this study situates itself in the broader debate of 
"consfitutionalization" of the WFO, but at the same time distinguishes itself from other 
works in the debate. 
With respect to three interrelated feature of international law analyzed by Finnemore 
and Toope, they are either not relevant to this study or have been properly addressed in 
this study. First, given the special institutional settings of the GATr/WTO, customary 
international law does not play a role in the institutionalization of the trade regime. 
Second, precision and delegation are important characters of the GATT/WTO rule and it 
is justified to include them as indicative variables in analysing the WTO system. 
Moreover, this study considers the definition and indicators of obligation in the special 
issue properly captures the features of obligation in the GATT/WTO system. It may be 
true that there are other dimensions of obligation in general international law theory as 
Finnemore and Toope argued. This study, however, limits its scope of discussion from 
the very beginning and states that it is not engaging in normative debates, including 
legitimacy. 
Finally, this study addresses the relationship among three factors of legalization as 
part of the discussion concerning the uneven expansion of legalization in the 
GATTIWTO. It also examines the dynamic process of legalization in the GATT/WTO 
system from a historical perspective. It disagrees with Finnemore and Toope that the 
theoretical framework of legalization, by focusing on forms, is less useful to explain 
changes . 
65 To the contrary, in the context of the GATT/WTO, the theoretical framework 
of legalization is helpful since it facilitates empirical researches by providing an effective 
way to describe process, namely to identify the value of three factors of legalization at a 
particular point of time and enabling meaningful comparisons between the status of 
legalization over a period of time . This study considers that an abstract description of the 
process is not sufficient if there is no theoretical framework to allocate values to variables 
and provide a reference system to cross-examine variables over a period of time. 
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In sum, the criticisms raised by Finnemore and Toope indeed provide another 
perspective to explore the broader interaction between law and politics. Nevertheless, 
their particular arguments and criticisms are either not relevant to this study or have been 
properly addressed in this study. These criticisms therefore do not have an impact on the 
analytical work of this study. 
3. Applying Legalization in the WTO System 
3.1 Elements of Legalization in the WTO 
This section adopts the definition of legalization setting out in the previous section 
to analyze the WrO system by examining the status of three factors of legalization in the 
WTO system. 
Obligation 
Obligation refers to norms set in all WTO agreements, agreed Understandings and 
other binding documents, such as the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations. The WTO 
treaty system is generally described as highly legalized and closely resembles a modem 
municipal legal system since it has a comprehensive collection of legally binding primary 
rules. 66 However, if considering the indicators of obligation in the previous section, wide 
variations between WrO obligations can be identified. Despite the fact that all WTO 
obligations are legally binding, the collection of WTO obligations constitutes a full 
continuum of obligations, ranging from specific and unconditional obligations which 
require or prohibit certain behaviour of national authorities, to general principles which 
may tolerate divergent practices of WTO Members. Thus, it is impossible not only to 
characterize the features of obligations in different WTO agreements, but also to 
characterize the obligations with different natures in the same covered agreement. An 
analysis of obligations in the WTO therefore has to be not only sector-specific, but also 
provision specific, as to be presented in the analysis of obligations in the Anti-dumping 
Agreement (ADA) in Chapter IV below. 
65 lbid 750. 
66 Ibid 466. The author noted that by any means, the WTO is one of the most comprehensive collections of primary 
obligations existing in the field of public international law. 
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Precision 
Precision in the context of the WrO measures not only the clarity of the wording of 
related WTO agreements, but also to which extent that the WrO rules narrow down the 
scope of reasonable interpretations by requiring (or prohibiting) specific actions by WTO 
Members. Many claim that lack of precision of many WI70 rules leaves a wide range of 
latitude enjoyed by national trade authorities in acquiescing to or, on the contrary, 
rejecting a specific WTO rule in both formal and informal means. 67 
One explanation provided by existing works is that the decision-making approach of 
the WTO is the root reason for this. The "legislative branch" of the WTO is its 
membership, taking decision on all matters and acting by consensus. The nature of such a 
broad decision-making power of the plenary organ decides that "rules made through it 
can only be the compromise between parties and lack of extensive certainty'9.68 
This study agrees with this observation since it is largely confirmed by the evolution 
of AD rules in the GATT/WTO. As to be elaborated in below Chapter IV, one of the key 
reasons that many provisions in the ADA are lack of precision and unable to cover sharp 
differences among national practices is that the text of ADA is a result of comprises. 
Trading partners with different agendas put together the text of ADA at the last minute as 
part of the Uruguay Round bargaining. 69 It is therefore not surprising that the text of the 
ADA, although fairly detailed, does not achieve high precision in the sense that a large 
number of provisions does not narrow the scope of reasonable interpretations. 
Delegation 
Delegation in this study reflects the willingness of WrO Members to delegate 
authority to designated WTO institutions to implement agreements and solve trade 
dispute. It first refers to the acceptance of the quasi-judicial dispute settlement 
mechanism (DSM). It also refers to the acceptance of the activities of other regulatory 
67 J Gathii 'Insulating Domestic Policy Through International Legal Minimalism: A Re-characterization of the Foreign 
Affairs Trade Doctrine' (2004) 25 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 1,105. 
('Insulating Domestic Policy') 
61 P Kuijper 'Some Institutional Issues Presently Before the WTO', at D Kennedy and J Southwick (eds) The Political 
Economy of International Trade Law --- Essays in Honour of Robert E. Hudec (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 82. 
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agencies and administrative bodies of the WTO, such as activities of the WTO 
Secretariats and the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB). 70 
With respect to delegation to the DSM, WTO Members treat it with extreme caution 
and clearly distinguish rule interpretation from dispute resolution. In terms of dispute 
resolution, the DSM enjoys high level of delegation as expressed in Article I of the 
DSU. 71 Nevertheless, when it comes to interpret WTO law, delegation conferred to the 
DSM is restricted. Although the DSM made a lot of efforts in interpreting WTO law, it 
has to restrict itself and limit the effect of its interpretations to a specific dispute. 72 
The capacity of other WTO bodies to interpret WTO rules is also restricted. An 
example can be found in the TPRM, where the TPRB are strictly forbidden to amend or 
interpret WI70 obligations. Nevertheless, although without explicit delegation, WTO 
bodies and trade diplomats are making their own contributions to the WTO rule 
interpretation through their day-to-day activities. Also, the WTO Secretariat produced a 
large number of soft law-like publications to guide the interpretation and application of 
VVTO rules, such as the WTO Analytical Index. 73 Although not legally binding, activities 
of WTO bodies promote uniform understanding of WTO norms and are influential to 
national trade policies and later VVTO dispute settlement cases. 74 
In addition to the limited scope of delegation conferred to the DSM and 
administrative bodies of the WTO in terms of rule interpretation, it is also observed that 
there is no parallel delegation of rule interpretation to political organs of the WTO . 
75 'Ibis 
study agrees with this observation and considers that examples can be found in the AD 
regime where significant controversies are caused by the tension between activities of the 
69 For more details on GATT negotiations, T Steward (ed) The GAI"T Uruguay Round. A Negotiation History 1986- 
1992, Volume IL Commentary (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishing, Deventer, 1992). 
70 For the details of the role and activities of the WTO Secretariat, see H Nordstrom 'The World Trade Organization 
Secretariat in a Change World' (2005) 39 JWT 819. ('The WTO Secretariat') 
71 DSU (n 55) Art 1. 
72 For example, D Blackmore 'Eradicating the Long Standing Existence of a No-precedent Rule in International Trade 
Law - Looking Towards Stare Decisis in WTO Dispute Settlement', (2004) 29 North Carolina Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 487 ('Towards Stare Decisis in WTO Dispute Settlement') More recently and from a different 
erspective, J Trachtman 'Regulatory Jurisdiction and the WTO' (2007) 10 JIEL 63 1. ('Regulatory Jurisdiction') 
3 The WTO Analytical Index is regarded as the authoritative guide to the interpretation and application of findings and 
decisions of WTO panels, the WTO Appellate Body and other WTO bodies. See, WTO Website, 
httl27//www. wto. orp-/en2lish/res e/booksp elanalytic index e/analytic index e. htm (visited 15 Oct 2004) 
74 Ibid. 
75 C Ehlermann and L Ehring 'Decision-making in the World Trade Organization - Is the Consensus Practice of the 
World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade? ' (2005) 
JIEL 5 1. 
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DSM and the negotiation forum. Take "zeroing" as an example. Despite having a series 
of Panel and the AB reports ruled that "zeroing" was WTO-inconsistent in a number of 
specific investigations (both original investigations and reviews), Article 2.4.3.3 of the 
draft Consolidated Texts on Anti-dumping and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
circulated by the Chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules ("the Chair's text) allows the 
76 utilization of zeroing under certain circumstances. The reactions of WTO Members are 
mixed. On the one hand, the US, by criticizing the panels and the AB's interpretative 
approach on "zeroing" cases, publicly expressed it view that zeroing is "allowable under 
current global trade rules, penned in the 1994 Uruguay Round accord, " and "has 
signalled that any agreement emerging from the six-year-old Doha Round of talks must 
recognise its validity". 77 On the other hand, officials from countries which are frequent 
targets of AD measures warned that the Chair's text which "reinstate zeroing and reverse 
the earlier WTO rulings" posed a major challenge to the organization's dispute settlement 
system and could undermine its credibility". 78 This example illustrates that delegation in 
terms of rule interpretation in the WTO is limited, although by contrast, delegation in 
terms of dispute resolution is high. 
3.2 Uneven Expansion of Legalization in the WTO 
Although the GATT/WTO system is originated from a single undertaking and 
commonly regarded as a uniform global regulatory infrastructure, as the system 
expanded, a close look shows that three elements of legalization differentiate among 
different parts of the WTO. This section, by describing the current status of each factor of 
legalization in different parts of the WTO, intends to demonstrate that although the rise of 
legalization is generally observed, the expansion of legalization in different parts of the 
WTO is uneven and imbalanced. The uneven expansion of legalization may explain the 
widely observed long-lasting tension between the diplomatic negotiation and the 
76 Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and SCMAgreements, TN/RLIW/213,30 November 2007, available at 
http: //www. wto, orpJcnglish/tratop c/rulcsncg c/rules chair text novQ7 e. htm (last visited 10 May 2008) 
77 ., U. S. import penalties new problem for WTO pact", Reuters, 12 December 2007, available at 
http: //in. reuters. com/articletbusinessNews/l*dINIndia-30957720071212? pageNumber--I&virtua]BrandChannel--O (last 
visited 5 May 2008) 
78 BNA International Trade Reporter "WTO Members Discuss Services Conference; Doha Rules Chair Promises New 
Revised Text", 20 March 2008, available at 
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operation of legalized multilateral institutions, which has not disappeared even with a 
complicated legal system in place. 79 
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As shown on Chart 1, three parts are covered under the roof of the WTO, which 
function relatively independently. The WTO is at first a decision-making mechanism, 
where trade negotiators "bargain in the procedural context to achieve certain kind of 
httD: //Dubs. bna. co AllView/259EI C65883BD6B 1852574110071 BOE8? Oven&hi2 
h1i6t=ZEROING (last visited 5 May 2008) 
79 Many prominent observers in particular expressed their concerns about the tension between the (quasi-judicial) 
dispute settlement process and the diplomatic and treaty-making activities of the WTO. Legalization in this study, 
however, refers to a process which includes, but not limited ot4 the evolution of the dispute settlement process, as to be 
discussed in later chapters. For comments on the tension between the dispute settlement process and treaty-making, C 
Ehlermann 'Tensions Between the Dispute Settlement Process and the Diplomatic and Treaty-making Activities of the 
WTO 1 (2002) 1 World Trade Review 301. 
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compromises". 80 The WrO is also a locus of surveillance activities, aiming to oversee 
the implementation and operation of the VY70 agreements already on the book. 81 Finally, 
the WTO provides a quasi-judicial DSM to its Members, which results in "centrally 
authorized sanctions against recalcitrant violators of the multilateral trade agreementS". 82 
Based on the definition with three elements, namely obligation, precision and 
delegation, a simple (if not overly simple) chart is constructed to demonstrate the status 
of legalization in different parts of the WFO. One of the two values, High or Low, is 
assigned to each component, as shown in Chart 2. The value of "high" or "low" refers to 
two extremes of the legalization spectrum. High value is typically represented in most 
advanced domestic legal systems; while low value can normally be found in a system 
with loose rules and institutions, such as the traditional international law system. 
Decision-making Surveillance Adjudication 
Obligation Low Low High 
Precision Low High High 
Delegation Low Low High 
Unart 2 Different Factors of Legalization in Different Parts of the WTO 
The first and foremost part of the WTO is its decision-making body, with a 
negotiation forum as its centerpiece. The negotiation forum is formally the resource of all 
WTO rules. As an institution of barter, it is analogized as a private market, a place where 
states "trade" their regulator power towards international trade. 83 In this multilateral 
"market", low legalization is observed - with no tight obligation, no precise rules and no 
third-party delegation, it represents the lowest level of legalization of the spectrum. 
The above observation, however, does not necessarily mean that there is no formal 
procedure in the WIO negotiations. Three provisions in the Marrakesh Agreement 
80 R Steinberg 'In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO' 
(2002) 56 International Organization 339. ('Consensus-based Bargaining and Outcomes') 
" Nordstrom (n 70) 819. ('The WTO Secretariat') The term "surveillance" is used to in a different context of dispute 
settlement in some literatures. Here it refers to the professional activities conducted mainly by the WTO Secretariat. 
82 W Schwartz and A Sykes 'The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade 
Organization' (2002) 31 Journal of Legal Study S 179, S 179. ('Economic Structure of Renegotiation') 
83 J Dunoff and J Trachtman 'Economic Analysis of International Law' (1999) 24 The Yale Journal of International 
Law 1,14. ('Econornic Analysis of International Law') 
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establishing the World Trade Organization (the WTO Agreement) formulate rules for this 
negotiation forum, namely Art IX Decision-making, Art X Amendments and Art XII 
Accession. 84 Those provisions stipulate that the principle of WTO decision-making is by 
consensus; if consensus cannot be reached, the issue can be decided by voting. Each 
member of the WTO has an equal vote in decision-making. 
Voting is, however, not used in practice, as widely observed. 85 As argued, powerful 
parties have simultaneously dominated bargaining outcomes and supported the consensus 
86 decision-making rule. Hence, the WTO largely inherited the paradoxical practice of 
GATT decision-making --- the coexistence of "Green Room" practice and the consensus 
principle. 87 It is observed that only when a deal has emerged in the Green Room 
meetings between major countries and a representative set of developing countries, it 
would then be submitted to the whole WTO membership for discussion. Therefore, the 
assessment of obligation and precision of the decision-making mechanism cannot rely on 
the provisions of the WTO Agreement. Rather, the practice of the WTO to date supports 
the "low" mark of obligation and precision in this part. 
The rule of delegation in the WTO decision-making is laid out by Art IX paragraph 
2 of the WTO Agreement, which explicit imposes the "exclusive authority to adopt 
interpretations" to intergovernmental institutions - Ministerial Conference and the 
General Council. 88 In Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate Body (AB) re- 
emphasized the exclusive authority of the Ministerial Conference and the General 
Council on decision-making, by refusing the Panel's finding that panel reports adopted 
by the DSB constituted "subsequent practice" within the meaning of Art 31 of VCLT. 89 
In doing so, the AB confirmed that in terms of decision-making, no delegation to the 
third party exists. 
94 NffO Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, LT/URIA12,15 April 1994 ('The WTO 
Agreement'). 
85 B Hoekman and M Kostechi The Political Economy of the World Trading System -- The WTO and Beyond (2d edn) 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) 58. ('The Political Economy of Trading System') Also, Nordstrom (n 70) 821. 
('The WTO Secretariat') 
86 Steinberg (n 80) 365. ('In the Shadow of Law or Power') 
17 Hoekman and Kostechi (n 85) 61. ('The Political Economy of Trading System')The "Green Room" is originally a 
conference room adjacent to the Director-General's office. Later, Green Room meetings referred to a consultative 
process of a small group of diplomats from major countries and a representative set of developing countries, which 
tried to hammer out the outlines of acceptable proposals or negotiating agendas. 
88 WTO Agreement (n 84) Article IX 
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The second part of the WTO system is its surveillance mechanisms, represented by 
Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). Labeled as "low" in obligation and delegation 
but "high" in precision, this part of the WTO abstains from creating new obligations or 
delegating legal authority. Trade technocrats, however, intend to employ those "soft" 
mechanisms to improve the transparency of national trade policy and induce compliance 
of the GATT/WTO rules. 
Annex 3 of the WTO Agreement sets the rules for the TPRM, stipulating the 
mission of TPRM, the reporting obligation of the governments and the procedure of 
reviews. 90 There is little doubt that precision of the TPRM can be marked as "high" given 
the sufficient elaboration of the rules, yet its delegation and obligation can only be 
marked as "low". The TPRM, as stated by Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB), "had been 
conceived as a policy exercise and it was therefore not intended to serve as a basis for the 
enforcement of specific WTO obligations or for dispute settlement procedures, or to 
impose new policy commitments of Members". 91 It is not the mandate of the TPRB to 
either make or enforce VV`TO rules. The obligation of Members under the TPRM is to 
report their trade policies, while the change of those inconsistent trade policies is only 
voluntary. The TPRM is therefore in the intermediate zone along the spectrum: low 
obligation, low delegation but high precision. 
The third part of the WTO system is its adjudicatory system. The WTO DSM 
significantly differentiates with other international tribunals and dispute settlement 
regimes in that it is "to a large extent similar with the court in domestic law with 
compulsory jurisdiction and clear procedural rules". 92 It reaches the "high" end of the 
spectrum in all three factors. 
Obligation in the DSM was covered by the DSU, a comprehensive instrument 
93 dealing with all aspects of the process. Not only is the DSU binding to WTO Members, 
the panel or the AB reports adopted by the DSB are also binding on parties of a dispute. 
In this sense, the value of obligation of DSM is "high", even the panel or AB reports have 
89 WTO Japan -Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/R, WTIDSIO/R, WT/DS I I/R, as modified by the AB report, 
WT/DS8/AB/R, Wr/DSIO/AB/R, WT/DSII/AB/R, para 132. 
90 WTO Annex 3 Trade Policy Review Mechanism, LTIUR/A-3nTR/l. 15 April 1994. ('TPRM') 
91 WTO Report of TPRB to the Third Ministerial Conference, WTIMIN (99) 2,8 October 1999, para 3. 
"' A Schneider 'Getting Along: The Evolution of Dispute Resolution Regimes in International Trade Organizations' 
(1999) 20 Michigan Journal of International Law 697,719. ('Evolution of Dispute Resolution') 
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no precedent status. With 27 articles, precision of the DSU is also undoubtedly "high", 
particularly in terms of procedural rules. 
The issue of delegation in the DSM is more complex as mentioned in the previous 
section. On the one hand, all WTO Members accepted the delegation of the DSB in term 
of settling a particular dispute. To what extent that the DSB is delegated to produce 
legally binding interpretation of WTO law is a contested issue, on the other hand. WTO 
Members showed a certain degree of reluctance to empower the DSB to produce binding 
interpretations in the process of dispute settlement. One of the evidence is that there is no 
stare decisis in the WTO dispute settlement. Nevertheless, it is still fair to conclude that 
the DSM represents the highest level of legalization in the whole WTO system. 
In conclusion, the above discussion illustrates that the level of legalization in 
different parts of the WTO is not uniformed and the expansion of legalization is uneven. 
This important feature of legalization process may provide the answer to the question 
why the emergence of a complicated legal system cannot wipe away the tension between 
different parts of the GATTIWTO. 94 
3.3 Consequences of Legalization in the WTO 
3.3.1 "Legalizing" National Trade Policy in the GATT/WTO System 
The first consequence of legalization explored by this study is the impact of 
legalization in the trade regime on national trade policies. When the GATT/WTO has 
evolved away from its origins as a decentralized and relatively powerless institution and 
become a legal entity, the formalized interaction between the rise of legalization at 
international level and domestic systems became apparent. 95 Considering the impact of 
legalization in multilateral framework on national trade policy outcomes, a two-way 
process can be identified: on the one hand, examples where the gradually "legalized" 
multilateral system constraints on national policy choices are more and more easily to be 
pointed, and on the other hand, domestic actors are increasingly mobilized to utilize 
93 DSU (n 55). 
94 P Sutherland etc 'The Future of the W`TO - Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium', Report by 
the Consultative Board to the former Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, 2005, < 
http: //www. wto. orgLenelish/thewto e/lOanniv elfuture-wto e. htrn> (accessed at 31 July 2006), 10. ('The Future of the 
WTO') 
95 Goldstein and Martin (n 10) 603. ('Trade Liberalization and Domestic Politics') 
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domestic laws or create domestic legal vehicles to limit the impact of legalization on 
domestic systems and protect their interests. The rise of legalization therefore has both 
intended and unintended effect on domestic trade policies due to the uncertain economic 
and political environment at domestic level. Again, given the difficulty to generalize the 
intended and unintended effects of the rise of legalization in all subject areas, this section 
limits itself to provide certain general remarks which has to be read together with the 
empirical study of EC AD regime in Chapter V below. It also has to be noted that the 
discussions in this section draw certain ideas from the special issue as discussed in the 
previous section, it however does not follow the line of argument in any particular article 
in the special issue. 
As well-argued in the special issue, one most noticeable consequence of legalization 
in the trade regime is increased obligation. The intended effect of this change is to 
"expand the breadth of the trade regime" and to "enhance compliance so as to increase 
the benefit of membership by using a discourse focusing on rules, their applicability and 
exceptions, rather than on intereStS,, 96 An illustrative example in this regard is that major 
trading partners, through different domestic legal vehicles, transposed The WTO 
agreements to their domestic systems. 
Yet, increased obligation, frequently joined by greater precision and stronger 
delegation, has unintended effects on domestic policies. While higher level of obligation 
imposes pressure on domestic systems to be consistent with precise WTO obligations and 
deters opportunism of a WTO Member, there are strong incentives for domestic actors to 
create certain vehicles which can be generally refer to as "W"FO-plus" rules to balance 
interests of different domestic groups and retain the power to deal with economic 
uncertainty at the hands of national authorities. 
Similarly, increased precision has both intended and unintended effects on domestic 
systems. Greater predictability and transparency are typically associated with the 
intended effects of the improvement of precision. Nevertheless, the higher degree of 
precision also affects the behaviour of domestic protectionist groups, by increasing 
information available to them. 97 Hence, increasing rule precision has two different, and 
96 Ibid. 605 and 619. 
97 Ibid, 606. 
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competing, effects. Increased transparency can undermine trade liberalization movements 
by activating import-competing groups in importing WTO Members. Conversely, precise 
rules may also result in more trade liberalization by activating exports groups in 
exporting countries. 
The unintended effects of stronger delegation, namely "a system of highly 
deterministic penalties", have the same logic with tight obligation: "too little enforcement 
may encourage opportunism; but too much may backfire, undermining the ability of 
domestic actors to find support for an open policy", as argued by Goldstein and Martin. 99 
The above arguments are well illustrated in the evolution of the EC AD regime. On 
the one hand, it is the most striking trend of the evolution of EC Trade Defence 
Instruments (TDIs) that they are essentially repeating basic principles of The WTO 
agreements and using similar vocabulary with WTO rules in the majority of provisions. 
Nevertheless, a number of WTO-plus provisions, such as injury margin, the Community 
interest, anti-circumvention and Non-market Economy Treatment, institutionalize the 
discretion of the Community institutions and allow them the flexibility to deal with 
economy uncertainties in the EU. An analysis of the WTO-plus provisions of the EC AD 
instruments suggests that there are two common features of these legal tools: first, they 
are developed in the areas where no precise WTO rule exists (or no rule at all); and 
second, these rules can change the outcomes of specific cases. One example is that in 
case where both injury and dumping have been found, the Commission can still propose 
to terminate the investigation and not to impose the AD duty on the ground of the 
Community interest. Chapter V below analyzes both the WTO-transposed and WFO-plus 
provisions of the EC AD laws and provides more details of the practice of the EC 
institutions, with a view to demonstrating both the intended and unintended effects of 
legalization. 
3.3.2 Building up Legal Capacity to Utilise the DSM 
In addition to formal institutionalized interaction between the legalization process 
of the GATT/WTO and domestic systems, this study examines another consequence of 
"legalizing" the trade regime, namely the impact of legalisation on the utilization of the 
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DSM to strategically advanc a WTO Member's trade claims, a consequence of 
legalization which has not been extensively addressed in the special issue. 99 
The rise of legalization in the GATT/WTO makes the DSM an adjudication site 
which is "generally able to enforce, in an economically and politically meaningful way, 
rulings sufficient to compel a violating party to reform its act or omission". 100 Strong 
incentives are provide for WTO Members to utilise this mechanism to strategically 
protect its trade rights or advance their trade interests. As well documented in the 
literature, more and more WTO Members realized that "the legal rules in the treaties and 
agreements overseen by the WTO can be turned into instruments of power and means of 
persuasion against others in a legitimate way". 101 Given the growing interests at stake, 
scholars argue that WTO Members, such as Japan and Korea, are embracing "aggressive 
legalisie' - "a conscious strategy where a substantive set of international legal rules can 
be made to serve as both 'shield' and 'sword' in trade disputes among sovereign 
states". 102 
It is, however, not an easy task to effectively utilise the WI70 DSM. WTO Members 
must have sufficient legal and institutional capacity to be able to make the full use of the 
DSM. It is observed that "[W]ith more rigorous disciplines and a growing body of 
jurisprudence, the dispute settlement system has however become significantly more 
legalistic and consequently more arduous to navigate'. 103 In order for a WTO Member to 
use the DSM effectively, it must "develop cost-effective mechanisms to perceive injuries 
to its trading prospects, identify who is responsible, and mobilize resources to bring a 
legal claim or negotiate a favourable settlement". 104 In other words, even when a WTO 
Member is aware that it has sufficient legal grounds to act in the DSM, this awareness 
98 Ibid 63 1. 
99 Legal capacity has been defined as a state's ability to identify violations of its right under the WTO. For recent 
literature, for example G Shaffer 'The Challenges of WTO Law: Strategies for Developing Country Adaptation' (2006) 
World Trade Review 177,178 ('Challenges of WTO Law'); and T Walsh 'Dispute Settlement at the World Trade 
Organization: Do Municipal Laws Promoting Private Party Identification of Trade Disputes Affect State 
Participation? " (2006) 40 JWT 889. ('DS at the WTO') 
10() H Nordstrom and G Shaffer 'Access to Justice in the World Trade Organization: The Case for a Small Claims 
Procedure -A Preliminary Analysis' ICTSD Issue Paper No. 2, June 2007, Forward. ('Access to Justice') 101 S Pekkanen 'Aggressive Legalism: The Rules of the WTO and Japan's Emerging Trade Strategy' (2001) 24 The 
World Economy 707,708. ('Aggressive Legalism') 
102 Ibid. For Korean experience, D Alin 'Korea on the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement. System: Legal Battles for 
Economic Development' (2003) 6 BEL 598. ('Korea on the GATT/WTO DSS') 
"' Nordstrom and Shaffer (n 100) Forward. ('Access to Justice') 
104 Shaffer (n 99) 178. ('Challenges of WTO Law') 
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will not be "automatically transformed into the invocation of formal panel procedure". 105 
The decision to start the formal DSM procedure can only be made under the condition 
that a VY70 Member is confident that its claim is worth pursuing in light of its capacity to 
elaborate the law, litigation cost, possible remedies and associated political risks. In other 
words, a decision to pursue a particular case in the DSM involves both institutional 
resources and legal capacity of a WTO Member. 
The progress of legalization in GATr/WTO system has impacts on both institutional 
and legal capacity building of WTO Members. This study, from two aspects, analyzes 
how the legalization process provides incentives for a WTO member to build up 
institutional and legal capacity to utilize the DSM, namely the capability to mobilize 
domestic resources for WTO complaints and the capacity to elaborate the law and to 
advance trade claims in the circumstances where the degree of obligation and precision of 
the provisions in the corresponding covered agreements which are expected to be applied 
in the dispute is low. The two factors can be referred to as "engaging the private sector" 
and "litigating the unlitigatable". 
The mobilization of domestic interest groups enters into the discussion of the 
institutional capacity building since the process of legalization "entails a process of 
increased precision of rules and transparency of agreements" and therefore it "affects the 
behaviour of domestic groups by increasing the information available to actors about the 
distributional implications of trade agreements". 106 Scholars therefore argue that well- 
placed private actors have more incentives, under a more legalized DSM, to actively 
engage in the WTO litigation process which is traditionally dominated by public 
actors. 107 The emerging public-private network in trade disputes, as observed by many, 
brought together private enterprises, their lawyers and public officials by structure 
changes at international level, namely the move to higher level of legalization in the 
GATT[WTO, and pressure at domestic level, i. e. "firms more aggressively demanding 
the removal of foreign trade barriers in a globalising economy". 108 As a result, it is 
105 Ibid. 179. 
106 Goldstein and Martin (n 10) 606. ('Trade Liberalization and Domestic Politics') 
107 G Shaffer 'What's New in EU Trade Dispute Settlement? Judicialisation, Public-private Networks and the WTO 
Legal Ordee (2006) 13 Journal of European Public Policy 832,832. ('Public-private Networký) 
log G Shaffer 'Behind the Curtains of International Trade Dispute', for a book on Changing Patterns of Authority in the 
Global Political Economy, 6, available at httj2: //www. law. harvard. edu/students/0rjzs/hela/i)at)ers/ýub-12fiv-teubineen- 
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considered that one of the key reasons for major trading partners, such as the EC and the 
US, to be successful in the DSM is that they "fostered the development of a reflex within 
their export sectors to assist them in investigating claims and building factual and legal 
cases in order to enforce their trading rights through the DSM". 109 
With respect to legal capacity building, to litigate unlifigatable, or in other words, to 
sufficiently elaborate WTO law and bring claims in areas where the level of obligation or 
precision are low, is one of the most important dimensions of legal capacity of a WTO 
Member. This study consider that the frequent utilisation of the DSM is not only due to a 
higher degree of delegation, as commonly understood, but also closely related to the 
higher level of obligation and precision in covered agreements. The reason that the level 
of obligation or precision in particular provisions of covered agreement has an impact on 
state behaviour in trade disputes is simply: since WTO litigations involve huge amount of 
resources and are associated with high political risks, a WTO Member has to accurately 
access the legal merits of a particular claim before taking any initiative to challenge 
foreign trade barriers. To a large extent, to be able to access what might be a winning 
claim in the WTO DSM and to focus on the winning claims instead of wasting time and 
resources on losing claims signals the maturity of a WTO Member in terms of the 
utilization of the DSM. 
With the development of legalization in the GATT/WTO as a whole, WTO 
Members made efforts to bring claims which used to be without "good" textual bases in 
the covered agreements and ask the panel or the AB to evaluate the WrO-consistency of 
particular domestic methodologies or policies, when the level of obligation or precision 
of relevant provisions in the covered agreement has changed. 
A typical example in this regard is the series of "zeroing" cases. Before India 
110 challenged "zeroing" methodology in EC - Bed Linen , zeroing has already been 
new. doc (last access 6 July 2008) For general discussion on national procedures engaging private actors to identify 
foreign trade barriers, see Walsh (n 99). 
109 Shaffer (n 99) 185. ('Challenges of WTO Law') 
110 WTO European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India - Report of 
the Panel (Part 1,2 and 3) (30 October 2000)WT/DS 14 1/11 and WTO European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on 
imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India - AB-2000-13 - Report of the Appellate Body (I March 2001) 
WT/DS 141/AB/R. (EC- Bed Linen, Panel and AB reports) 
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challenged by Japan in EC - Audio Cassette"' unsuccessfully. Although in EC - Audio 
Cassette, the Panel did not preclude that the EC methodology might in certain cases be 
inconsistent with the 1979 Code, it nevertheless concluded that the EC's practice, namely 
not to take negative dumping into account, was not inconsistent with the 1979 Code in 
that case. 112 
India, under the WTO ADA, successfully challenged the EC's zeroing methodology 
in EC - Bed Linen case. Part of India's success can be attributed to its effective advocacy 
strategy, namely in constructing its zeroing arguments, India did not simply assert that 
every aspects of "zeroing" practice are against "fair comparison" and therefore WFO 
inconsistent. For example, India did not challenge the EC's determination of different 
models of the like product and acknowledged that comparisons for individual product 
types within a single like product are appropriate in the context of an AD investigation 
and the weighted average normal value and weighted average export price for each model 
at issue in this case were properly calculated by the EC. 1 13 Instead, India pinpointed the 
exact practice of the Commission which is alleged to be WrO-inconsistent. 
India's successful challenge of zeroing, however, also in part benefits from the 
improvement of Precision of Article 2.4.2 of the ADA. The wording of Article 2.4.2 
ADA is more precise than the equivalent provision in the 1979 Code, which was the legal 
basis of Japan's challenge in EC-Audio Cassette. It is still controversial whether Article 
2.4.2 of the ADA disallows all forms of zeroing in AD investigations, it is nevertheless 
clear that the panels and the AB considered that the Article 2.4.2 is precise enough to 
serve as the legal basis to challenge the zeroing practice in EC-Bed Linen and the 
following cases. 
This study chooses China as the subject of its empirical study to exemplify the 
effects of legalization on the utilization of the DSM on two grounds: first, as the most 
frequent target of AD investigations worldwide by far, China's utilization (or absence of 
utilization) of the WTO DSM to advance its AD agenda is an important dimension of the 
consequence of legalization in this subject area. Second, AD investigations against 
111 GA'17 European Community-Anti-dumping Duties on Audio Tapes in Cassettes Originating in Japan - Report of 
the Panel (28 April 1995) ADPI136 (unadopted). (EC-Audio Cassette) 
112 lbid, para 366. 
1" EC- Bed Linen (n I 10) footnote 45. 
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Chinese products are governed by special rules of Non-market Economy (NME) in 
China's Accession Protocol, which were vaguely drafted and have low level of 
legalization. China's efforts to litigate NME therefore illustrate the strong incentives 
provided by the legalization process, whilst indicating the limitations of legalization. 
Conclusion 
This chapter provides a theoretical description of the rise of legalization in the trade 
regime and the complicated consequences of legalization. It first sketches the concept of 
legalization in the International Relations and summarizes the discussions in the special 
issue concerning the uneven expansion of legalization and its complicated consequences. 
It then applies the theory of legalization to analyze the GATF/WTO by providing a 
general account of the status of three factors of legalization in the WTO system and 
discusses the uneven expansion of legalization in the GAIT/WTO. It also discusses two 
consequences of legalization, namely "legalizing" national trade policies in the 
GATT/WTO system and legal capacity building to utilise the DSM, to provide theoretical 
foundations for the discussion in the chapters below. 
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Chapter IH The Rise of Legalization in the Multilateral AD 
Framework 
1. Introduction 
The WTO system effectively inherited the architecture and "legalized" management 
approach of the GATT system. To better understand the dynamic legalization process in 
the trade regime, it is necessary to trace back how the GATT/WTO system has evolved 
from a loose, shortsighted "diplomatic" treaty network to a "legalized" multilateral 
framework in terms of both formal rules and daily operations. 
This chapter intends to demonstrate, from a historical perspective, the dynamic 
processes of legalization in the trade regime by picking up significant events or 
institutional changes of the GATT/WTO system and analyzing their impacts on the 
process of legalization. As a general pattern, different parts of the GAT`T/WTO have been 
significantly legalized and there was certain degree of correlation between the processes. 
However, the "legalizing" processes of each of them were sometimes disparate. The 
original GATT institutional framework was chosen as a consequence of the particular 
political constellation in which trade negotiators were operating. After four decades' 
development, by the time of the Uruguay Round, the evolution of both the institutional 
framework and the substantive treaty network required a new WTO package with 
fundamental changes to re-strike the balance. Yet, the new WTO system is not perfectly 
balanced and the expansion of legalization is uneven. 
The discussion of the rise of legalization at international level starts with an 
assessment of the development of legalization in the GATT, a process from politic to 
"diplomatic jurisprudence". It summarizes the most noticeable features and changes that 
have occurred in the development of the GATT system in line with the three-factor 
framework of legalization established in the previous chapter. The next section elaborates 
the institutional changes of the WTO system which improved the value of three elements 
of legalization. The third section surveys theoretical debates relating to "juridicialization" 
of the WTO, which are closely related to the analytical work of this study. The fourth 
section concludes the chapter. 
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2. The Rise of Legalization in the Multilateral Framework 
2.1 From Politics to "Diplomat's Jurisprudence" - the Evaluation of the GATT 
As the prototype of the WTO, the GATT system share a great number of similarities 
with the WTO system. Among them, the most distinct one is the unique "legal" system 
developed by GATT diplomats to manage the trade regime. ' This unique type of 
legalization appeared in the GATT system was referred to as "diplomat's jurisprudence" 
by Professor Hudec, meaning that the diplomats conducted power-based bargaining in a 
"legal", mostly procedural, context. The following section analyzes the general 
institutional development of the GATT and the development of legalization in each part 
of the GATT system, demonstrating how "diplomat's jurisprudence" gradually developed 
to a unique kind of legal system and how increased legalization exerted its effects in the 
overall development of the trade regime. 
The most widely acknowledged institutional feature of the GATT system is that it 
has a "constitutional-flawed" origin, yet it managed to develop an institutional structure 
to run the multilateral trading system. 2 Being only a chapter of ITO Charter, the basic 
GATT text provided no sufficient "decision-making apparatus and dispute machinery". 3 
However, when it reached the point of the completion of Uruguay Round, the GATT has 
already become a defacto institution "with fairly elaborate procedures for conducting its 
business through trial and erroe 7.4 The three functions, i. e. decision-making, surveillance 
and dispute settlement, which are currently carried out by the WTO, all have their origins 
in the GATT system. 
The institutionalization of the GATT started from the establishment of a GATT 
Council. Originally, the Contracting Parties comprised the only administrative organ 
mentioned in the treaty. 5 To prepare the GATT to play better the role as the central 
1R Hudec 'GATT or GABB? The Future Design of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade' at Essays on the 
Nature of International Trade Law (Cameron May, London 1999) 77. This essay was original part of a larger article 
published in the Yale Law Journal, volume 80, p. 1299-1368 (1971). ('Nature of International Trade Law'), and J 
Jackson The World Trading System --- Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, 2nd edition, (The MIT 
Press, Massachusetts 1997) 35. ('The World Trading System') 
2 For the comprehensive discussion of the history of GATT, J Jackson World Trade and The Law of GATT ( Bobbs- 
Merrill, New York 1999) 35-37. ('71ie Law of GATT') 
3 Hudec (n 1) 37-38. ('Nature of International Trade Law') 
4j Jackson Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2005) 97. ('Changing Fundamentals of International Law') 
5V Price 'New Institutional Developments in GATT' (1992) 1 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 87,87. 
('Institutional Developments in GATT') 
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international institution for trade, the Contracting Parties took a decision in 1960 to 
establish a Council without any explicit treaty language as the legal basis. 6 The Council is 
"a self-selected body composed of a group of countries interested in GATT", numbering 
about half of the total membership. 7 It was set up to conduct "intersessional" business, 
i. e. the day-to-day running of the GATT when the Contracting Parties were not sitting in 
their full-scale annual session. 8 Over time, the Council became the "principal permanent 
institution for the GATT" and "increasingly shouldered the burden of directing it7'. 9 In the 
meanwhile, numerous specialized committees and working parties having a limited 
membership were set up to assist the Council, especially after the Tokyo Round. 10 
This "organic" process of institutionalization was highly successful as many 
believed. However, when it moved forward, it was confronted with the rigidity of the 
underlying treaty. " The flexibility of the institutions was based mainly on the voluntary 
tolerance and respect of Contracting Parties, but without the support of an equally 
flexible treaty system. This contrast of the rigid treaty language and flexible institutional 
arrangement generated uncertainty on the development of legalization in each part of the 
GATT and made the legalization process uneven and imbalanced in many aspects. 
As a negotiation forum, the GATT successfully hosted eight rounds of multilateral 
trade negotiation, expanding its disciplines from the reduction of tariff to non-tariff 
restrictions and areas such as trade in services and trade-related intellectual property. Yet, 
the uncertainty created by the tension between the treaty language and the operation of 
institutions kept the development of legalization in this forum at a bare minimum. The 
GATT decision making remained a combination of "legal" sovereign equality rules and 
the "political" invisible weighting process, where "powerful parties have exercised their 
invisible weights to dominate agenda setting and outcomes of the multilateral talks". 12 
As analyzed by Steinberg, trade rounds can be divided into three overlapping stages: 
6 Jackson (n 4) 97. ('Changing Fundamentals of International Law') 
7 GATT Rules of Proceduresfor Sessions of the Contracting Parties - Other Procedures BISD 91h Supp. 7,7 (196 1). 8 Price (n 5) 87-88. ('Institutional Developments in GATT') 
9 Jackson (n 4) 97. (Thanging Fundamentals of International Law') 
10 Price (n 5) 88. ('Institutional Developments in GATT') As a result of the Tokyo Round "side agreements", nice 
permanent committees were established in the following areas: anti-dumping practice, customs valuation, government 
procurement, import licensing, subsidies and countervailing measures, technical barriers to trade, trade in civil aircraft, 
diary products and meat. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid, 365. 
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launching, informal agenda setting, and closing. 13 Typically, a trade round is launched 
while a vague mandate for negotiation has attained consensus. A consensus on the 
drafting negotiating mandate will be blocked until "virtually all topics of interest to 
members have been included and until the language has been sufficiently vague so as not 
to prejudice the outcome of negotiations". 14 After being launched, most of the important 
work took place on an informal agenda-setting process, which "largely rested with the 
coordinated action of the major trading powers and a secretariat that is strongly 
influenced by them". 15 Most initiatives that broadly conceptualize a new area or a new 
form of regulation have been developed "first in Brussels and Washington DC, discussed 
informally by the transatlantic powers, then in increasingly larger caucuses such as 
OECD, and ultimately in the 'Green Room"'. 16 The draft emerged from the Green Room 
was then "presented to a formal plenary meeting of GATT Contracting Parties and is 
usually accepted by consensus". 17 
During the negotiation process, there is no tight obligation, no precise rules, and no 
third-party delegation, representing the lowest level of legalization. The fact that the 
decision-making were set in a procedural context has little impact on the level of 
legalization. Yet, it is important to make a distinction between the status of legalization of 
the rules which were produced by the decision-making body of the GATT and the 
development of legalization in the body itself. While the level of legalization of GATT 
rules has been in general greatly improved over time, the decision-making practice of 
GATT evolved in a modest manner in terms of legalization. 
As an institution of surveillance, the idea of increased surveillance of trade policies 
in GATT can be traced back to the Tokyo Round. 18 In 1979, the "Understanding 
Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance" provided, 
among others, for special GATT Council meetings to review general developments in the 
13 R Steinberg 'In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATTIWTO' 
(2002) 56 International Organization 339,350. ('Consensus-based Bargaining and Outcomes') 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid 354. 
16 Ibid 355. Green Room caucuses normally consist of twenty to thirty-five countries that are interested in the particular 
text being discussed and include the most senior members of the secretariat, diplomats from the most powerful 
members of the organization, and diplomats from a roughly representative subset of the GATr membership. 
17 Ibid. 
11 Price (n 5) 97. ('Institutional Developments in GATr') 
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trading system. 19 The GATT Secretariat prepared a document for these meetings, based 
on a combination of "official trade policy notifications" and on what it was able to glean 
from "the press and unofficial sources". 20 In April 1989, based on the previous 
experience, GATT technocrats established, on a provisional basis, a Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (TPRM), as the first fruits of the Uruguay Round. The TPRM differs from 
the previous Special Council meetings as "it provided a mechanism to periodically 
review trade policies of all member countries at fixed intervals on a country-by-country 
basis" 21 . As a "soft" legal device, the TPRM provides a continually updated and 
comprehensive inventory of trade policy measures, which was hoped to be able to reduce 
the information cost of monitoring compliance. Although generally appreciated by 
academics, the question remains whether the peer pressure and increased transparency 
generated by the TPRM will have more than a marginal effect on the development of 
legalization, since it represents low obligation and low delegation, even with high 
precision. 
The most controversial part of the GATT system --- its DSM --- is the part that has 
been "legalized" most. It is commonly observed that it largely overcame most 
deficiencies it shared with other public international law organizations, such as lack of 
autonomous judicial rules and a strong enforcement mechanism, to become a more 
"legal" "organ". 22 At the beginning of GATT, disputes were generally taken up by "the 
diplomatic procedures", at first at semi-annual meetings of the Contracting Parties and 
then a working party set up to examine the disputes. 23 Around 1955, a major shift in the 
procedure occurred, when the Contracting Parties decided that rather than use a "working 
party" composed of nations, a dispute would be referred to a "panel" of experts. This 
development, as commonly acknowledged, "represented a major shift from primarily a 
'negotiating' atmosphere of multilateral diplomacy, to a more judicial procedure of 
19 GATT Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, BISD 26 th Supp. 
210 (1980). ('Understanding') 
20 Ibid. 
21 D Keesing Improving Trade Policy Reviews in the World Trade Organization (Institute for International Economics, 
Washington DC 1998) 5. ('Improving Trade Policy Review') 
22 D Palmeter 'The WTO as a Legal System' (2000) 24 Fordham Journal of International Law, 444. ('WTO as a Legal 
Systern') 
23 Jackson (n 4) 139. ('Changing Fundamentals of International Law') 
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dispute settlement". 24 During the Tokyo Round, the Contracting Parties took the initiative 
to improve the process and the "Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, 
Dispute Settlement and Surveillance" became a landmark in the history of the GATT 
DSM. 25 This document, along with its annex, consisted of a detailed description of 
dispute settlement processes of the GATT and "formed a sort of 'constitutional 
framework' for these processes in GATT after 1947 and prior to the WTO". 26 
Although the sole dispute settlement procedure incorporated in the GATT text was 
Art XXIII, "nullification and impairment", the GATT DSM evolved over four decades 
and became a rather "legalistic" institution. At the commencement of it, with vague treaty 
languages, obligation and precision were considerably low and since the DSM was based 
on the consensus principle, i. e. parties to a dispute can block either the initiation or the 
completion of the process, delegation was also very restricted. 27 Yet the shifts in its 
working procedure and substantive focus after 1960s made the GATT DSM a more rule 
orientated institution and by the time of the Uruguay Round, the DSM has significantly 
improved along the legalization spectrum. 
This genuine increase of legalization in GATT institutions was, however, largely 
restricted by two distinct characters of GATT obligations, which imposed fundamental 
restrains on the development of legalization and largely offset the efforts in the trade 
rounds to enhance the level of precision and obligation of GATT rules. 
First, the GATT inherited the character of drafted ITO Charter with the mix of 
rigorous obligations on substance and relatively broad exceptions on others. On the one 
hand, it is observed that drafters of the GATT, through bargaining in the negotiation 
forum, tried to set out detailed rules that would "leave no doubt about the expected good 
trade practiceS". 28 On the other hand, the real operation of the system rested more on 
"less well-defined elements out of the rule-making process - the wide-ranging exceptions 
to the formal rules". The common feature of these exceptions is that they may, to a large 
extent, justify the preference of trade authorities under a particular circumstance, even if 
24 ibid. 
25 Understanding (n 19). 
26 Jackson (n 4) 140-141. ('Changing Fundamentals of International Law') 
27 B Hoekman and M Kostechi The Political Economy of the World Trading System --- The WTO and Beyond, 2d 
Edition (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) 75. ('Political Economy of the World Trading Systenf) 
28 Ibid. 
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it deprives other trading partners of their legitimate benefits. In other words, the 
diplomats acted in a more "pragmatic" way to apply their "law", which "included the 
considerations of not only the legally binding obligation, but also the domestic preference 
of solutions, the fact of prior deliberation and commitment and the community consensus 
underlying substantive norms', . 
29 
It is argued that the wide exceptions of GAIT rules have developed in a particular 
historical context to facilitate the process of ratification so that the GATT could be put 
into force immediately. The drafters intended to show the public a clear picture of the 
rights and obligations in this restricted trade agreement and hoped it could be ratified 
easily. However, as observed by Professor Hudec, "as governments started to implement 
the GATT, the effectiveness of detailed substantive rules began to be seriously 
undermined by the wide exceptions after the first successful decade of GATT", namely 
late 1960s. 30 When the practice of formally deviating from the GATT became less 
fashionable, the members sought to justify their increasing non-compliance or negative 
compliance by referring to the exceptions of GATT rules. A typical example is that the 
Article XIX "escape clause" served as the legal basis of the widely used form of 
quantitative restriction - "voluntary export restrains" in late 1970s to early 1980S. 3 1 The 
GATT rules hence obtained "an equivocal status": it is generally considered as "a source 
of binding obligations on trading partners"; yet "under particular circumstances, it can be 
deviated by invoking the relatively broad exceptions". 32 
Leading scholars consider that to its credit, the wide exceptions in the treaty 
language enable the GATT to achieve institutional innovations and play a vacuum-filling 
role even without explicit treaty text authority. 33 The major expansion of the activity and 
competence of the GATT was achieved without amendments to the GATT treaty text, 
9 34 since "the treaty amendment requirements were too difficult to be practical'. However, 
the relatively imprecise terms and the low level of obligation and delegation incorporated 
29 Hudec (n 1) 35. ('Nature of International Trade Law') 
30 Ibid, 82 
31 For the details of the normative analysis of "escape clause! ', A Sykes ' Protectionism as a "Safeguard": A Positive 
Analysis of the GAIT "Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations', (1991) 58 University of Chicago Law Review 
255 
320 Perez 'Ecological Sensitivity and Global Legal Pluralism: Rethinking the Trade and Environment Debate'. (2001) 
PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science. 
33 Jackson (n 4) 98. ('Changing Fundamentals of International Law') 
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in the GATF system significantly lowered the level of legalization of the whole system 
and has significant impact on the development of the system. 
Another dist)-nct feature of GATT obligations is its "grandfather" clause, namely 
GATT norms were accepted only "provisionally" and to the extent that obligations were 
"not inconsistent , with" existing national legislations. 35 . This clause allowed the 
Cor, txacting Parties' inconsistent legislations to be in effect until they expired. It 
expressed both the Contracting Paities' reservation to the system, namely "no removal of 
existing trade barriers cr restrictions", and the. ir exceptions - instead of harmonizing 
national trade policies, the main function of the detailed GATT rules was to help "prevent 
36 bad things frern happer-ling". Closely linked to it, the GATr developed a distinction 
lbetweert mande. ory and discretier, ary legislations. 37 Only legislations, which mandated 
action inconsýstenl with the GAT17, could be challenged as such, whereas legislation, 
which merely gave the discretiop to the executive authority to act inconsistently with the 
GATT, could not be challen-ged . 
38 Under the historical background, it is understandable 
that the drafters hoped to make it easy for the GATT to be ratified, by leaving the existing 
trade barriers untouched. Nevertheless, this clause significantly weakened the capability 
of GATT rules to touch the comeirstone of domestic protectionism and justified a 
considerable number of GATT "Elegal" measures for a long time. 
By the time of the Uruguay Round, it became apparent that it is difficult for the 
GATT to adequately address the com plex new generation of trade barriers, such as anti- 
dumping (AD) measures, voluntary restrains, service regulatory measures, and 
intellectual property norm. s. 39 Hence, although the GATT has been significantly 
legalized, with the development of the system, a new kind of legalization was called for 
and breakthroughs culminated with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994 to 
34 Ibid. 
35 Hudec (n 1) 35-36. ('Nature of International- Trade Law') 
36 Ibid 91 
37 WTO United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 - Complaint by the European Communities - Report of the Panel 
31 March 2000) WT/DS 136/R, paragraph 3.26. ('US - Anti-dumping Act 1916') 38 WTO Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft - Report of the Panel (20 August 1999) 
WTIDS70/R, paragraph. 9.124. ('Canada-Aircraft') 
39 F Abbott 1NAFrA and the Legalization of World Politics: A Case Study' (2000) 54 International Organization 519, 
520. ('NAFrA and the Legalization') The author notes that there are second- and third- generation of trade barriers. 
Second-generation trade barriers refer to non-tariff governmental measures directed towards trade, such as quotas, 
export subsidies and voluntary restraints. Third-generation trade barriers refer to internal government regulatory 
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establish a new WTO system. 
2.2 A New Hope of Legalization - the Establishment of the WTO 
The establishment of WTO on I't January 1995 was a significant* event in 
international trade governance. The new WTO treaty system integrated thefruits of all 
previous multilateral negotiation rounds -. about 60 agreements, understandings and 
decisions - into a comprehensive treaty network, supported by a constitution-like 
agreement, the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the 
WTO Agreement) . 
40 The WTO also established an international organization. which is 
manifestly less "diplomatic" and more "legalistic" than the GATT, although they are 
similar in the organizational structure and day-to-day operation. 41 Unlike the ambiguous 
and informal institutional buildup of the GATT, each function operated by the WTO has 
its explicit legal basis in the WTO agreements and the level of legalization is generally 
higher than the GATT. 
2.2.1 Decision-making of the WTO 
After the establishment of the WrO, the multilateral trade talking has been formally 
moved to the permanent negotiation forum of the YV70. Largely inheriting the GAIT 
practice, the WrO negotiation forum remains a combination of "legal" sovereign equality 
rules and the "political" bargaining process. 
Consensus remains as the principle of decision-making of WTO, with the exception 
to decide the issues by voting when the decision cannot be reached by consensus. 42 In 
theory, this "one country one vote7 provision makes the WI70 a more legitimate 
institution, and as argued, "the most democratic one among international 
organizations". 43 However, as discussed above, the consensus rule did not improve the 
status of legalization in the WTO decision-making. Even in cases where "the rules called 
measures not specifically directed toward trade, but which may distort international competition, such as competition 
q ol'cies (over- or under- regulatory). M 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LT/UR/A/2,15 April 1994. ('the WTO 
Agreement') 
41 Hoekman and Kostecki (n 27) 74. ('Political Economy of the World Trading System'). 
42 WTO Agreement (n 40) Article IX 
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for a formal vote", negotiations and consultations, "in particular between the larger 
trading partners, would usually be held to arrive at a consensus text before the forinal 
9 44 vote was held'. The tension between the informal oligarchy and the formal democracy 
led to, in part, the failure of Doha Round, which is experiencing an irreconcilable clash of 
negotiating objectives pursued by the developing partners and by the developed ones. 
Hence, in the new WTO decision-making body, obligation and delegation remain low. 
In addition to the general decision-making procedure, several provisions of the 
WTO Agreement also provide some special decision-making procedures, such as Article 
X for amendment, Article XII for accession, etc. Ideally, those rules, especially the rule 
of amendment, may improve the degree of precision and delegation in the WTO decision- 
making. For instance, Article X authorizes not only the Member of the WTO, but also the 
Councils listed in Paragraph 5 of Article IV, to initiate an amendment proposal. 45 
Consequently, those Councils, by sharing the right of initiative with Members, may 
become autonomous actors to some extent and push the progress even beyond the 
expectation of some Members. Nevertheless, it never happened in practice, mainly due to 
the strict requirements of Article X. This provision provides that the Ministerial 
Conference must approve an amendment proposal with a two-thirds majority of WTO 
Members, if it cannot reach consensus within 90 days. Then, two thirds of the Members 
must accept (i. e. ratify) the amendment for it to become effective: for all Members, where 
the amendment does not alter substantive rights and obligations; for those who accept the 
amendment, where it does alter substantive rights and obligations. 46 
In short, although the WIFO added more "constitutional" rules, such as various 
voting procedure, into its negotiation forum, the decision-making of the WTO largely 
followed the GAIT practice and stays as low legalization with low obligation, precision 
and no third-party delegation. 
43 F Weiss 'WTO Decision-making: Is It Reformable? ', at D Kennedy and I Southwick (eds), The Political Economy of 
International Trade Law --- Essays in Honour of Robert E. Hudec (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002), 75. 
('Political Economy of International Trade Law') 
44 Jackson (n 1) 97. ('The World Trading System') 
45 The WTO Agreement (n 40) Art X, para I and Art IV, para 5. 
46 Ibid. 
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2.2.2 Trade Policy Review Mechanism and its Impact 
The previous chapter locates the TPRM in the intermediate zone of the spectrum, 
with low obligation, low delegation but high precision. This feature of TPRM partly 
relates to its creation time. Basically, the TPRM is a GATT product, with the common 
character of other GATT bodies, with low obligation and low delegation, matching the 
general features of the GATT system at that time. But it was the first fruit of the Uruguay 
Round, created at a time when the Contracting Parties had strong wishes to reform the old 
GATT system. It therefore represents a "soft" legalization formula, with mixed value of 
different factors of legalization. 
Based on Annex 3 of the WTO Agreement, the TPRB, a newly created organ 
responsible for conducting the reviews within the WTO Secretariat, begins the review 
"by selecting a set of countries each year, according to the intervals laid down in the 
WTO Agreement". 47 The countries under review are required to complete and return a 
questionnaire prepared by the TPRB promptly and to submit its own report, referred to as 
a "policy statement", on its trade policies and practices. TPRB staffs also draft a 
46secretariat's report" based on sources such as the country's official publications, the 
country's notification of trade policy changes to the WTO, and information from a visit to 
the capital of the country under review. After the completion and distribution of the 
secretariat report, a review meeting is held by the TPRB. Representatives of Members are 
chosen to participate in the meeting and invited to subrnit questions and comments for the 
reports. The representatives of the country under review then present their responses. 
TPRB staffs complete the review "by releasing the final report, which consolidates the 
secretariat's report, the chairperson's conclusion remarks, self-report of the country and 
the minutes of TPRB meetine'. 48 
The purpose of the TPRM is twofold: "to improve adherence by all WTO Members 
to rules, disciplines and commitments", and "to the smooth functioning of the multilateral 
trading system by achieving greater transparencytt. 49 It is clear that, first, the TPRM is not 
a formal assessment of compliance and can not impose new obligations on the WTO 
Members under review. Second, the TPRM has formally distanced itself from the WTO 
" WTO Annex 3: Trade Policy Review ldechanisP4 LT/UR/A-3/TPRII, 15 April 1994. ('TPRM') 
48 Keesing (n 21) 12. ('Improving the Trade Policy Review') 
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DSM and emphasized that it only intends to "provide a forum to discuss trade policies 
and practices of a Member by the whole membership" and to be the "external audit" of a 
Member's trade and economic situation, without confrontational and legalistic 
50 expressions. WTO Members and the WTO Secretariat have become convinced that 
initiatives to increase transparency such as the TPRM is beneficial to the system. 51 The 
TPRM therefore becomes one of the few mechanisms which formally provides the WTO 
Secretariat with the investigation power to generate systematic information about the 
country's trade polices and practices. 
In practice, however, criticisms have showed up from the past experience of TPRM 
and there are serious doubts concerning the effectiveness of this mechanism. Apart from 
the comments about the substance of the review, an important criticism is that TPRs were 
biased in general towards optimism - "toward saying what the country under review 
would like them to say". 52 Although occasionally WTO Members do offer sharp 
criticisms to trade policies and practices of the Member under review, it is often blunted 
by a "glass house" effect: representatives of WTO Members understand that their turn on 
the firing line will come soon, so that they tend to be more gentle when criticizing others. 
For example, from mid-1990, the US and EU have entered into a sort of "Unholy 
alliance" not to criticize each other's AD actions in their public statements. Therefore, 
even if AD has been considered as "the most serious US and EU protective device after 
voluntary export restrictions, there has been no thorough treatment of this topic in 
TPRs". 53 Moreover, due to low level of delegation in the process, TPRB staffs often 
found themselves either under considerable pressure from the country under review to 
give favourable marks, or in a situation without sufficient resources or authorities to 
conduct a deeper and more comprehensive analysis 
To sum up, the TPRM, as a "soft" legalization device chosen by GATT Contracting 
Parties at the time of the Uruguay Round, is an improvement of legalization in the GATT 
system, especially in term of precision. Yet the deep-seated reluctance of nations to 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid, Appendix B -A VY70 Description of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. "G Marceau and P Pedersen' Is the WTO Open and Transparent? ' in JKelsey(ed)lntemational Economic Regulation 
(Dartmouth / Ashgate, England 2002) 7. 
52 Keesing (n 21) 30. ('Improving the Trade Policy Review') 
53 Ibid 45. 
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delegate power to international bureaucrats, even only the power to make official 
pronouncements on their policies, resulted in the limited mandate of TPRM, which in 
turn limited the impact of TPRM on the legalization process of the WTO. The TPRM, to 
a large extent, remains a game of diplomats. 
2.2.3 Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) of the WTO 
It is commonly recognized that the WTO DSM is the greatest achievement of the 
Uruguay Round and is the core "lynchpin" of the trading system. 54 It is the first time that 
a unified and comprehensive dispute settlement system was established in the trade 
regime. The new DSM has the highest level of legalization in the WTO, with high 
obligation, high precision and high delegation, as characterized in the previous Chapter. 
This section describes the institutional innovations introduced in and after the Uruguay 
Round, in particular the rise of the Appellate Body (AB) as the centrepiece of the DSM, 
as they profoundly improved the level of legalization of the DSM. 
The most significant institutional innovation introduced by the new DSM of the 
WTO is the introduction of the "reverse consensus" requirement for the adoption of panel 
55 
reports. This institutional development largely promoted the level of obligation and 
delegation in the DSM. The panel has been granted greater authority to apply the rules in 
resolving disputes since a panel report is automatically binding on the parties. The 
introduction of the "reverse consensus" for the adoption of panel reports therefore 
"resolved the problem of blockage and paralysis which existed in the GATT DSM and 
makes the adoption of panel reports by the DSB quasi-automatic". 56 
However, it raised WTO Members' concern of losing effective control over the 
adoption of "bad" or undesirable panel reports. An unexpected effect of "reverse 
consensus" was to justify the establishment of a standing AB to review panel reports. 
Yet, the ambition of the negotiators was modest when they established a standing AB to 
allow parties to appeal from panel reports. It is argued that they did not intend to "create a 
54 Jackson (n 1) 124. ('The World Trading System') 
55 P Van den Bossche 'From Afterthought to Centrepiece: The WTO Appellate Body and its Rise to Prominence in the 
World Trading System" Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper 2005/1,5-6. ('WTO Appellate Body and its Rise to 
Prominence') 
56 Ibid. 
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strong international trade court at the apex of the new DSM, '. 57 Instead, their intention 
was to ensure that their biggest innovation, namely the quasi-automatic adoption of panel 
reports by the DSB, would not have Ahe undesirable side-effect of being without 
protection against occasional 'bad' panel reports". 58 
Despite the limited ambition of Uruguay Round negotiators, the AB "has risen as the 
centrepiece of the WTO DSM". 59 Several developments in the procedural and substantive 
rules of appellate review have contributed to this rise to prominence. These developments 
include the compositions of the AB, the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, the 
early embracement and consistent application of the rules of interpretation of the VCLT, 
the manner in which the AB used its authority of appellate review and the case law to 
date, especially those "balancing free trade and other societal values and interests and 
those ensuring the fairness and effectiveness of the WTO DSM, 9.60 
The first two developments, especially the Working Procedures for Appellate 
Review adopted in February 1996, reassure, from a procedural perspective, "the judicial 
nature of the appellate review proceedings and the quality and authority of the decisions 
of the AB 19.61 They advanced the level of precision and delegation of the DSM by 
providing precise rules for judicial-type proceedings and court-like appeals. The three 
developments concerning the rules of interpretation, the authority of appellate review and 
the development of jurisprudence improved the level of obligation, filling the gaps of the 
treaty system. 
To sum up, the institutional innovation of "reverse consensus" has been the most 
important change in the WTO DSM in terms of legalization It did not only result in direct 
improvements of obligation and delegation in the DSM, but also push the establishment 
of a standing AB. The rise to prominence of the AB is another important development of 
legalization in the DSM, which extended its influence to the whole system and 
profoundly advanced the level of legalization on all aspects and dimensions of the WTO. 
3. Theoretical Debates related to Judicialization 
57 Ibid, 7. 
58 ibid. 
59 ibid, 13. 
60 Ibid, 13-14. 
64 
Chapter III 
While previous sections sketch the rise of legalization in the multilateral framework, 
theoretical debates surveyed in this section provide a more detailed account of the most 
important manifestations of legalization in the trade scholarship, namely "judicialization" 
of the GATTMTO. Although, as discussed above, this study considers legalization as a 
special form of institutionalization which happens not only in the DSM, but also in other 
parts of the GATT/WTO, the literature concerning judicialization of the GAT7/WTO is 
the most relevant ones in the field and this section intends to provide a brief account of 
the hotly debated issues. 
Based on the simple mark of legalization of the DSM in the previous chapter, this 
section reviews various schools of scholarly comments on four interrelated contentious 
issues: the role of the DSM, standard of review, institutional settings of the DSM and 
remedy and compliance of dispute settlement reports. 71bese four issues cross-refer to the 
discussion of three elements of legalization in this study. 
The first issue, the role of the DSM, relates to the value of obligation of the DSM. 
The second one, standard of review, relates to obligation and precision of the DSM, since 
it decides to what extent the DSM can interpret The WTO agreements by deferring or 
rejecting the decision of national trade authorities. The third one, the institutional setting 
of the DSM and the fourth one, the issue of remedy and compliance of dispute settlement 
reports also closely relate to the value of delegation of the DSM from different 
perspectives. The purpose of this section is therefore two-fold: it is a brief survey of the 
contemporary literature in the field; it also Provides further insights into the relationship 
between three elements of legalization and the ongoing controversies related to them. 
3.1 The Role of the DSM 
To answer the question what is the role of the DSM, a distinction must be made at 
first between the formal alleged role of the DSM in the WTO legal text and the normative 
role claimed by scholars. Literally speaking, the preliminary role of the DSM is to 
effectively peacefully "solve the trade dispute between WTO Members". 62 In this sense, 
the revolutionary change engendered by the DSU over the GATr dispute resolution has 
61 Ibid, 15-17. 
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been viewed as an enormous succesS. 63 However, over time, criticisms and controversies 
emerged. On the one hand, some observers found that the practice of the panels and the 
AB in fact developed a body of jurisprudence which may exceed their authority, i. e. the 
alleged goals in the WTO legal text. 64 Due to the controversy of some of the panel or AB 
reports, the DSM, as argued, may even "undermine the governmental support for the 
multilateral trading system" . 
65 Another group of scholars, on the other hand, by referring 
to the DSB as a "world court for trade", expressed their expectation that the DSM should 
become "a legal institution more than just a diplomatic club". 66 They insisted that the 
DSM should play a more important normative role in the WTO system --- as the engine 
of constitutional norm-generation or judicial law-making. 67 The WrO DSB should be a 
"courf' system, which "provide 'justice' not some of the time, or most of the time, but all 
the time, and judicially fill in the gaps of treaty language". 68 
The key points of this debate are, first, whether the DSM has done a good job and 
second, whether the DSM is or should be a "court". Based on different normative 
preferences, there are three main lines of discussion in the WI70 commentary. 
The first group, including the majority of legal practitioners, acaden-dcs, and even 
members of the AB, takes the view that the WrO DSM was and is functioning well. 69 
The role of the DSM has been clearly defined in the DSU, namely to settle disputes and 
to clarify the Member's rights and obligations by interpreting the related WTO 
agreements . 
70 Despite the fact that some institutional changes are still in the process, the 
62 WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A- 
2/DS/U/I, Art 3.2. ('DSU') 
63 J Ragosta. 'Unmasking the WTO - Access to the DS13 System: Can the WTO DSB Live Up to the Moniker "World 
Trade Court77 (2000) 31 Law and Policy of International Business 739,739. ('Unmasking the WTO') 
64 W Davey 'Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System Exceeded its Authority? -A Consideration of Deference Shown 
by the System to Member Government Decisions and Its Use of Issue-avoidance Techniques' (2001) 4 JEEL 79,79. ('A 
Consideration of Deference') 
65 Ibid, 80. 
66S Wilson 'Can the WTO Dispute Settlement Body be a Judicial Tribunal Rather than a Diplomatic Club? ' (2000) 31 
Law and Policy of International Business 779. 
61 For example, D Cass 'The "Constitutionalization" of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the 
Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade' (2001) 39 EJIL 31. ('Judicial Norm-Generation') 
(, Judicial Norm-Generation') 
6' Ragosta (n 63) 768. ('Unmasking the WTO') 
61 For example, C Ehlermann 'Six Years on the Bench of the "World Trade Court" - Some personal Experiences as 
Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization" (2002) 36 1YV7 605; and J Greenwald 'WTO Dispute 
Settlement: An Exercise in Trade Law Legalization? ' (2003) 6 HEL 113. ('WTO Dispute Settlement') 
70 DSU (n 62) Art 1. 
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DSM presented "a very satisfactory result to both the diplomats and academiCS". 7 1 The 
DSB in general and the AB in particular, were "responsible" and "well-functioning" 
institutions that "has secured, in practice, the authority it was given on paper in the 
Uruguay Round. 9972 What the DSM need is not to consider the possibility to reintroduce 
elements of the original diplomatic model of the dispute settlement, but to go ahead along 
the road "which has been taken, and which has proved so far to be a notable success". 73 
On the other side, the voice of critics is also very strong. Among them, there are two 
sub-groups holding almost opposite arguments on two extremes. The first subgroup took 
the view that WTO panels and the AB have been too activist and "overly instructive" 
with respect to policy-making of sovereignty WTO Members. 74 Especially in trade 
remedy cases, the panels and the AB were accused of "selling their policy preferences 
rather than reading the language of the WTO agreements neutrallygi. 75 For instance, they 
argued that the AB's ruling has "essentially disregarded" the Article 17.6 (ii) standard of 
review in the VV70 ADA . 
76 This practice clearly showed the AB's aversion to national 
import-restricting states, a sharp attitude inspired by "constitutional aspirations", i. e. "to 
restrict national practices inconsistent with liberal trade value and to establish a more 
significant role for the Appellate Body in shaping the Wro9t. 77 Although the gaps or 
ambiguity of WrO treaties have been commonly recognized, the cons still claimed that 
the panels and the AB are "not the authorized institutions to fill the gaps by promoting 
their favored policy", and it may create "differential obligations" to the Members. 78 
Another subgroup consists of ambitious reformers. In their view, the WTO DSM, in 
particular the AB, is "a dynamic force behind constitutional-building by virtue of its 
71 D Steger 'The Appellate Body and its Contribution to WTO Dispute' in D Kennedy and J Southwick (eds) The 
Political Economy of International Trade Law -- Essays in Honour of Robert E. Hudec (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2002) 493. ('The Political Economy of International Trade Law') 
72 R Hudec 'The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years", (1998) 8 Minnesota 
Journal of Global Trade 1,28 and 3 1. 
"C Ehlermann 'Reflections on the Appellate Body of the WTO', (2003) 6 JIEL 695,706 and 708 
7' Davey (n 64) 80 ('A Consideration of Deference') 
75 Greenwald (n 69) 115 (VTO Dispute Settlement'); also, D Tarullo 'Hidden Costs of International Dispute 
Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti-dumping Decisions', (2002) 34 Law and Policy of International Business 
109. ('Hidden Costs') 
76 WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (15 April 
1994) LT/UR/A- I A/3. ('the ADA') 
11 Tarullo (n 75) 159. ('Hidden Costs') 
7' Greenwald (n 69) 114. (VTO Dispute Settlement') 
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capability to generate constitutional norms and structures during dispute resolution". 79 
The DSM is assumed, or at least encouraged, to take a constitutional policing role, which 
may "invalidate activities of national governments that are inconsistent with the world 
trade constitutions", modeling the activism of the ECJ. 80 The practice of the panels and 
the AB is by nature "judicial supervision" but not "dispute settlement", because of "the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the panels and the AB over any cases brought by WTO 
Members, and their ability to adopt reports which are not only binding to the parties of 
this dispute but also to be considered as valuable as precedent in the future practice". 81 
More importantly, as argued, there is a tendency of WTO Members to bring complaints 
even if they have "suffered no injury in a concrete and material sense". 82 Therefore, the 
panels and the AB are not only doing the job of settling dispute, but also of securing 
WTO rules. Although, to date, there is no enough evidence to conclude that the DSM are 
playing the role of judicial supervision in the WTO system, it is undeniable that, in fact, 
"what the growing jurisprudence of DSM provides is far more than the neutral 
interpretation of treaties" . 
83 
Despite all the normative arguments above, the research of law and economic 
84 
scholars shows another interesting aspect of the DSM. They characterized the dispute 
process before the DSM as "bargaining in the shadow of the law", by pointing out that 
"the decision of Members to move from the negotiation phrase to the panel stage is linked 
directly to the consideration of transaction CoSt,,. 85 When the subject matter of the dispute 
has an all-or-nothing character and leaves little room for compromise, such as health and 
safety regulations, the parties' ability to reach an agreement is restricted and they are 
willing to bring the case before the DSB. In contrast, "if the subject matter permits 
greater flexibility to be determined by the trade authority in domestic level, such as tariff 
11 Cass (n 67) 42. ('Judicial Norm-generation') 
so Ibid. 
81 Y Iwasava 'WTO Dispute Settlement as Judicial Supervision' (2002) 5 JIEL 287,287. The definition of "judicial 
supervision" is that a mechanism to control and secure compliance of international obligation undertaken by state by 
judicial means. There is opposite opinion about the WTO dispute settlement. Also, J Pauwelyn 'A Typology of 
Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in NatureT (2003) 14 EJIL 907 
11 Iwasava, ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 M Busch and E Reinhardt 'Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes'. (2000) 
24 Fordharn Journal of International Law 158 ('Early Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes'); also, A Guzman and B 
Simmons 'To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the World Trade Organization' 
(2002) 31 Journal of Legal Study S205. ('To Settle or Empanel') 
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rates and trade remedy cases, the parties can more easily structure appropriate transfer 
payments and settle their dispute out of the 'court"'. 86 They argue that the DSM served as 
a legal framework in the WTO system, which, to a large extent, is neutral. It may 
influence the future actions of WTO Members, but not because it promotes the ideology 
of trade liberalization. Instead, the Members decide to empanel for the reason of saving 
the transaction costs. The DSM is "not a symbol of the free trade, but a legal framework, 
87 which can reduce the transaction cost of parties". Once the parties of the dispute are 
well aware of the fact that the cost of litigation may exceed the potential benefits of 
"winning", they may choose to settle the dispute even the final outcome may not in the 
line with the ideology of a "rule-based" system. 
In sum, depending on normative preferences and perspectives, scholars offer 
different opinions on the role of the DSM. It is not the intention of this study to support a 
particular argument. Instead, this section focuses on demonstrating that the asymmetry of 
delegation to the DSM in terms of dispute resolution and rule interpretation is widely 
recognized, echoing the discussion in the previous chapter. 
3.2 Standard of Review 
With the development of the DSM, more precise rules are called on for the 
"legalized" dispute settlement process, even if the DSU has been considered as a 
comprehensive and precise legal instrument. To respond to this need, the panels and the 
AB addressed a substantial number of procedural issues in their rulings. 88 An 
unexhausted list of those issues includes terms of reference, representation by private 
attorney, the relevance of general international law, burden of proof, standard of review 
and so on. Most of those issues were addressed in a precise and less controversial way, 
which was recognized as "within the authority of the panels and the AB ". 89 However, 
some lead to great controversies, such as the standard of review. 90 
85 Busch and Reinhardt, ibid. 
86 Ibid, S222. 
87 Ibid. 
88 For example, D McRac 'What is the Future of WTO Dispute Settlement? ' (2004) 7 JIM 3,5. (Tuture Of WTO 
Dispute Settlement') 
89 Davey (n 64) 110. ('A Consideration of Deference') 
90 D Palmeter and P Mavroidis Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Practice and Procedure (2 nd edn) (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2004) 85. ('Dispute Settlement in the WTO') 
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By definition, the standard of review refers to "the nature and intensity of a court 
scrutiny of the legal validity of a legislative or administrative decision", i. e. " "the degree 
of deference judges should accord legislators and regulators". 91 In the WTO, the standard 
of review refers to the "margin of appreciation" which "panels and the AB grant national 
authorities in enacting and enforcing their obligations under The WTO agreements". 92 In 
other words, the standard of review defines to what extent panels or the AB, when 
providing international scrutiny of contested national measures, should respect "the 
prerogatives that the WTO agreements leave to individual Members". 93 The answer to 
this question not only shapes the jurisdictional competence of the WTO adjudicating 
body, but also influences the division of power between the judiciary and other bodies of 
the WTO. It related to, first, the value of obligation of the DSM since it establishes "no 
go" areas for the panels and the AB, requiring them to respect the choice made by 
national trade authorities. It also related to precision in that it restricts the scope of the AB 
or panels to interpret the WTO agreements. The standard-of-review question has thus 
become "a touchstone regarding the relationship of sovereignty concepts to the 
GATTIWO rule system. 94 
In legal terms, the standards of review applied by the panels and the AB determine 
"the appropriate level of deference in reviewing a Member's measure in both finding of 
, 95 fact and legal interpretation'. With respect to factual issues, in EC-Hormones the panel 
and the AB rejected both the idea of "total deference" and the suggestion to conduct a de 
novo review . 
96 On one hand, the AB made it clear that total deference to the findings of 
national authorities could not ensure an "objective assessment" expected by Art II of the 
DSU. On the other hand, the panel's practice not to engage in a de novo review has also 
been confirmed by the AB in several occasions. 97 Rather, the AB gradually developed a 
91 C Ehlermann and N Lockhart 'Standard of Review in WTO Law' (2004) 7 HEL 491,493. ('Standard of Review in 
WTO Law') 
92 M Oesch Standards of Review in the WTO Dispute Resolution (Oxford University Press. Oxford 2003) 14-15. 
(, Standards of Review') 
93 Ehlermann and LA)ckhart (n 90) 494. ('Standard of Review in WTO Law') 
94 Jackson (n 1) 6-8. ('The World Trading System') 
9' Oesch (n 91) 16. ('Standards of Review') 
91 WTO EC - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (11ornitmes) - Report of Appellate Body, (13 February 
1998) WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, para 45. 
9' For example, United States - Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yam ftom Pakistan - Report of 
Appellate Body (5 November 2001) WT/DS192/AB/R. para 7.32; Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of 
Certain Dairy Products - Report of Appellate Body (12 January 2000) WT/DS98/AB/R, para 3.00; and United States - 
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doctrine that key elements are to be examined by a panel in assessing the factual 
evidence. These key elements include, for example, "the objective assessments of 
whether the national authorities examined all relevant facts", "whether they provided 
adequate explanations of those facts supported the factual determination", and so on. 98 
However, the panels and the AB have shown great reluctance to define the contours of 
the appropriate standards of review of factual issues in general. The precise character of 
the review is "not the same in each case", as argued. 99 
With regard to legal interpretation, the panels and the AB leave less doubt about 
their view on this issue. WTO law is a constant subject of the panels and the AB's de 
novo review. It is observed that they interpreted WTO provisions pursuant to the VCLT 
and "have made no deference to legal interpretations set forth by the parties of a 
dispute". 100 As to domestic laws, since they are considered as a matter of fact rather than 
a matter of law, there is no de novo review of them and the diverging national 
implementations of the WTO law are assumed legitimate. As the panel stated in US- Anti- 
dumping Act of 1916, it was not the role of panels to "develop our own independent 
interpretation of US law". 101 So, what the panel did was to rule the conformity of the US 
law to the ADA according to the interpretation of the US authority. 
Except the general standard of review in the VY70 system, the ADA is the only 
covered agreement with a specific and carefully drafted standard of review clause. 102 It 
directs panels not to interfere with a Member's interpretation and application of the ADA 
if the measure in question rests upon a "permissible interpretation". 
Many argued that the AB regarded Art 17.6 as relatively "insignificant in 
practice". 103 They contented that exporting countries challenging the imposition of AD 
duties by other countries have prevailed in every case and national authorities' decisions 
Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan- Report of Appellate Body (23 August 
2001) WT/DS 184/AB/R, para 7.32. 
"' Ocsch (n 91) 106. ('Standards of Review') 
99 Ehlermann and Lockhart (n 90) 497. ('Standard of Review in WTO Law, ) 
100 Oesch (n 91) 74. ('Standards of Review'). 
101 US-Anti-dumping Act 1916 (n 37) para 3.10 
I" Oesch (n 91) 88. ('Standards of Review') 
103 Tarullo (n 75) 114-120. ('Hidden Cost') 
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have been frequently overturned, and the AB was criticized for "'selling' its own 
normative preference and creating different obligations to the Members". 104 
This bitter criticism to the AB's standard of review is rejected as "exaggerated" by 
other scholars. The different answers of this question relate more to different 
understandings on the delegation to the DSM. If the WTO DSM has high degree of 
delegation in terms of rule interpretation, it will be "necessary for it to be able to conduct 
the de novo review of both fact and law since it can promote the uniform application of 
WTO laws". 105 If this development is not welcomed, the panels and the AB will then 
have to keep a strict line in terms of standards of review. Arguably, the debate itself and 
the gradual development of standards of review have evidenced that "the WTO has 
started the journey from a functionalist and contractual framework towards more 
constitutional structure". 106 
3.3 Institutional Settings of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
With respect to institutional arrangements of the DSM, according to the DSU, three 
institutions are working closely in a dispute settlement case. The DSB, an independent 
body established by the DSU, will administer the dispute settlement process. A panel, 
established under the authority of the DSB, makes an "objective assessment" of the facts 
of the case and the conformity with the relevant agreements. 107 Finally, a standing AB 
provides a review mechanism to the findings of a panel. 
In the context of the DSU review, a few most far-reaching issues have been put on 
the table. One of them was a proposal of permanent panel body. 108 It suggests the creation 
of a "small permanent panel body composed of full-time panellists, functioning similar to 
the AB". 109 This proposal has been subject to strong criticism, while a number of key 
figures in the academic circle and legal officers of the WTO support it firmly. 
... Ibid. 123. 
105 Ibid, 519. 
10" Oesch (n 91) 243. ('Standards of Review') 
107 DSU (n 62) Art 11. 
log Ibid. 
109 W Davey 'Mini-Symposium on the Desirability of a WTO Permanent Panel Body - Introduction', (2003) 6 JIEL 
175,175. ('the Desirability of a WTO Permanent Panel Body') 
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The view shared by the proponents is that the establishment of a permanent panel 
body would be desirable. 110 It would, in Davey's words, "solve the case-by-case panel 
selection problems, allow the most efficient solution to a number of pressing problems 
that arise under the prevent system", and encourage "great (necessary) legal expertise". "' 
The present ad hoc panellist system has been perceived to be inefficient and incapable of 
responding to the increasingly complexity of the WTO system for two reasons. First, the 
fact that ad hoc panellists have their own full-time job indicates the problem of 
scheduling and the problem of working under tight time pressures. To meet the strict time 
limits set out by the DSU and cope with the pressures imposed by the parties, ad hoc 
panellists are accused to be "more inclined to find a solution and be less concerned about 
the WTO orthodoxy". ' 12 Second, parties of the dispute still have large room to exercise 
their power over the selection of the panellist. A standing panel body could be a 
timesaving choice, while "allowing the improvement of the process and the coherence 
and standardization of the panel reports". ' 13 
On the other side, widespread scepticisms of this proposal argued from two 
perspectives. Politically, it is argued that WTO Members have gone fairly far in 
judicializing dispute settlement by setting up the AB. It is quite questionable whether 
they are ready to take further step to establish a permanent panel body. ' 14 In doing so, the 
Members will lose the party control over the panel process, "the last thing that they are 
still in control in the dispute settlement process". ' 15 Most importantly, it is argued that a 
permanent panel would likely to be more ideological than an ad hoc body. 116 with 
reference to the recent debate over the over-activism of the AB, the creation of a 
permanent panel body will definitely make it more intolerable to WTO Members, who 
has always been very cautious to avoid over-judicialization and law-making of the DSM. 
110 For example, T Cottier The WTO Permanent Panel Body: a Bridge Too FarT (2003) 6 JIEL 187,189. ('A Bridge 
Too Far') 
111 W Davey 'A Permanent Panel Body for WTO Dispute Settlement: Desirable or Practical? ' in D Kennedy and J 
Southwick (eds) The Political Economy of International Trade Law --- Essays in Honour of Robert E. Hudec 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002) 513 ('A Permanent Panel Body') 
112 J Bourgeois 'Comment on a WTO Permanent Panel Body' (2003) 6 JIEL 211,212. 
113 Davey (n I 11) 179-18 1. ('the Desirability of a WTO Permanent Panel Body') 
114 A Porges 'Comment: Step by Step to an International Trade Court', in Southwick and Kennedy (n I 11) 535. ('Step 
by Step to an International Trade Court') 
115 lbid, 183. 
"6 Cottier (n 110) 189. ('A Bridge Too Far') 
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Practically, major concerns go to the selection of permanent panellists and the 
relationship of the Permanent Panel Body and the AB. Any valid proposal in suggesting 
the establishment of a Permanent Panel Body would have to firstly answer the questions 
such as, how to select the permanent panellist; who is qualified to be appointed as the 
Permanent Panellist; whether there will be any restrictions on the nationality of the 
Permanent Panellist, etc. By far, no one can answer them satisfactorily. 117 In addition, the 
establishment of a Permanent Panel Body will definitely affect the balance of power 
within the WTO. Given the fact that in the present system, panel reports are revised by 
the AB with relatively frequency, there are reasonable doubts whether "a new standing 
Permanent Panel Body could get the respect and support it needs when it is developing its 
own coherent procedures and judicial politics". 118 
The proposal of establishing a permanent panel body indicates the strong desire of 
trade scholars to further strengthen the judicial side of the dispute resolution. However, 
there are expected difficulties to take this step. One reason might be the reluctance of 
WTO Members, and their worries of losing control over the dispute settlement process. 
Yet, the root reason is the divergence of the view of the role of the DSM: does the DSM 
have the delegation to interpret rules? If yes, then it is quite reasonable to build up a 
Permanent Panel Body as a court of first instance, working together with the AB to 
secure the WTO law. If the answer is no, the rejection of the idea of permanent panel 
body are understandable since the ad hoc system will definitely provide a larger degree of 
flexibility to the parties of the dispute than in a standing Permanent Panel system. 
3.4 Remedies and Compliance in the DSM 
Once a panel or an AB report has been issued by the DSB, for most legal 
professionals, it is the end of the story. The panel or the AB has confirmed what is right 
and what is wrong, who is the winner and who is the loser, according to WFO rules. 
However, in reality, this is still far from a happy ending. In case of non-compliance, a 
few questions have to be asked: what are the remedies available for the breach of a WTO 
117 S Chang 'Comments on a WTO Permanent Panel Body' (2003) 6 JEEL 211,222; also, A Shoyer 'Panel Selection in 
WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings' (2003) 6 JML 203. 
1" Cottier (n I 10) 189. ('A Bridge Too Far') 
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obligation? Are those remedies effective? What is the next step for this system to ensure 
greater compliance? 
It is widely observed that the WTO system provides a bundle of legal options to be 
followed by the "loser" of a dispute. First, the most preferred solution indicated in the 
DSU is the wrongdoer to "bring its measures into conformity", according to the 
recommendations of the panel or the AB. 119 Second, if the settlement or withdrawal of 
the WTO-inconsistent measure cannot be accomplished, the "loser" can also choose to 
compensate its trading partners. Finally, if again the parties cannot decide on mutually 
acceptable compensation, the "last resort" of the WTO system - retaliation - will be 
authorized. In principle, the "winner" is authorized to suspend its concession in the same 
economic sector and at the same level of its injury. If this is not practical and effective, 
cross-sector suspension may be allowed. 120 Generally, the priority concern of the whole 
system of remedy is to "induce compliance, rather than to repair the damage of injured 
partygi. 121 
While there are general cheers for the successful experience of the DSM, some 
scholarly discussions highlight the structural tension within this enforcement 
mechanism. 122 Deep controversies persist over two main issues: the meaning of 
conformity and the effectiveness of sanction as the "last resort". 
It is argued that a warning from a WrO panel or the AB that a Member must bring 
itself "into conformity" is "sufficient directive, yet ambiguous enough". 123 Ironically, 
even when a Member lost the case in the DSM, the content of the obligation to "bring 
into conformity" is left to be defined by the losing party, since the panel or the AB report 
will not raise any issue of calculation, supervision or other practical recommendations. 
For disputes relating to those WTO rules with a high level of precision, it might be clear 
for the parties what conformity means. However, for those dispute regarding to WTO 
provisions with various interpretations and understandings, the term "conformity" 
indicates not a definite outcome, but a series of possible outcomes across a spectrum. 
119 DSU (n 62) Art 19. 
120 lbid, Art 22. 
121 C Carmody 'Remedies and Conformity under the WTO Agreement', (2002) 5 BEL 307,320. (Ternedies and 
Conformity') 
"I For example, G Horlick ' Problems with the Compliance Structure of the WTO Dispute Settlement Resolution 
Process', in Bronkers and Quick (n 98) 636. (Troblems with the Compliance Structure') 
75 
Chapter HI 
Many WFO Members argue that conformity did not necessarily mean the withdrawal of 
infringing measures. 124 For example, the EC in EC-Honnone argued that the losing 
Member is free to do anything "not inconsistenf' with the recommendation of the panel. 
In addition, the DSM does not provide incentives for swift compliance of a panel or an 
AB report. Even after appeals exhaust, the DSU still allows the delay of compliance for 
several months. Adding the 15 months before the release of the report, the measure in 
question could last almost 2 years even if it has finally been declared as WrO- 
inconsistent. 
It is unfair to say that there is no legal resort for a winning Member. Art 21.5 of the 
DSU provides an arbitration mechanism for surveillance of implementation. 125 It has 
been proved as a useful system, "which was frequently referred to by the parties of the 
disputes in case of non-compliance". ' 26 However, due to the absence of retroactive 
remedies in the WTO, "it is difficult for a government to refuse to pursue the entire range 
of delay tactics when pressured by domestic interest groups with a stake in maintaining 
127 protection" . When 
domestic pressures are strong enough, the government may find that 
non-compliance is a better choice than to fully and timely comply the report. For 
instance, in EC-Hormone, after utilizing all available legal tactics to delay the 
conformity, the EC "finally chose non-compliance even facing the sanction from the 
us99.127 
The result of EC-Hormone raised another question: to what extent the availability of 
sanctions promotes voluntary compliance? Numerous literature discuss the desirability of 
sanctions in the WrO DSM. 128 A popular view is that the retaliation itself has "some 
undesirable economic features". 129 It is particularly unattractive to the smaller and poorer 
countries. Even if these countries have the authorization to retaliate against a Member on 
whom they relied for imports, they can hardly benefit from the retaliation. Tberefore, 
123 Carmody (n 121) 321. ('Remedies and Conformity') 
124 EC-Hormone (n 95) 
125 DSU (n 62) Art 21.5. Also, J Kearns and S Chornovitz 'Adjudicating Compliance in the WTO: A Review of DSU 
Art 21.5' (2002) 5 JIEL 33 1. 
126 Ibid, 332. 
127 Ibid. 
127 B O'Conner 'Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement System -The Bananas and Hormones Cases' (2004) 38 JWT 
245,249. ('Remedies in the WTO') 
128 For example, P Grane 'Remedies under WTO Law', (2001) 4 JIEL 756, and K Anderson, 'Peculiarities of 
Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement', (2002) 1 World Trade Rev 123. 
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punitive remedies, such as collective retaliations and retrospective remedies, might be 
desirable to the WTO in the sense that they may improve the effectiveness of sactions. 
Nevertheless, although some WTO Members want the DSM to move away from a 
rebalancing approach, namely focusing on the rebalance of negotiated tariff, to a punitive 
approach, many others insisted that "the basic assumption of the WTO DSM is to 
preserve further trading opportunities rather than redress past injury ,. 130 When a WTO 
panel ruled that retrospective repayment of past subsidies was required, it was criticized 
as "challenging the long-standing understanding of DSM and a one-time aberration of no 
precedential value". 131 
In conclusion, the above theoretical debate largely reflects the uneven expansion of 
legalization in the WrO DSM, in particular in terms of the delegation on rule 
interpretation, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
Conclusion 
71be past sixty years witnessed the phenomenal rise of legalization in the 
GATr/WTO as described in this chapter. Starting from the construction of a "legalized" 
operational system of the GATT, the institutional development discussed in the first two 
sections illustrate the general pattern of the rise of legalization in the GATr/WTO. Key 
changes in decision-making, surveillance forum and the DSM of the GATT/WTO 
highlighted the process of legalization. 
The literature review in the last part of this chapter reinforced the argument that the 
expansion of legalization in the DSM is uneven. It identifies four highly debated issues 
relating to the DSM: the role of the DSM, institutional settings of the DSB, the issue of 
standard of review and remedy and compliance of the DSM reports. It concludes that 
despite the fact that the DSM has been siginificantly "legalized" and has the highest level 
of legalization in the WTO, the expansion of legalization in the DSM remains uneven and 
imbalanced in many aspects. 
"" Anderson, ibid, 123; and Horlick (n 122) 641. ('Remedies and Conformity') 
130G Goh and A Ziegler 'Retrospective Remedies in the WTO after Automotive Leather' (2003) 6JIEL 1,1. 
131 Ibid. 
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Chapter IV Legalizing Anti-dumping Rules at international 
level 
1. Introduction 
By formulating legalization as a process of structurally manifesting law in the trade 
regime, the first three chapters conceptualize legalization as a special form of 
institutionalisation and examined its discourse in the trade regime over the past sixty 
years. Although this study considers the rise of legalization is generally playing a positive 
role in the trade regime, it observes that the undergoing process is uneven and unbalanced 
in many aspects. 
Given the pragmatic nature of legalization, the analysis of legalization cannot be 
approached in an abstract or a general way. This chapter, together with the next two 
chapters, advances the research by examining the process of legalization in the 
international AD regime and the consequences of legalization at domestic level. This 
chapter portrays how AD, an originally unilateral trade policy, has been multilateralized 
and legalized in the broader context of the development of legalization in the 
GATT/WTO. The next two chapters focus on the effects of the rise of legalization of the 
international AD regime on domestic AD policy-making, administration and judicial 
review and the dispute settlement activities. 
There are two reasons to choose AD as the trade instrument to demonstrate the 
process of legalization: AD is one of the most well-developed legal instruments in the 
GATT/WTO; it is also one of the most controversial trade instruments. Indeed, after a 
century's development, AD is not a regime that lacks of complex and intricate rules at 
both international and domestic levels. However, all these "awfully technical" rules did 
not provide a sound solution to make the AD regime less controversial. Instead, AD has 
moved from "being a little used unilateral trade policy to a major W170-approved weapon 
in the protectionist arsenal", which can provide the benefits of "strategically harassing 
trading partners in the rough and tumble of trade policy". ' In this sense, the evolution of 
AD provides an illustrative example of both the significant contribution that legalization 
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made to multilateral trade liberalization, and the uneven expansion of legalization in the 
trade regime. 
The development of legalization manifested in the international AD regime echoes 
the general trend of legalization in the GATT/WTO. On the one hand, the rise of 
legalization can be observed in all parts and dimenstions of the AD regime. Multiple 
rounds of trade negotiations generate tighter and more specific obligations in the AD 
regime over the past half-century. The evolution of legal instruments marked major 
turning points of the process of legalization. The GA'17/Yv7O also provides surveillance 
mechanisms, as the "soft law" devices, to improve precision of international AD rules 
and the DSM, by adjudicating AD disputes, made significant contributions to enhance 
precision of AD rules. 
A closer analysis of the AD regime, on the other hand, indicated the uneven and 
imbalanced expansion of legalization. A large number of obligations in the ADA are 
unspecific or contingent in nature, so that the sharp differences of national practices 
cannot be covered. This feature of the ADA also influences the level of precision of 
international AD rules and makes the deference to national authorities a highly 
contentious issue. The development of obligation beyond the ADA, mainly the judicial 
activities of the DSM and "authoritative interpretation" of the Ministerial Conference and 
the General Council, has been bitterly criticized. In particular, irrespective of the 
significant contribution made by the DSM to the development of obligation and precision 
in the AD regime, considerable controversies are surrounding the activities of the DSM. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the basic notion of 
dumping and the AD law and provides a brief historical account of the evolution of AD 
rules. Section 3 articulates the development of AD laws in the GATT/V; TO negotiation, 
surveillance and dispute settlement forums - the process of legalizing AD at international 
level. It also provides an assessment of the current status of three elements of legalization 
in the AD regime with focuses not only on formulated rules, but also on the congruence 
of formal rules, jurisprudence and institutions. Section 4 further examines the unevenness 
IW Kerr and L Loppacher 'Anti-dumping in the Doha Negotiations - Fairy Tales at the WTO' (2004) 38 JWT 211, 
211, ('Anti-dumping in the Doha Negotiations') 
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of legalization in the AD regime in the context of the uneven expansion of legalization in 
the trade regime. Section 5 concludes the chapter. 
2. Phenomenon of Dumping and the Development of AD Laws 
Originally, dumping is a trade practice defined as price differentiation or price 
discrimination during the sale of goods, namely "selling the same product in different 
,2 prices at different markets'. In classic economic literature, dumping has been classified 
3 in several groups according to different characters of dumping practices. One of the 
chief classifications distinguishes between predatory and non-predatory dumping. 4 'Me 
former denotes the practice that the exporter sets low export prices, with the intention of 
eliminating more efficient competitors in the importing country and gaining, in the long 
term, a monopolistic position. After that, "the exporter will be able to establish 
international monopolies which permit them to charge inflated prices without fear of 
competition and recoup its short-term IOSS,,. 5 
Dumping may also appeal to an enterprise for a number of non-predatory reasons, 
such as the different competitive process and capitalisation ratio in different countries. 6 
Dumping that occurs for these non-predatory reasons is normally considered as harmless 
and "fair" in competition policy terms, although it may also adversely affect the 
competitive structures of the importing country. 7 
According to economic literature, given the fact that dumping practices, in particular 
these with predatory intention, may adversely affect the situation of a domestic industry 
"to the detriment in its sales volume, its pricing strategy and its workforce employment", 
the importing country normally reacts to dumping in two scenarios: "if it causes or 
threatens to cause material injury to an established industry in the importing country; or if 
2R Bierwagen GAIT Article VI and the Protectionist Bias in Anti-dumping Laws (Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, Deventer and Boston 1990) 1. ('the Protectionist Bias in And-dumping Law') 
3 For example, J Viner Dumping: A Problem in International Law (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1923) 23-34. 
4 Ibid. 
'J Leclerc 'Reforming Anti-dumping Law: Balancing the Interests of Consumers and Domestic Industries' (1999) 44 
McGill Law Journal 111,115. ('Reforming Anti-dumping Law') 
6 Bierwagen (n 2) 9. ('the Protectionist Bias in Anfi-dumping Law') 
"G Harpaz ' "Dumping" the Anti-dumping Instruments in the Trade Relations Between the European Union and the 
State of Israel? - The European Union's Perspective' (2005) 39 JWT 445,451. ('Durnping the Anti-dumping 
Instruments') 
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it materially retards the establishment of an industry in that country". 8 This is the genesis 
of anti-dumping law. It provides the most often offered justification of AD legislations: 
"the prevention of predatory pricing - an unfair trade practice and the perseverance of the 
level playing field in a liberal trading system"? 
Apart from economic efficiency, scholars and practitioners also put forward non- 
economic arguments in favour of AD laws, such as "nationhood", "communitarianism" 
or "fairness". For instance, Hutton and Trebilcock argued that "the private non-pecuniary 
costs of the community and individual disruption would ensue when domestic production 
is displaced by low-priced foreign goods". 10 In their view, since "individuals are often 
left with comparatively few traditional attachments to institutions such as family and 
religion in a rapidly-changed society", job displacement caused by dumping practices 
may be "particularly traumatic to the individuals and communities concerned". 11 
The classical economic theories and non-efficiency rationales for AD laws, 
however, failed to convince many commentators. 12 Although not all criticisms are 
equally thorough, most critics seem to acknowledge two principles: first, dumping in 
most cases has positive welfare effects on the overall economy of the importing country 
and global economy; second, AD duties negate these effects and may be used "as a 
surrogate tariff in protecting import-competing industry from cheaper imports". 13 The 
combination of these two perceptions then leads to the conclusion that AD duties 
normally have no justification on welfare analysis and are therefore merely protectionist 
of the local industry. 14 
Irrespective of hotly debated normative or economic rationales of AD, AD rules are 
46a well-established political construct" at both domestic and international arenas. 15 First 
enacted in 1904 by Canada, AD laws gradually acquired a worldwide status, "with 
8R Bhala 'Rethinking Anti-dumping Law' (1995) 29 George Washington J Int L and Economic 1,4. ('Rethinking 
Anti-dumping Law') 
9 For example, A Lowenfeld International Economic Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002) 245-248. 
('International Economic Law') 
"S Hutton and M Trebilcock 'An Empirical Study of the Application of Canadian Anti-dumping Laws: A Search for 
Normative Rationales' (1999) 24 JWT 123,135. ('Empirical Study of Canadian Anti-dumping Laws') 
11 Ibid. 
12 For detailed comments on the economic rationale of anti-dumping laws, T Broude 'An anti-dumping " To Be or Not 
To Be" in Five Ads: A New Agenda for Research and Reform' (2003) 37 JWT 305,308-312. ('New Agenda for 
Research and Reform') 
13 Ibid 3 10. 
14 Ibid. Also, A Sliberston 'Anti-dumping Rules - Time for ChangeT (2003) 37 JWT 1063,1078. ('Time for Change') 
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incredibly complex international rules and jurisprudence and a growing number of 
national laws". 16 
Unlike some newly developed WTO norms, national AD laws have a much longer 
history than the GATT/WTO AD rules. 17 By mid-1920s, national AD legislations 
modelling the Canadian AD law, have been enacted by eight countries, namely Canada, 
Australia, South Africa, United States, Japan, New Zealand, France and United 
Kingdom. 18 Although largely divergent in terms of administrative procedures, it is 
observed that "certain basic tests for determining normal value in anti-dumping actions 
had already been established", including "(a) price on the home market of the country of 
exportation; (b) price of the product when exported to other countries; and (c) cost of 
production in the country of exportation". 19 
At around the same period of time, the first international deliberation on dumping 
and AD laws had already commenced . 
20 When the preliminary ITO-GATT work began 
in 1945, AD rules found their way into the GATT "as a counterbalance of the high tariffs 
on imports in several exporting countries". 21 After that, AD joined other parts of the 
GNIT/WTO on their journey of legalization. The US's proposal of inserting a standard 
into the GATT 1947, which was modelled roughly but not precisely on its own Anti- 
dumping Act of 1921, was accepted by the Contracting Parties. It is argued that at the 
same time, worrying about the potential protectionism embodied in AD rules, the 
founding father of the GATT tried to "design an instrument to balance the protectionist 
effects of the application of AD lawS,, 22 . From the very beginning, the GATI7 AD rule, 
GATT Article VI (Article VI), is a balance between "the necessity of providing members 
15 Ibid. Sliberston, 1078. 
16 M Zanardi 'Anti-dumping: What are the Numbers to Discuss at Doha' (2004) 27 The World Economy 403,407. 
('Numbers to Discuss at Doha') 
17 For a detailed on this history of national AD laws, F Snyder 'The Origins of the "Non-market Economy": Ideas, 
Pluralism and Power in EC Anti-dumping Law about China! ' (2001) 7 European Law Journal 369,375-378. ("The 
Origins of the Non-market Economy") 
18 Canard (n 16) 408. ('Numbers to Discuss at Doha') 
19 Snyder (n 17) 377. ("Ile Origins of the Non-market Economy") 
20 Harpaz (n 7) 453. Mumping the Anti-dumping Instruments') Also, League of Nations 'Final Report, the World 
Economic Conference of 1927', Geneva Final Report, C. E. 1 44 L347,33-34. 
21 Sliberston (n 14) 1078. ('Time for Change') 
22 Lowenfeld (n 9) 243. ('International Economic Law') 
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with an international seal of approval for their use of AD laws" and "the intention to 
regulate national AD practice to avoid its potential trade distorting effecf 9.23 
Article VI established a framework for the law of AD that has remained unchanged 
to date. This article first defined the term "dumping" and committed the determination of 
dumping to authorities of the importing states. 24 It further stated that the remedy against 
dumping is an AD duty, which is to be imposed "only upon a finding of injury caused by 
the dumping imports". 25 It contained "all the bare bones of international anti-dumping 
rules", but was relatively brief and has left too much to interpretation by individual 
stateS. 26 
Given the simplicity of Article VI, there were later efforts in the GATT to reach 
agreements on more detailed and specific rules of AD. In the Kennedy Round, AD was 
placed on the agenda and the result of the negotiation turned out to be the first Code 
under the auspices of GATT - Agreement on Interpretation of Article VI (the 1968 
Code). At the next round, the Tokyo Round, extensive negotiations were undertaken to 
establish a code on subsidies. When those negotiations on subsidies were completed, it 
was agreed that the 1968 Code should be revised to make it parallel (but not identical) to 
the Subsidies Code. 27 The new 1979 Code therefore conformed to their analogues in the 
Subsidies Code. When the Uruguay Round was first launched in 1986, it was not initially 
expected that the 1979 Code would be a major subject of negotiations, as it had not been 
mentioned in the agenda set out in the Ministerial Declaration. As the negotiations 
unfolded, AD became a seriously contested subject. The outcome of negotiation, as set 
down in the 1994 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI (ADA)28, was a package 
of compromises: procedural rules were tightened, while there were only few, rather 
minimal, tightening of substantive rules. The discussions below indicate that this new 
ADA, as a package of compromises, does not reflect "so much a coherent philosophy" --- 
23 Harpaz (n 7) 453. ('Dumping the Anti-dumping Instruments') 
24 Art VI Para I of the GATr 1947 
25 Art VI Para 2 and 3 of the GATr 1947 
26 J Jackson, W Davey and A Sykes Legal Problems of International Economic Relations - Cases, Materials and Texts 
(4'h edn West Group, St. Paul 2002) 694. ('Legal Problems of International Economic Relations') 
27 Ibid 695. 
29 WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (15 April 
1994) LTILWA- I A/3. ('ADA) 
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some of provisions favouring imports, but others addressed to the needs of domestic 
producers. 29 
Parallel with the international efforts to establish more legalized multilateral AD 
rules, there was also significant progress at domestic level in introducing national AD 
rules during the last five decades. The spread of AD laws worldwide shows the power of 
multilateralism. As indicated before, by mid-1920s, the US, the United Kingdom (UK), 
some members of the British Commonwealth, Japan and France already had AD laws at 
their disposal . 
30 As a consequence of the GATT Article VI, about 20 countries introduced 
their own AD laws. 31 In the post-1979 Tokyo Code era, more than 25 countries adopted 
their national AD laws, while after the WTO ADA, there is a surge of introducing 
national AD laws, which resulted the birth of more than 35 new AD laws during the past 
decade. 32 As of 23 October 2007,71 Members had notified the WTO AD Committee that 
they had national AD legislations. 33 Given the fact that 28 WrO Members had not made 
any notification of AD Idgislation in 2007 and non-WTO trading partners has no 
obligation to notify its AD legislation, it is expected a total of around 100 countries has 
AD laws. 34 The countries having national AD legislations cover almost all major trading 
partners in the world, including non-WTO members such as Russia. 35 It is therefore 
argued that "more than 90 percent of worldwide imports are potentially subject to AD 
actions today". 36 
Given the popularity of AD rules, not surprisingly, there are also a huge number of 
AD activities. Between I January 1995 and 30 June 2007, WrO members notified 3,097 
AD investigations and a total of 1,997 AD measures were in force worldwide as of 30 
" Lowcnfeld (n 9) 250. ('International Economic Law') 
30 The 8 countries are Canada, Australia, South Africa, United States, Japan, New Zealand, France and United 
Kingdom. Zanardi (n 16) 409. ('Numbers to Discuss at Doha') 
31 Ibid. Those 20 countries include the industrial countries like Germany, Norway, Finland, Austria, and newly 
industrial and developing countries such as Zambia, Malaysia, Uganda and South Korea. 
32 Ibid. In the last decade, most of the activities in introducing AD legislation have been in developing countries, as 
most of the industrialized world already had AD laws prior to 1990. 
33 WTO 'Report (2007) of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices' G/U830,26 October 2007. The report stated: 
"As of 23 October 2007,98 Members had notified the Committee regarding their domestic anti-dumping legislation. Of 
these 98 Members, 27 notified the Committee that they had no anti-dumping legislation..... Twenty-eight Members had 
not, as of the end of the review period, made any notification of anti-dumping legislation and/or regulations". 
34 H Vandenbussche and M Zanardi 'What ExpWns the Proliferation of Antidumping Laws? ' (2008) 23 Economic 
Policy 93. 
35 Russia adopted its AD law in 1998, ibid. 
36 Ibid, 407. 
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June 2007 . 
37 Traditionally, there were four major users of AD rules - US, EU, Canada 
and Australia and less developed or newly industrialized countries are the targets of their 
AD laws. 38 However, now it is India on the top of the list - as of 30 June 2007, it 
reported 474 AD initiations, the largest number in the world . 
39 This indicates that the role 
of new users, most of which are developing countries, is more important than expected 
from the past experience. 40 Many therefore argue that the recent intensive 
implementation and use of AD seems to have a retaliatory motive, as "countries started to 
use AD to offset the negative effect of unfair trade policies from another WTO 
Member". 41 The increasing pace of adopting national AD laws has another possible 
explanation - countries have to equip themselves with AD laws in order to not only 
defend, but also fight. 42 
The brief account of the development of international and national AD rules 
suggests that there is an identifiable vicious circle in the AD regime, where all sorts of 
elements such as multilateral and national AD legislations, trade liberalization, retaliatory 
motives, protectionism etc, are part of the same circle. The original debate that whether 
dumping is unfair is of only theoretical or historical interest. Nor does the north-south 
question matters - "the entire First World is not on one side or the other in term of AD, 
nor is there a single Third World PoSitioWt. 43 In the end, AD appears to be such a popular 
legal game that no one can fortunately have a way out, although actually most of the time 
the players are facing no-win situations. 44 
37 VV70 'Statistics on Anti-durnping', available at httv: //www. wto. orglcnelish/tratov--e/adi)-eladp e. htm#statistics (last 
visited 5 March 2007). 
38 R Acharya and M Daly 'Selected Issues Concerning the Multilateral Trading System', (2004) WTO Discussion 
Paper No. 7, available at http: //www. wto. intlenglish/res -elbooksl2 e/discussion papgrs7 e. vdf 
(last visited 5 Jan 2006), 
20. ('Selected Issues Concerning the Multilateral Trading System')Ibid 
39 WTO 'WTO Secretariat reports new anti-dumping investigations continue to decline, while new final measures show 
increase', Press Release 458.27 Nov 2006, available at httn: //www. wto. orp/enplish/news e/rres06 e/pr458-e. htm (last 
visited 5 March 2007) 
40 Zanardi (n 16) 403 and 405. ('Numbers to Discuss at Doha') 
41 Ibidq 411. The author argued that this is another crucial point that must be discussed in the Doha Round since the 
WTO ADA excludes the use of AD in a retaliation fashion, because it is a violation of non-discriminatory principle of 
the WTO. 
42 C Molyneux Domestic Structures and International Trade --- The Unfair Trade Instruments of the US and the EU 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford 2001) 15. ('Domestic Structure and International Trade') 
43 R Bhala 'New WTO Anti-dumping Precedents (Part One: The Dumping Margin Determination)' (2002) 6 Singapore 
I Int L and Comparative L 335,336. ('New WTO Anti-dumping Precedent') 
"As analysed by economist, the AD in general has negative global welfare effects, which is welfare reducing from 
both an international and a domestic point of view. For example, Broude (n 12) 307 ('New Agenda for Research and 
Reform') and Zanardi (n 16) 404. ('Numbers to Discuss at Doha) 
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3. "Legalizing" the AD Rules at international level 
3.1 Trade Negotiations and International AD Rules 
3.1.1 Pre-Uruguay Trade Rounds and the AD Negotiations 
After the GATT's inception in 1947, six rounds of trade negotiations occurred 
before the commencement of the Uruguay Round in 1986. Although the first four 
rounds 45 were largely limited and focused on tariff reductions rather than other non-tariff 
barriers, the three decades, from the 1950s to the 1980s, witnessed significant 
developments of international AD rules on three elements of legalization - obligation, 
precision, delegation. During this period, four legal instruments highlight the 
evolutionary process of international AD rules: the GATT Article VI, the GATT Reports 
of Group of Experts, the 1968 Code (Kennedy Round) and the 1979 Code (Tokyo 
Round). The analysis of these four instruments, together with the negotiation background, 
offers insights into the "legalizing" journey that international AD rules went through. 
GATT Article VI 
At the time of the ITO-GATT negotiation, the US insisted on "addressing unfair 
trade in the form of dumping and subsidized exports" at the original ITO agreement and 
the GATT. 46 The US I 's proposal was generally supported due to the conventional 
concerns on unfair trade practice. The Contracting Parties then agreed that "the 
imposition of AD and countervailing duties would be allowed under the multilateral 
agreement, as long as such dudes were imposed where conditions had been properly 
t 47 investigated' . There were, however, two major areas of 
disagreement in the 
negotiations: the scope of the dumping definition and the possible use of forms of 
retaliation other than AD duties against dumped imports. 48 
45 The four rounds are Annency Round in 1949, Torquay Round in 1950, Geneva Round in 1956 and Dillon Round in 
1960-1961. 
46 T Stewart (ed) The GAIT Uruguay Round: A Negotiation History 1986-199Z Volume 11. Commentary (Kluwer Law 
and Taxation Publisher, Deventer 1992) 1405. ('The GATT Uruguay Round') 
47 For example, Draft Report of the Technical Subcommittee, U. N. Econ. Social. Council, GATT Doc No. 
EIPC/T/C. 11/54 (16 Nov 1946), at 11; and Tenth Meeting held on 19 November, 1946, U. N. Econ. Social. Council, 
GATT Doc No. E/PC/T/C-IY55 (20 Nov 1946), at 2. 
48 Stewart (n 46) 1046. ('The GATT Uruguay Round') 
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With respect to the scope of the definition, the parties established four types of 
dumping early in the negotiations: price, service, exchange and social. 49 It is documented 
that opinions on the definition of dumping was divided into two camps . 
50 Developing 
countries argued that all forms of unfair trade practices should come under the dumping 
heading, while developed countries preferred a more limited definition with special 
reference to price dumping. Since the parties worried that "the broad definition favoured 
by the developing countries would have left open a wide range of retaliatory actions", a 
narrow definition of dumping was adopted in the GATT Article VI. 51 
The question of the use of retaliatory forms other than AD duties was centred on the 
use of quantitative restrictions against dumped imports. Due to "the inconsistency of 
quantitative restrictions with the fundamental theme of the GATT negotiations", the 
possibility of utilizing direct limitation of dumping through quantitative restrictions was 
ruled out of the text of Article VI. 52 Ultimately, the desire to avoid the use of quantitative 
restrictions limited retaliatory dumping measures to AD duties. 53 
The negotiation history on AD manifested the first multilateral efforts under GATT 
to "legalize" national AD rules and led to the first multilateral rule in this area. Although 
fairly brief (with only seven paragraphs and just over two pages), Article VI laid out "the 
multilaterally recognized definition of dumping and the conditions under which 
individual countries were justified in taking defensive measures". 54 In an implicit way, 
Article VI established three basic obligations: the determination of dumping (Paragraph I 
and 2), the determination of injury (Paragraph 1) and causality (Paragraph 6 (a)), which 
constituted a platform for future development of the AD regime. Yet, Article VI did not 
provide full details on the administration of an AD law. 
Regarding the obligation of determining dumping, the first paragraph of Art VI 
articulated the situation that a product is to be considered as being dumped. The second 
49 Ibid. Except price dumping, other types of dumping were either given less than cursory treatment or failed to produce 
a clear definition during negotiations. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
" Record of Work Performed, UN Econ. Social Council, GATT Doc. No. E/PC/T/103 (19 June 1947), 12. The 
Working Party on technical articles added an interpretative note as "no measures other than anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties or charges shall be applied by any Member for the purpose of offsetting dumping or 
subsidizatioW'. 
54 Ibid. 
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paragraph further restricted the imposition of an AD duty within the margin of dumping. 
Together they limited trade authorities' ability to respond to alleged dumping practice - 
only under certain circumstances is the imposition of an AD duty permissible. Regarding 
the obligation of determining injury to domestic industry, Article VI specified "material 
injury" as the condition for the imposition of an AD duty, although the term itself left 
undefined. The abstraction of this language "made this obligation at the time an area of 
contention, as different parties had different standards of injury in their domestic 
55 legislations" . Nevertheless, it prohibited a trade authority from imposing an AD duty 
without a statement of injury, despite the ambiguous meaning of "injury". Finally, under 
paragraph 6 (a) of Article VI, neither AD nor countervailing duties could be levied unless 
the effects of dumping or subsidization were "to cause or threaten material injury to an 
established domestic industry, or such as to retard materially the establishment of a 
domestic industry". 56 Again, it was clear that a trade authority is under the obligation to 
prove causality. The text, however, did not provide a working definition of domestic 
industry and a functional framework to practically assess the casual link. 
As Article VI only outlined a definition of dumping and the basic parameter of an 
acceptable response, the precision of Article VI became "a big concern" of many 
parties. 57 The lack of specificity and ultimately precision, which pern-dtted countries to 
implement the GATT according to their own understandings of Article VI, led to 
enormous conflicts among the Contracting Parties. This became the reason for intensive 
negotiations on expanded rules in regulating national AD practices in later rounds of 
negotiations. 
As an article of the GATT 1947, delegation of settling AD disputes were not 
separately stressed in Article VI. All GATT disputes, including the AD disputes, would 
refer to Article XXIII of GATT - the "nullification and impairment" clause. As a DSM 
based on the consensus principle, the parties have enough opportunities to block either 
the initiation or the completion of the process. Also, the existences of pre-existing AD 
laws in contrast with Article VI were justified by the well-known "grandfather clause", 
under which the parties were only required to comply with GATT provisions to the extent 
" Stewart (n 46) 1409. ('The GATr Uruguay Round') 
16 Para 6 (a) of GATT Art VI. 
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not inconsistent with existing legislations. Consequently, in addition to individual 
58 
conflicts with Article VI, the laws of the parties conflicted with each other. In short, at 
the time of Article VI, precision and delegation of the AD regime were considerably low, 
despite that certain fundamental obligations have been designated. 
GATT Report of Group of Experts (1961) 
From the birth of the GATT to the end of the 1950s, there was no major change in 
Article VI except the 1955 Interpretative Note which specified the rules of circumvention 
(Article 5) and state-monopoly (Article 6)59 and one formal challenge to an AD action by 
a GATT Contracting Party. 60 It however did not indicate that the multilateral efforts to 
modify and clarify international AD rules stopped. The Contracting Parties first asked the 
GATT Secretariat to undertake a systematic, comparative study of the AD laws of the 
Contracting Parties in 1956 . 
61 Then a Group of Experts was appointed to further study a 
number of technical AD issues. 62 The Report of Group of Experts (the Report) was 
published in March 1961, as the first comprehensive consideration of practical aspects of 
the AD administration since the GATT's establishment. Although the opinions of the 
Report were not legally binding, it had a critical influence on the future development of 
the international AD rules. It is observed that the Report later emerged as "the basis of a 
large part of the 1968 Code developed during the Kennedy Round negotiations". 63 
The first effort made by the Group of Experts in the Report was to clarify a key 
substantive issue - the price comparison in the determination of dumping. The Report 
stressed that the essential aim of Paragraph I of Article VI was to "make an effective 
comparison between the normal domestic price in the exporting country and the price at 
57 Stewart (n 46) 1409. ('The GATT Uruguay Round') 
58 Ibid. 
" GATT Report of Review Working Party III on Barriers to Trade Other than Restriction on Tariffs, L1334, I March 
1955. 
1 Italy challenged a Swedish AD action against its nylon stockings in 1954. Swedish Anti-dumping Duties: Statement 
67 
the Government of Italy, GATT Doc. No. L. 215 (29 July 1954). b 
6 GATT Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties, GATT Sales No. GATT/1958-2. 
62 GATT Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties, Report of Group of Expert, GATT Sales No. GATT/1961-2 (The 
Report). 
63 Stewart (n 46) 1417. ('The GATT Uruguay Round') 
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which the like product left that country". 64 For the purposes of proper price comparison, 
three issues were addressed in depth - normal value, like product and export price. 
The Report first noted that an importing trade authority should aim at a comparison 
of normal value and export price "at the same level in the trade and at the same date or 
dates as near as possible". 65 It then considered the problem of the determination of 
domestic market price when more than one selling price on the domestic market 
occurred: "direct price comparison of individual sales transactione' would be preferable 
and the use of weighted averages should be confined to cases where "it was impossible to 
9 66 use a more direct method of establishing the normal domestic price'. In addition, the 
Report set forth the opinion that two alternative methods of establishing normal value in 
Paragraph I (b) could only be used after "the establishment of a normal market value 
67 under Paragraph 1 (a) of Article VI had failed". These two methods were equally valid 
and there was no order of priority. It further noted the term "production costs" under 
Paragraph I (b) (ii) should "include all direct and indirect cost incurred in producing the 
product, such as the cost of materials and components, labour, general overheads and so 
olft. 68 The ultimate goal of utilizing whatever method was to "achieve at a normal value 
which was genuinely comparable with the export price". 69 
Next to the normal value, the Report entered into the discussion of "like prodUCet. 70 
The term was interpreted as a product "which is identical in physical characteristics 
subject, however, to such variations in the presentation which are due to the need to adapt 
the product to special conditions in the market of the importing country (i. e., to 
accommodate different tastes or to meet special legal or statutory requirements)" . 
71 This 
term was not allowed to be interpreted too broadly so as to cover products of a different 
kind with higher prices on the internal market. It also should not be interpreted 'too 
stringently so as to elude the application of Paragraph I (a) of Article VI, 9.72 
64 The Report (n 62) 7. 
65 Ibid 8. 
66 Ibid 16. 
67 Ibid 9. 
69 Ibid. 
69 Ibid 10. 
70 Ibid 11. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
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Finally, the ideal "export price" was stipulated as "the ex-factory price on sales for 
73 
export or the F. O. B. price, port of shipment". The ultimate aim was, again, "in any 
event to arrive at a price which was genuinely comparable with the domestic price in the 
exporting country". 74 If the importers sold imported products at a loss and were not 
recompensed by the exporters, they should not be considered guilty of dumping. 75 
The next major achievement of the Report was to lay down certain rules on material 
injury and industry. 76 The Group of Experts agreed that no precise definition of "injury" 
could be given, but "a common standard ought to be adopted in applying this criterion 
and that decisions about injury should be taken by the authorities at a high level" . 
77 
National legislations which provided for "injury" was suggested to be applied "only as if 
the word material were stated therein". 78 On the question of "industry", the Report noted 
that "as a general guiding principle, judgements of material injury should be related to 
total national output of the like commodity concerned or a significant part thereof '. 79 The 
use of AD duties to "offset injury to a single firm without proper justification" would be 
protectionist in nature. 80 
Apart from clarifying provisions of Article VI to increase the level of legalization in 
the normative system, the Report also revealed the opinion of the Group of Expert on a 
number of procedural issues regarding the AD investigations and "legalized" the 
administrative system of domestic AD rules at the first time. 81 Under the heading of 
"Application of Anti-dumping Duties", the Report particularly considered the areas 
unaddressed in Article VI but of obvious divergence among the national AD laws, such 
as hearings, provisional AD measures, the publication of AD measures and the duration 
of AD measures. In terms of hearing, no preference of any national practice was 
indicated. 82 The Report only emphasized that it would be desirable not to impose an AD 
duty unless the interested parties had been afforded an opportunity to be heard by the 
73 Ibid, at 7. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid, at 11. 
76 Ibid, at 10. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
go Ibid. 
81 Ibid 15-19. 
82 Ibid 17. 
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competent authority. 
83 Also, to increase the transparency of AD investigations, the Report 
decided that "decisions concerning the application of AD measures should be taken at a 
t 84 high administrative level and should be published'. It noted furthermore that AD duties 
should remain in force only as long as necessary to counteract dumping. It might be 
desirable for an importing country "to review the AD measure from time to time and the 
exporters might request the competent authority to do so". 85 On the issue of provisional 
AD measures, the Report put forward that while provisional AD measures might 
occasionally be justified for the purpose of limiting material injury, it "should be used 
sparingly and for the shortest possible time in order to interfere as little as possible with 
1 86 normal trade and in order that they should not assume a protectionist charactee . 
By refining the meaning of substantive terms in Article VI and clarifying certain 
procedural obligations of trade authorities, the Report is a big step forward in the 
development of legalization. It established the framework of the determination of 
dumping that is still in use today, and specified the "material injury" criterion and certain 
procedural requirements in AD investigations. Many issues discussed in the Report, such 
as price comparison, provisional AD measures and the duration of AD measures, became 
the focuses of future trade negotiations. Although the Report was unable to add 
obligations to the GATT Contracting Parties, since the Contracting Parties were under no 
mandate to take actions, it made significant contributions to the increase of precision at 
the AD regime. As a subject-specific report, it did not address the issue of dispute 
resolution and therefore was incapable of improving the level of delegation in the AD 
regime. 
The Anti-dumping Code of Kennedy Round (the 1968 Code) 
At the time that the Kennedy Round commenced in 1963, "non-tariff measures 
(NTMs) began to replace tariffs as the primary obstacle inhibiting the free flow of 
international trade". 87 There were increased pressures for the GATT to set common 
parameters in the issues of NTMs through multilateral agreements. In this context, the 
83 Ibid. 
64 Ibid 18. 
85 Ibid 19. 
86 Ibid 18. 
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AD was placed on the agenda and the result of the negotiation turned out to be the first 
88 AD code under the auspices of the GATIP, which entered into force on I July 1968. 
The Code covered five main areas, including the determination of dumping, the 
determination of material injury, investigation and administration procedures, AD duties 
and provisional measures, and AD actions on behalf of third countrieS. 89 Developed 
largely from the Report, the main purpose of the 1968 Code was to improve the level of 
precision, both in terms of procedural rules and substantive criteria for the determination 
of dumping and injury. While there was no obvious change for the determination of 
dumping on the 1968 Code in comparison with the Report, Article 3 (a) of the 1968 Code 
provided: 
A determination of injury shall be made only when the authorities 
concerned are satisfied that the dumped imports are demonstrably the 
principal cause of material injury or of threat of material injury or the 
principal cause of material retardation of the establishment of such an 
industry. In reaching their decision the authorities shall weigh, on one 
hand the effect of the dumping, and on the other hand, all otherfactors 
which may be adversely affecting the industry. (emphasis added) 
In addition, it specified minimal procedural standards for AD investigations, such as 
the authorities were required to conduct dumping and injury investigations 
simultaneously, and provisional measures could only be applied upon an affirmative 
finding of both dumping and injury. 90 The Code also established a permanent Committee 
on Anti-dumping Practices (the AD Committee) to resolve disputes between contracting 
parties on the administration of national laws, to consider and make recommendations on 
new AD laws or changes in existing legislations, and to oversee the efforts of the 
signatories to bring their legislations in line with the new Code. 91 
As the first separate multilateral agreement dealing with AD, the 1968 Code 
significantly promoted legalization in the AD regime after GATr Article VI. Remarkable 
advancement of obligation and precision on the basis of the Report can be identified from 
87 Stewart (n 46) 1417. ('The GArr Uruguay Round') 
88 GATr Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1968), reprinted 
in GATT, BISD 15'ý Supp., 26. (the 1968 Code) 
89 Art 2-12 of the 1968 Code. 
90 Art 5 and 10 of the 1968 Code. 
91 Art II of the 1968 Code. 
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the 1968 Code. It tightened up the rules in the AD investigation in both substantial and 
procedural terms. In particular, it imposed much more stringent obligations on importing 
trade authorities in the determination of injury. Although the 1968 Code was applied to 
those who signed it92' it turned most issues clarified and discussed in the Report into 
legally binding rules. 
The achievements of the 1968 Code are not limited in promoting the level of 
obligation and precision of international AD rules, however. The establishment of the AD 
Committee to resolve disputes and superintend national AD laws was an important 
development of delegation in the AD regime. Most significantly, a general article was 
inserted in obligating each signatory to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and 
administrative procedures with the provision of the 1968 Code. 93 The laws of, inter alia, 
the US, the EC, Canada and Australia were modified to reflect the GATr 1968 Code, 
even though the US did not formally adopt the 1968 Code. 94 . After the Kennedy Round, 
major trading partners' AD legislations were all largely based upon the wording of 
thel968 Code. For the first time, the demonstrative convergence emerged as a result of 
the development of multilateral rules in the AD regime. 
The Anti-dumping Code of Tokyo Round (the 1979 Code) 
Launched in 1973, the Tokyo Round negotiation had "an ambitious agenda", 
including "significant tariff reduction" and "a major focus on non-tariff measures". 95 AD, 
however, was not considered a priority early in the Round because of the resistance of 
further legalization by major trading partners, in particular the US. It is argued that the 
history of the US Congressional opposition to the 1968 Code "made the US negotiators 
hesitate to undertake further AD negotiations". 96 Given the political sensitivity of this 
area, trading partners were worrying that "a breakdown of negotiation in the AD regime 
9 97 could endanger the success of the entire Round'. Until later in the Round, under the 
92 Art 14 of the 1968 Code. Due to the congress opposition, the US did not adopt the 1968 Code. 
93 Lowenfeld (n 9) 249. (International Econornic Law') 
91 Stewart (n 46) 143 1. ('The GATr Uruguay Round') 
95 Ibid 1435. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
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auspices of the AD Committee, trading partners were starting to grapple with difficult 
issues which were in need of further clarification and refine them in the negotiation. 
The end result was the 1979 Code, officially titled "Agreement on Implementation 
, 98 of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade'. The new Code continued 
the efforts of promoting a higher level of legalization in the AD regime. Despite its 
similarity with the 1968 Code, the new Code was intended to supersede the old one and 
signatories specially denounced the 1968 Code. 99 
With respect to obligation, while some basic obligations remained unchanged from 
the 1968 Code, several new obligations were added, and others were significantly 
modified or expanded. One area of significant reform was the determination of material 
injury. 100 On the one hand, the new Code revised the 1968 Code so that it was no longer 
necessary to show that dumping was "the principal cause of injury" when contributing 
factors exist. 101 Instead, a non-exhaustive list of all relevant economic factors and indices 
having a bearing on the state of injury was provided and the competent authority was 
expected to examine all of them. 102 On the other hand, the 1979 Code specified that a 
determination of injury should be based on positive evidence of two areas: "(a) the 
volume of the dumped imports and their effect on prices in the domestic market for like 
products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such 
products". 103 
Other major obligations added or modified in the 1979 Code were the length of AD 
investigations (except in special circumstance, an investigation shall be concluded within 
one year) 104; the rule of evidence, especially those of confidential information (requiring 
the cause be shown as to why such data should be considered as confidential and the 
submission of public summaries of such data) 105 and the rule of price undertaking. ' 06 
With the addition or modification of these obligations, a comprehensive framework at 
99 GATT Agreement on Implementation ofArticle VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, (1980) reprinted 
in GATr, BISD 26h Supp., 17 1. (the 1979 Code) 
99 Art 16 (5) of the 1979 Code. 
100 Stewart (n 46) 1456. ("Ile GATT Uruguay Round') 
101 Art 3.3 of the 1979 Code. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Art 3.1 of the 1979 Code. 
'04 Art 5.5 of the 1979 Code. 
105 Art 6.3 and 4 of the 1979 Code. 
106 Art 7 of the 1979 Code. 
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international level has been established to regulate the conduct of investigating 
authorities. The level of obligation and precision in the AD regime again has been 
improved. 
The last major area of change was the addition of a special dispute settlement 
provision - Article 15 "Consultation, Conciliation and Dispute Settlement". 107 Article 15 
stated that any Contracting Party that believed "any benefit accruing to it under this Code 
is being nullified or impaired" could request consultations with the offending party and 
each party was to provide "sympathetic consideration" to any request for consultation. 108 
In case that parties fail to find a mutually agreed solution through consultation, the matter 
could be referred to the Committee for conciliation. 109 The Committee should then "meet 
within 30 days to review the matter" and "encourage the Parties involved to develop a 
mutually acceptable solution". " 0 Finally, if these efforts were fruitless, the Committee, at 
the request of any Party involved, should "establish a panel to examine the matter, based 
upon the written statement of the exporting country and the facts made available to the 
authorities of the importing country". "' Procedures under Article 15 were governed by 
the provisions of "Understanding regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute 
Settlement and Surveillance". 112 As the first dispute settlement provision inserted into an 
AD Code, this provision demonstrated the Contracting Parties' desire to strength the 
delegation to third-party adjudicators in the AD regime. Notwithstanding the imperfect 
general DSM in the GATT, this provision, by requesting the panel examination of both 
the statement of exporting country and facts available to the competent authorities, 
significantly pushed the process of legalization in the AD regime forward. 
In sum, a continuity of the improvement of legalization between the 1979 Code and 
the previous GATT AD texts can be observed. In particular in terms of obligation and 
precision, the 1979 Code carried forward the unfinished job of the 1968 Code, further 
clarifying both substantive terms in Article VI and investigating procedures. The 
presence of a special dispute settlement provision illustrated the parties' concern 
107 Art 15 of the 1979 Code. 
108 Art 15.2 of the 1979 Code. 
109 Art 15.3 of the 1979 Code. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Art 15.5 of the 1979 Code. 
112 Art 15.7 of the 1979 Code. 
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regarding delegation in this particular regime. Although Article 15 of the 1979 Code did 
not necessarily make the AD regime special in the GATr with respect to dispute 
settlement, it makes dispute settlement in this regime more "rule-oriented". The impact of 
this movement of legalization was two-fold: on the one hand, it made AD rules one of the 
most comprehensive and sophisticated multilateral legal framework under the GATT; on 
the other hand, it resulted in the distrust and hesitation of some trading partners, inter 
alia, the US to further legalization. 
3.1.2 The Uruguay Round and the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement (ADA) 
The Uruguay Round Negotiation 
AD has not been expected as a area where intense negotiations would be conduced 
when the Uruguay Round was first launched in 1986. However, as the negotiations 
unfolded, serious contentions emerged in the AD area. As observed, on the one hand, 
"the US and the EU determined to plug 'loopholes' of the 1979 Code, in particular 
regarding the use of certain devices to prevent the circumvention of AD duties". 
113 On 
the other hand, "many of other countries commonly targeted by AD actions pressed for 
changes in both the basic concepts embodied in the 1967 and 1979 Code and the 
practices that seemed to tilt the required price comparison against imports, so as to make 
the AD rules less susceptible to use for the protectionist purpose". 114 Due to lack of 
consensus on most of the major issues, drafting a text satisfactory to all parties appeared 
to be impossible at early negotiations. Finally, the parties managed to reach a set of 
compromises, as set out in the ADA: the procedural rules were tightened, with only few, 
rather minimal, tightening of substantive rules. As correctly argued, this new ADA "does 
not reflect so much a coherent philosophy as a package of compromises --- some 
, 115 favouring imports, but others addressing to the needs of domestic producers' . 
During the long and difficult negotiation of the Uruguay Round, there were a 
number of "open issues" raised in the AD regime, which required "urgent political 
decisions". 116 These issues were first identified in the Ramsauer Draft Text, a draft text 
113 Jackson, Davey and Sykes (n 23) 695. ('Legal Problems of International Economic Relations') 
114 Ibid. 
115 Lowenfeld (n 9) 250. ('International Economic Law') 
... Stewart (n 46) 1532. ('Tbe GATT Uruguay Round') 
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issued in 1991 to be a compromise document for continuing negotiations 
117 
. It included: 
118 
(1) use of weighted averages in the calculation of export 
prices and normal value; 
(2) sales below cost ofproduction; 
(3) constructed value: calculation of administrative, selling 
and other costs and profits; 
(4) standing; 
(5) de minimis margins of dumping and negative import 
volumes; 
(6) cumulation of imports from multiple countries for 
determination of injury; 
(7) sampling; 
(8) sunset, 
(9) anti-circumvention; 
(10) dispute settlement, 
(11) public interest. 
Given the divergent interests of negotiating parties, while some issues enjoyed a 
fairly broad consensus, such as inserting a sunset review, strengthening transparency and 
procedural due process, most others were "characterized by a polarization of 
positions". 119 The contention about key issues reflected two different perspectives of the 
parties: some were of the view that international AD rules should be "strengthened and 
improved so that relief from unfair trade practices would be more timely and effective"; 
others held that the 1979 Code should be revised "to deal with implementation on the part 
of some countries that had led to arbitrary, burdensome and unfair results". 
120 
Consequently, the level of legalization in the final text of ADA has been significantly 
influenced by the competing positions of parties in the negotiation. 
Despite substantial disagreements among parties regarding whether the changes 
contained in the final text were "appropriate, necessary or sufficient", the "clarifications, 
modifications and expansions" of these key AD issues in the Uruguay Round 
demonstrated the latest major improvement of legalization in the AD regime, in particular 
in terms of obligation and precision. 
117 GATT Draft Anti-dumping Code (Nov 26,1991) (unpublished working documents), cited in Stewart (n 46) 1533. 
118 Ibid 153 1. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid 1537. 
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Legal Status of the ADA 
a. An Overview 
In general, the new WTO ADA is "a much more specific and detailed document 
than its predecessors". 121 It took a large step further than the old Codes, in terms of both 
procedural and substantive rules, although it still need to be understood as part of the 
political balancing between trade liberalization objectives of the GATT/WTO and WTO 
Members' domestic concerns. It is in particular directed at "addressing some of the 
perceived shortcomings and abuses made possible by the vagaries of the old Codes and 
imposed more tight procedural obligations on trade authorities". 122 However, before the 
general examination of ADA starts, it has to be pointed out that these improvements of 
international AD rules never successfully prevented AD from being the most important 
modem non-tariff barrier. So, "the concept of AD on paper might be disarmingly simple, 
whereas in practice, it is anything but that". 123 
in total, there are eighteen articles in the ADA, with two annexes on procedural 
requirements for on-the-spot investigation and best information available. Article 2 to 
Article 4 dealt with the basic substantial issues, namely the determination of dumping, 
the determination of injury and the definition of domestic industry. By providing 
definitions to key words like dumping, normal value, constructed normal value, sale 
below cost and fair comparison, Article 2 sets forth the detailed rules for determining the 
existence and the margin of dumping. To establish the existence of dumping, Article 2.1 
requires "a comparison of the export price with the comparable price, in the ordinary 
course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting 
country. " 124 For the meaning of "like product", Article 2.6 clarified it as either identical, 
or "close resembling" in case of absence of identical one. 125 If there are some situations, 
where no comparable price of domestic sale of the product in question exists, or the 
121 K Steele (eds) Anti-dumping Under the WTO: A Comparative Review (Kluwer Law International and International 
Bar Association, London 1996) 3. ('Anti-dumping Under the WTO') 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid 6. 
124 VVrTO United States - Anti-dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip 
from Korea - Report of the Panel (Part I and Part 2) (22 December 2000)WT/DS179/R, paras. 6.90-6.91. (US - Steel 
Plate) 
125 Art 2.6 of the ADA. 
99 
Chapter TV 
domestic price cannot be relied on as the reference of comparison, Article 2.3 authorizes 
importing Members to compare the export price with the constructed normal value of the 
product, a price that does not actually exists, but is calculated by adding costs, selling, 
general, and administrative (SG&A) costs, and profit. 126 Furthermore, Article 2.4 
provides available methodologies to be used by trade authorities in doing the comparison 
and calculating dumping margin. 127 
Article 3 turns the focus on "substantive obligations that a Member must fulfil in 
making an injury determination". 128 Among them, Article 3.1 is an overarching provision 
that sets forth a Member's fundamental obligation in this respect -a determination shall 
be based on both "the quantity of dumped products and its effect on the price of like 
products and producers of such products". 129 Although without a definition of either " 
material injury" or "threat of material injury", the succeeding paragraphs on Article 3 
imposed more obligations to trade authorities on the following issues: the determination 
of the volume of dumping imports and their effect on prices (Article 3.2), investigations 
of imports from more than one country (Article 3.3), the impact of dumped imports on 
the domestic industry (Article 3.4), causality between dumped imports and injury (Article 
3.5), the assessment of the domestic production of the like product (Article 3.6) and the 
determination of the threat of material injury (Article 3.7 and 3.8). 130 Essentially, this 
article is the same as the 1979 Code, emphasising that injuries caused by factors other 
than dumping should not be attribute to the dumping, but "rejecting the idea that dumping 
should be demonstrably the major cause of the injury in 1967 Code". 131 
Except the first three substantive Articles, the majority of other Articles are dealing 
with procedural issues, including the investigation (Article 5), evidence (Article 6), 
provisional measures (Article 7), price undertaking (Article 8), imposition and collection 
of AD duty (Article 9), retroactivity (Article 10), duration and review of AD duties and 
126 Art 2.3 of the ADA; also M Matsushita, T Schocnbaurn and P Mavroidis The World Trade Organization: law. 
Practice and Policy (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003) 316. ('The WTO') 
127 Art 2.4 of the ADA. 
128 WTO Thailand - Anti-Dumping Duties on - Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams 
from Poland - AB-2000-12 - Report of the Appellate Body (12 March 2001)WT/DS122/AB/R, para. 106. (Thailand - 
H-Bearn) 
129 Art 3.1 of the ADA. 
I" Thailand - H-Bearn (n 130) para. 106. 131 Matsushita, Schoenbaurn and Mavroidis (n 126) 326. ('The WTO') 
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price undertakings (Article 11), public notice (Article 12) and independent judicial 
review at domestic level (Article 13). 
These procedural obligations are in general much more precise and less 
controversial than substantive issues. The improvement of the level of precision of 
procedural standards offered great helps to exporting countries when arguing their cases 
in front of the WTO panels or the AB. For instance, in United States- Hot-Rolled Steel, 
the US authority asked a Japanese exporter to submit evidence that was in the possession 
of its US joint venture. As its request failed, it decided to resort to a "facts available" 
methodology because of the failure of the Japanese exporter to submit the required 
evidence, which was caused by the refusal of its joint venture to supply them. 132 The AB 
ruled against the US, stating that the US was wrong in utilizing a fact available approach 
because the Japan exporter could not be said to be uncooperative in light of its joint 
venture's refusal. 133 By refusing the US's interpretation of "cooperative", the AB actually 
required trade authorities to act "in a reasonable, objective and practical manner", which 
in general means closer adherence to the ADA's procedural standards. 134 
Part II of the ADA contains two important institutional provisions. Article 16 
establishes a Committee on Anti-dumping Practice (APC), to which Members are obliged 
to submit several types of notification, including Notifications of Anti-Dumping 
Legislations and/or Regulations, Notifications of Anti-Dumping Actions, Notifications of 
Preliminary and Final Actions and Notifications of Competent Authorities. 135 As part of 
the surveillance mechanism of the WTO, the practice of APC enhanced the transparency 
of national AD rules. Article 17, dealing with the consultation and dispute settlement of 
AD disputes, is one of the most important, as well as controversial, provisions in ADA. 
Among the sub-paragraphs of Article 17, the most controversial part is its special 
standard of review of both factual and legal determinations by national authorities. 136 
This provision, "insisted upon by the US and accepted reluctantly by other parties as the 
132 WTO United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan - AB-2001-2 - 
Report of the Appellate Body (24 July 2001) V; T/DS184/ABIR (US -Hot-Rolled Steel). 133 Matsushita, Schoenbaum. and Mavroidis (n 126) 311. ('The WTO') 
134 WTO Guatemala - Definitive Anti-dumping Measure on Grey Portland Cementfrom Mexico - Report of the Panel 
(24 October 2000) WT/DS 156/R, para. 8.25 1. (Guatemala - Cement II) 135 WTO Anti-dumping: Notifications under the agreement on implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994, available 
at: htip: //www. wto. org/enjzlish/tratop e/adV e/antidum3 e. htm (visited 4 Jan 2005) 
116 Matsushita, Schoenbaum. and Mavroidis (n 126) 33 1. ('The V; TO') 
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Uruguay Round was coming to a make-or-break close", brought "serious criticism! ' of 
not only the AD rules, but also the whole DSM, as to be elaborated below. 137 
In short, the ADA continued the efforts of previous GATr codes and established a 
fairly "legalized" system in the AD regime. 
b. Obligation 
A central feature of the status of legalization of the ADA is the variability of its 
obligations. Although the ADA imposed a wide range of legally binding obligations on 
Members, the nature of these obligations differs, "from resulting coercion, comity or 
even morality alone". 138 Some of the obligations are specific and unconditional, which 
unambiguously require or prohibit certain behaviours of competent authorities. Others, 
however, are worded to circumscribe their obligatory force, and tolerate various practices 
of Members. To a large extent, the obligations in the ADA construct a continuum, from 
those which require specific implementations in national AD legislations, to those leaving 
greater flexibility to national authorities in developing their own practice, as shown on 
Chart 3. Various degrees of conditionality and specificity of the ADA obligations 
influence not only the level of obligations of ADA, but also closely link to the level of 
precision of the ADA, as to be discussed below. 
Very Specific and Detailed Rules but No 
Unconditional Specific 
(for example, Implementation 
Article 6.1.1 - Required, Implicit 
exporters or Conditions 
foreign producers (for example, Article 
receiving 2.4 - fair comparison 
questionnaires between export price 
shall be given at and the normal value) 
least 30 days for 
reply) 
Contingent Very General 
Obligations Principles 
Subject to National (for example, 
Implementation due process) 
(for example, 
Article 2.3 -"on 
such reasonable 
basis as the 
authorities may 
determine") 
Chart 3 Various Degree of Conditionality and Specificity of ADA Obligations 
"I Lowenfeld (n 9) 29 1. (International Economic Law') 
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Chart 3 indicates that the provisions in the ADA can be categorized as four types: 
unconditional and specific, specific with implicit conditions, contingent and principle. 
The first group of provisions provides detailed rules that give national authorities direct 
instructions on AD proceedings. The second and the third groups are fairly detailed, but 
in many situations, it remains unclear from the wording of them whether a particular 
decision or action taken (or not taken) by an authority during the course of an AD 
proceeding is WTO-consistent or not. 139 The difference between them is therefore 
instructive, rather than dichotomous - the third group of provisions may explicitly allow a 
competent authority to make decisions under special circumstances, but the second group 
only implicitly tolerates divergent national practices. The last group contains general 
principle obligations. The wording of this group of provisions makes normative claims 
instead of imposing specific obligations, such as the "sufficient", "Unbiased and objective 
manner" and "due process". 
In general, the ADA articulates substantive and procedural obligations in different 
manners. Although it has defined key substantive terms in the first three provisions in a 
fairly detailed manner, substantive obligations of the ADA do not require WTO Members 
to change their sharply different practices. 140 Hence, most substantive provisions in the 
ADA can be classified as the second or third group. They play a rather baseline role in 
national AD proceedings - they have been incorporated into domestic legislations, but 
can be interpreted in the way WTO Members prefer, instead of instructing national 
authorities to act in a particular way. 141 With respect to procedural obligations, the ADA 
makes a different, indeed tighter, stand. A number of procedural provisions imposed 
obligations to national AD authorities, intending to directly discipline their behaviour. If 
those procedural requirements cannot be met, there is a real risk that the measure taken 
by the authorities might be easily challenged in the WTO. 142 Most of procedural 
138 K Abbott, R Keohane, A Moravcsik, A Slaughter and D Snidal 'The Concept of Legalization' (2000) 54 
international Organization 401,408. ('Concept of Legalization') 
"' M Cetlan 'WTO Dispute Settlement: Issues in Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Law'(1998) 1075 Practising 
Law Institute/Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series 799,828. ('Issues in AD and CVD Law') 
"0 J Kim 'Fair Price Comparison in the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement - Recent WTO Panel Decisions against the 
"Zeroing7' Method' (2002) 36 (1) JWT 39,39. (Tair Price Comparison in the ADA') 
141 'nie large degree of discretion of each WTO Member in AD regime has been widely discussed, in particular within 
the context of dispute settlement. For example, Cetlan (n 141) 804. ('Issues in AD and CVD Law') 
142 For example, if the investigation authority cannot conclude the investigation within the required time limit, it is very 
possible that, as a result, the measure rnight be challenged in the WTO. I Czako, J Human and I Miranda A Handbook 
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provisions therefore are qualified as the first group. Both substantive and procedural 
provisions contain some principle obligations, which "inform" the rest of the provision. 
Table I further illustrates the variety of nature of obligations in the ADA. For the purpose 
of concise presentation, each provision is dissected to paragraphs and characterized as 
one of the four groups. In exceptional circumstance, when an important principle 
obligation exists to inform the rest of the paragraph, a paragraph may have two 
characters. 
Specific and 
Unconditional 
Specific with 
implicit condition 
Contingent Principle 
Art I --- 
Art 2.1 --- 
Art 2.2 --- 
Art 2.3 --- 
Art 2.4 --- --- 
(fair) 
Art 2.5 --- 
Art 2.6 --- 
Art 2.7 --- 
Art 3.1 --- 
Art 3.2 --- 
Art 3.3 --- 
Art 3.4 --- 
Art 3.5 --- 
Art 3.6 --- 
Art 3.7 --- 
Art 3.8 --- 
(special 
on Anti-dumping Investigation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003) 42. ("Handbook on Anti-dumping 
investigation') 
104 
Chapter IV 
care) 
Art 4.1 --- 
Art 4.2 --- 
Art 5.1 --- 
Art 5.2 --- 
Art 5.3 --- 
Art 5.4 --- 
Art 5.5 --- 
Art 5.6 --- --- 
(sufficient 
evidence) 
Art 5.7 --- 
Art 5.8 --- --- 
(sufficient 
evidence) 
Art 5.9 
Art 5.10 --- 
Art 6.1 --- 
Art 6.2 --- 
Art 6.3 --- 
Art 6.4 --- 
Art 6.5 --- 
Art 6.6 --- 
Art 6.7 --- 
Art 6.8 --- 
Art 6.9 --- 
Art 6.10 
--- 
Art 6.11 --- 
Art 6.12 --- 
6.13 
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Art 6.14 --- 
Art 7.1 --- 
Art 7.2 --- 
Art 7.3 --- 
Art 7.4 --- --- (as 
short as 
possible) 
Art 7.5 --- 
Art S. I --- 
Art 8.2 --- 
Art 8.3 --- 
Art 8.4 --- 
Art 8.5 --- 
Art 8.6 --- 
Art 9.1 --- 
Art 9.2 --- 
Art 9.3 --- 
Art 9.4 --- 
Art 9.5 --- 
Art 10.1 --- 
Art 10.2 --- 
Art 10.3 --- 
Art 10.4 --- 
Art 10.5 --- 
Art 10.6 --- 
Art 10.7 --- 
Art 10.8 --- 
Art 11.1 
--- (as 
long as and 
to the 
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extent 
necessary) 
Art 11.2 --- 
Art 11.3 --- 
Art 11.4 --- 
Art 11.5 --- 
Art 12.1 --- 
Art 12.2 --- 
Art 12.3 --- 
Art 13 --- --- 
(independe 
nt) 
Art 14.1 --- 
Art 14.2 
Art 14.3 --- 
Art 14.4 --- 
Art 15.1 --- 
(constructiv 
e remedies) 
Art 16.1 --- 
Art 16.2 
Art 16.3 --- 
Art 16.4 --- 
Art 16.5 --- 
Art 17.1 --- 
Art 17.2 
Art 17.3 --- 
Art 17.4 --- 
Art 17.5 --- 
17.6 
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Art 17.7 
Art 18.1 
ATt 18.2 
Art 18.3 
Art 18.4 
Art 18.5 
Art 18.6 
Art 18.7 
c. Precision 
It is a popular argument that "the current ADA is too vague or ambiguous on many 
key issues, leaving leeway to the authorities to interpret it in an unduly protectionist 
manner". 143 This, in turn, causes "inconsistency between different Members and 
consequent uncertainty for interested parties". 144 In particular, the second and third group 
of provisions, which covers almost all most important substantive issues in the ADA, are 
the most controversial ones. They are accused as "the main cause of the divergence of 
methods and modalities of national anti-dumping practices", which lead to greater 
difficulty in establishing a consistent and predictable AD regime under the WTO. 145 A 
question has to be asked: how the ADA provisions create vagueness and uncertainty in 
practice, even they have been articulated in such a detailed fashion? 
In answering this question, an example - calculation of dumping margin in Article 
2.4.2 - will be offered to illustrate how the "precise" obligations on paper are interpreted 
by different authorities in different ways, which are normally "unfair" to exporters. In 
this context, the reason of lack of precision of this provision will also be explored. 
According to the ADA, the existence and the degree of dumping are measured by 
the difference between the export price and the normal value, so-called "margins of 
dumping" in Article 2.4.2. The degree of final dumping duty is preliminarily based on the 
143 For example, K Adamantopoulos and D Notaris 'Ile Future of the WTO and the Reform of the Anti-dumping 
A reement: A Legal Perspective' (2000) 24 Fordharn International L. J. 30,35. ('Reform of the ADA') 14f, J Kempton and C Stevenson 'Agreement on the Implement of Article VI of the GATT 1994: Practical Problems and 
Possible Solutions' (2000) 6 International Trade Law and Regulation 6,6. ('Practical Problems and Possible 
Solutions') 
145 Celtan (n 136) 804. ('Issues in AD and CVD Law') 
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finding of this dumping margin. The importance of dumping margin calculation in the 
administration of AD laws lies in a simply fact: the AD duty is estimated on the basis of 
dumping margin. If the dumping margin is measured in a way that may result in 
66spurious" dumping margins, exporters which are subject to the duty "have to pay extra 
price for these fictitious differences between export price and normal value". 146 
Hypothetically, an investigating authority would definitely choose, among all available 
methods, one that may result in the greatest dumping margin. In this sense, it is very 
important to have international rules unambiguously ensure fairness in dumping margin 
calculation. 
It is unfair to say that we do not have detailed rules in the ADA to address to this 
important issue. Article 2.4.2 reads as: 
Subject to the provisions governing fair comparison in 
paragraph 4, the existence of margins of dumping during the 
investigation phase shall normally be established on the basis of a 
comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted 
average of prices of all comparable export transactions or by a 
comparison of normal value and export prices on a transaction-to- 
transaction basis. A normal value established on a weighted 
average basis may be compared to prices of individual export 
transactions if the authorities find a pattern of export prices which 
differ significantly among different purchasers, regions or time 
periods, and if an explanation is provided as to why such 
differences cannot be taken into account appropriately by the use 
of a weighted average-to-weighted average or transaction-to- 
transaction comparison. (emphasis added) 
The wording of Article 2.4.2 is more precise than its predecessors in the 1979 Code, 
Article 2.6, which only required fair comparison "at the same level of trade" and "in 
respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time". 147 The ADA disallowed the 
average-to-transaction comparison, a method was accused as "inherently unfair". 148 
However, this provision is far from adequate to converge the difference between national 
rules and ensure a "fair" comparison. For instance, the AD law of Czech Republic 
contains no provision that "allows the AD authority to use individual export prices in 
I` Kim (n 142) 39. (Tair Price Comparison in the ADA') 
147 Art 2.6 of the 1979 Code. 
148 Kim (n 142) 41. (Tair Price Comparison in the ADA') 
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comparison with weighted average normal value". 149 When the authority find the 
weighted average-to-weighted average method is not applicable, they will have full 
discretion to make a choice among other available methods, which may result in greater 
dumping margins. 
Even where a weighted average to weighted average approach is adopted, however, 
there can be a practical issue for dumping margin calculation where there is more than 
one type of the product concerned, as indicated in EC-Bed Linen. ' 50 EC's practice before 
EC-Bed Linen is to identify a certain number of different "models" or "types". The 
weighted average-to-weighted average comparison was done type-by-type or model-by- 
model. If a particular type is not dumped, the negative dumping was zeroed and not able 
to offset the positive dumping. So, "when the EC added up the dumping margin of each 
type or model in order to detern-dne the overall dumping margin for the product as a 
whole, the consequence of this zeroing was an increase in the resulting dumping 
margin". 15 1 The EC argued that this was a practice perfectly utilizing weighted average- 
to-weighted average method, since Article 2.4.2 did not provide any guidance as to how 
the second stage of this method, i. e. the combining of margins, should be put into 
practice. Nevertheless, this practice was found WTO-inconsistent by various WTO panels 
and the AB. 
This example clearly illustrated the problem of precision in the ADA: the 
complicated wording of the ADA did not narrow down the scope for "reasonable" 
interpretations, as discussed in Chapter II above. Most substantive rules in the second or 
the third group were formulated as relatively general "standard" rather than as relatively 
precise "rules". 152 Thus, although the ADA is highly elaborated, detailing a large number 
of conditions of application, spelling out required or proscribed behaviour in numerous 
situations, a competent authority can still make its determination ex post in relation to 
specific sets of facts. 
Apart from the complexity and technical deficiencies of the ADA, the most 
important reason for this problem was that the ADA text is the result of a compromise 
149 Kcmpton and Stevenson (n 146) 12. (Tractical Problems and Possible Solutions') 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Abbott, etc (n 135) 413. (Toncept of Legalization') 
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between very different negotiating positions emerging during the Uruguay Round, which 
was put together at the last minute, as noted in the previous section. 153 It is not surprising 
that the text of ADA lacks clear attitudes towards different practices between Members. 
This is perfectly illustrated by the negotiation history of Article 2.4.2 of the ADA. 
Before the Uruguay Round, the methods of comparing the average normal value to 
individual export prices were repeatedly challenged. 154 The GATr Panels in US- Salmon 
and EC-Audio Cassettes, however, did not take the position that Article 2.6 of the 1968 
Code outlawed any particular method of comparing the normal value and the export 
price. 155 The exporting countries, including the Nordic countries, Japan, Korea and Hong 
Kong, therefore, made several proposals, intending to strengthen the requirement of fair 
comparison in the Uruguay Round. 156 In particular, they emphasized that the calculation 
should be conducted in a "uniform and consistent", or "symmetricar' manner. 157 They 
particularly argue that any differentiation in "the method of calculation of the normal 
value and the export price without justifiable causes" should be disallowed. 158 On the 
other hand, the US and the EU strongly resisted any changes in this provision in the 
direction of making it less trade restrictive. 159 
In July 1990, a special Informal Group on AD headed by Charles Carlisle, then 
Deputy Direct-General of the GATT, released the so-called "Carlisle draft" which 
"temporarily hammered out the disagreement" between these two groups. 160 Regarding to 
calculating dumping margin, this draft advocated "neutral methods". The draft Article 
2.4.3 provided that "authorities shall in particular ensure that no margins of dumping are 
found when there are similar patterns of levels of movements of prices in the two 
153 Adamantopoulos and Notaris (n 145)35. ('Reform of the ADA') 
114 Kim (n 142) 45. ffair Price Comparison in the ADA') 
155 GATT Unite State - Imposition of Anti-dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon ftom 
Norway, Report of the Panel adopted by the Committee on Anti-dumping Practices on 27 April 1994, GATT Document 
ADP87, November 1992, para. 474; and European Community - And-dumping Duties on Audio Tapes in Cassettes 
Originating in Japan, GATT Document (unadopted), ADP/136/ Corr. 1, June 1995, para. 115. 
116 Kim (n 142) 42. ('Fair Price Comparison in the ADA') 
15' The Nordic countries especially proposed that the normal value and export price should be calculated in a "uniform 
and consistenf' manner, while Japan argued that the Tokyo Code should be amended so that it could ensure 
symmetrical comparison of the normal value and the export price. GATT Submission by the Nordic Countries, MTN. 
GNG/NG8/W/64 (December 1989) 5, and Submission of Japan on the Amendments to the Anti-dumping Code, MTN. 
GNGJNG8/W/48 (August 1989) 5. 
158 lbid, Japan's subn-dssion, 5. 
"' G Horlick and E Shea 'The World Trade Organization Anti-dumping Agreement' (1995) 29 (1) JWT 1,12. ('The 
WTO ADA') 
" Kim (n 142) 44. ffair Price Comparison in the ADA') 
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markets. " 161 Unfortunately, when the final result of negotiation released in December 
1991 as so-called "Dunkel texf', the principle of "fair comparison" as presented in the 
Carlisle draft was weakened. Significantly, the Dunkel text dropped the express support 
for "neutral methods", by which "the price comparison would reflect the movement of 
prices in the domestic and export market". 162 Moreover, the Dunkel text also support both 
weighted average-to-weighted average and transaction-to-transaction methods and 
explicitly departed from the Carlisle draft in which it was provided that "the normal value 
and export price shall, as a rule, be established on a weighted average basis". 163 
To a large extent, the negotiation history of dumping margin calculation manifests 
the common situation of negotiations involving most second and third groups of 
provisions in the Uruguay Round. Those negotiations always involved two sides. On the 
one hand, the exporting, or "target", countries, advocated various changes that would 
reduce the authority's discretion in administrating AD laws, mainly by codifying details 
of the provisions and requiring higher standard of fairness. On the other hand, the final 
outcomes of negotiation were always subject to the repeated attempts by the EC and the 
US to legitimate their interpretations of AD rules and their practices, which have been 
established for years. Hence, the ADA achieved the improvement of precision in a certain 
number of provisions, but overall precision is hard to reach the higher standard as 
expected by exporting countries. There were always trade-offs in the negotiations and it 
is impossible to totally exclude the discretion of national authorities. If those second and 
third groups of provisions are accused of imprecision, it is important to point out that 
their imprecision is not simply the result of a failure of legal draftsmanship, but rather a 
deliberate choice given the circumstances of the Uruguay Round negotiation. The 
imprecision of the ADA has, however, mixed effects on the process of legalization and 
the development of the DSM: on the one hand, it affords the DSM an opportunity to push 
the level of legalization and gain authority by clarifying the provisions; it, on the other 
"I GATr Report of the Acting Chairman of the Informal Group on Anti-dumping, MTN. GNG/NG8/W/83/Add5 (July 
1990)7. 
162 GATr Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Agreement 
on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, GATr Document MTN. TNCtW/FA, 
December 199 1, Art 2.4.2. 
163 Kempton and Stevenson (n 146) 45. ('Practical Problems and Possible Solutions') 
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hand, brought considerable controversies on, not only the interpretation of a particular 
ADA provision, but also the nature of the DSM and the process of legalization. 
d. Delegation 
The ADA in general has the most characteristic form of delegation in the WTO 
system - Article 17.1 sets the tone as "the Dispute Settlement Understanding is applicable 
, 64 to consultations and the settlement of disputes under this Agreement' I Given the 
heavily debated negotiation history of Article 17 and the different language between it 
and the general rules of the DSU, especially in terms of standards of review, many, 
including the Panel in Guatemala_, 165 , however, were of the opinion that Article 17 
provided for a coherent set of special rules for AD disputes. The AB disagreed with it. 166 
It held that the special or additional rules within the meaning of Article 1.2 of the DSM 
shall prevail over the provisions of the DSU only "to the extent that there is a difference 
between the two sets of provisions". 167 Here, "difference" was further interpreted as 
66conflict", i. e. the provisions of the DSU and the special or additional rules and 
procedures of a covered agreement are "mutually inconsistent and cannot be read as 
complementing each other". 168 The AB did not consider there is a conflict in this case. 
Therefore, in the view of protecting the integrity of the WTO DSM, the AB ruled that 
Article 17 of the ADA does not replace "the more general approach of the DSU". 169 
Even though Article 17 cannot replace the general approach of the DSU, the specific 
features in some of the Article 17 paragraphs are undeniable. Delegation in the ADA 
therefore can be divided into two parts: non-special provisions, namely Article 17.1-17.3 
170 
and special rules, Article 17.4 - 17.7, contained in the list of Appendix 2 of the ADA. 
For the non-special provisions, the equivalent provisions can be found in the DSU or 
other WTO agreements: Article 17.2 has similar wording of Article 4.2 of the DSU; 
Article 17.3 is considered as the equivalent provision in the ADA to Article XXII and 
164 Art 17.1 of the ADA. 
115 WTO Guatemala - Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cementfrom Mexico - Report of the Pane (19 
June 1998)WT/DS60/R, para 7.16. (Guatemala-Cement I Panel) 
161 WTO Guatemala - Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cementfrom Mexico - AB-1998-6 - Report of 
the Appellate Body (2 November 1998) WT/DS60/AB/R, para 65-68. (Guatemala -I AB) 167 Ibid para, 65. 
169 Ibid. 
169 Ibid para 67. 
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XXIII of the GATT 1994 171 , and closely linked to Article 26 of the DSU. These 
provisions delegate the same authority to the panel and the AB in settling the AD 
disputes as well as other WTO cases. 
Referred to as "special rules", Article 17.4-17.7 do not have exact equivalents in the 
DSU or other WrO agreements. Nevertheless, they still can be traced back to the DSU. 
For instance, Article 17.4 has similar function as Article 6 of the DSU and was frequently 
read together with Article 7 of the DSU in the panel or AB reports. 172 The special 
reference of Article 17.4 to "final action" of three types of AD measures - definitive AD 
duties, price undertakings and provisional AD measures - did not limit "the nature of the 
claims that may be brought concerning alleged nullification or impairment of benefits or 
the impeding of the achievement of any objective in a dispute under the ADA", as stated 
by the AB . 
173 Accordingly, the US's argument in US-1 916 Act'74 that Members could not 
bring a claim of inconsistency with the ADA against legislation as such was rejected on 
the ground that Article 17.1 does not address or affect a Member's right to bring a claim 
of inconsistency again an AD legislation independently from a claim with respect to one 
of the three measures identified in Article 17.4.175 
Article 17.6, the standard of review applicable in AD disputes, has been proven as 
the most controversial special rule of Article 17. It is more specific than Article II of the 
DSU, the commonly understood legal basis of the standard of review in the DSU, and as 
argued, "calls for more deference to domestic agency determinations". 176 Under the 
factual standard of review in Article 17.6 (i), panels must "determine whether domestic 
authorities have properly established the facts and evaluated them in an unbiased and 
170 Appendix 2 of the DSU. 
171 Guatemala-I AB (n 168) para 64. 
172 lbid para 70 and 77. 
173 Ibid para 79. 
174 WTO United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 - Complaint by the European Communities - Report of the Panel 
31 March 2000) WT/DS1361R. para 5.27 (US-1916 Act EQ; and United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 - 
Complaint by Japan - Report of thePanel (Part I and Part 2) (29 May 2000) WT/DS162/R, para6.91. (US - 1916Act 
hpan) 
175 WTO United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 - AB-2000-5 - AB-2000-6-Report of the AB (28 August 2000) 
WTIDS 162/AB/R, para 74. (US - 1916 Act AB) 
176 United States General Accounting Office 'World Trade Organization Standard of Review and Impact of Trade 
Remedy Rules - Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Finance, US Senate' GAO-03-824, July 2003 
< www. iiao. i! ov/cpi-bin/geiiMt? GAT-03-824> (last visited 20 October 2005) 24. (GAO Report) 
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objective manner". 177 At this point, an AD panel's obligation closely reflects the 
obligation imposed on other panels under Article 11 of the DSU. The second part of 
Article 17.6 addresses the standard of review on legal issues. Under it, panels must apply 
established international rules, namely the VCLT, in interpreting the provisions of the 
ADA. 178 When a panel applies these rules and finds that there is more than one 
permissible way to interpret a provision of the ADA, it must "uphold the domestic 
agency's determination if it is consistent with one of the permissible interpretation". 179 
There is a division of opinions among scholars. 180 Some argue that if one follows the 
first sentence in 17.6, there always is only one permissible interpretation. Therefore, the 
analysis is over and the second sentence has no meaning whatsoever. The opposite view 
insists that in fact, evidences suggest that there are situations in which one could argue 
that "there exists more than one permissible interpretations". ' 81 The panel and the AB are 
obligated to defer to the national authorities' determination, instead of overturning them, 
even if they consider better interpretations which are more consistent with the ADA are 
available. 
This single sentence of Article 17.6 (ii) brought a wide range of far-reaching 
normative questions beyond the review of administrative actions under the ADA, from 
the resistance to hegemony in the multilateral trading system, to the pragmatics of 
asymmetrical power in WTO decision-making and judicial branches. 182 It also reinforces 
that the expansion of legalization in the AD regime is uneven and imbalanced. The issue 
will be further discussed below. 
3.1.3 AD in the Doha Round 
In 2001, the first new round of trade negotiation after the birth of the WTO was 
fon-nally launched, as the so-called Doha Development Round. The November 2001 
Declaration of the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, provides the mandate 
177 VITO United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan - AB-2001-2 - 
Report of the Appellate Body (24 July 2001) VY7/DS184/AB/R, para, 55 and 62. (US-Hot-Rolled Steel AB) 
178 GAO Report (n 178) at 25. 
179 Ibid. 
"J Jackson 'The Varied Policies of International Judicial Bodies - Reflection on Theory and Practice' (2004) 25 
Michigan J Int'l L. 869,87 1. ('Policies of International Judicial Bodies') 
181 Ibid. 
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for negotiations on a range of subjects, including issues concerning the implementation of 
the present agreements, such as the ADA. 183 A good opportunity seemed to emerge to 
significantly enhance the level of legalization in the AD regime. Six years later, 
unfortunately, there is still no definitive answer whether the Doha Round negotiations 
have improved the level of legalization in the AD regime. 
In general, three features can be identified in Doha Round rule negotiations: 
restricted boundary, emphasis on precision and clarification, and divergent positions of 
parties. The first two features are especially intertwined in the sense that the restricted 
boundary of negotiation determined that Members could only emphasize on precision 
rather than proposing on fundamental reforms of the existing obligations. 
The restricted subject matters in Doha rule negotiation are the first indicator of how 
little negotiations can do to move the legalization process forward. From the beginning of 
the Doha Round, strict limits were put on what was open to negotiation. 184 Given the 
resistance of the US and the EU to open negotiations on fundamental issues of the AD 
regime, Article 28 of Doha Ministerial Declaration provided that negotiations were 
"aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines" under the ADA, "while preserving the 
basic concepts, principles and effectiveness of these Agreements and their instruments 
and objectives". 185 The wording precisely points out that that fundamental concepts, no 
matter how controversial they might be, must be maintained and improvements should 
aim to the functioning of the AD mechanisms to enhance their effectiveness. 186 This Strict 
boundary of negotiation disappointed many commentators as they considered that "the 
effectiveness of the current system was a function of biased or cumbersome procedures in 
national institutions" so that little meaningful reforms can be expected from the Doha 
Round negotiations. 187 
Three factors further indicate that Doha negotiations are less likely to create new 
obligations for WTO Members. The negotiations are rather working on the precision of 
182 For example, D Tarullo 'The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti- 
dumping Decisions' (2002) 34 Law and Policy in Int Business 109,167-172. ('Ile Hidden Cost') 
"' WTO 'Negotiations, implementation and development: the Doha agenda', available at < 
http: //www. wto. ori! /enjzlish/traton c/dda e/dda e. htm> (last visited 25 October 2005) 
184 Kerr and Loppacher (n 1) 211. ('Anti-dumping in the Doha Negotiations') 
115 WTO 'Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration 2001' WT/MIN (01)/DEC/l, 20 November 2001. Also available < 
httn: //www. wto. or2/en2lish/thewto e/minist e/min0l e/mindecl e. htm> (last visited 25 October 2005) 
186 Kerr and Loppacher (n 1) 215. ('Anti-dumping in the Doha Negotiations') 
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the existing obligations of the ADA. In the past five years, several countries, including 
the US, the EU, Canada, India, Australia, China and an ad hoc grouping of countries 
called "Friends of Anti-dumping"' 88 , have presented position papers in the negotiation. 
The areas that countries want addressed in the negotiations were wide ranging. However, 
first, the issued discussed so far generally did not go beyond the twelve issues identified 
in Ramsauer Draft Text of the Uruguay Round. 189 Moreover, WTO Members made their 
intentions very clear at the beginning of every submission that the Rules Negotiating 
Group is expected only to explore clarification and improvement of the rules under the 
ADA. '90 Finally, the issues contained in Members' submissions all have explicit linkages 
to the existing ADA provisions. In some of Friends of Anti-dumping group's 
submissions, issues are even indicated in the order of the articles of the ADA, rather than 
the order of priority. 191 
With respect to divergent positions of WTO Members, the US and the EU generally 
concentrated on increasing the strength and effectiveness of the ADA. The developing 
WTO Members, represented by Friends of Anti-dumping, who were not satisfied by the 
Uruguay Round ADA, were rather "keen to take this chance to propose changes and 
negotiate over details of the ADA rules which allegedly disadvantaged them for 
decades". 192 They wanted to rule out the possible abusive interpretations of the ADA. 193 
194 Therefore, most of the contentious substantive issues, such as "public interest" 
187 Ibid. 
118 The members of Friends of Anti-dumping are Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, China, Israel, 
Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand and Turkey. 
"9 These twelve issues are (1) use of weighted averages in the calculation of export prices and normal value; (2) sales 
below cost of production; (3) constructed value: calculation of administrative, selling and other costs and profits; (4) 
standing; (5) de minimis margins of dumping and negative import volumes; (6) cumulation of imports from multiple 
countries for determination of injury; (7) sampling; (8) sunset; (9) anti-circumvention; (10) dispute settlement and (11) 
rublic interest, above n 112. 
0 For example, WTO 'Identification of Additional Issues Under the Anti-dumping and Subsidies Agreements', Paper 
submitted by the Unite States, 6 May 2003, TN/RIJW/98; and 'Anti-dumping: Illustrative Major Issues'. Paper from 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, China, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Singapore, 
Switzerland, Thailand and Turkey, 26 April 20OZ TN/RUW/6 (Friends of Anti-dumping Submission 1). 
191 For example, WTO 'Second Contribution to Discussion of the Negotiating Group of Rules on Anti-dumping 
Measures'. Paper by Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, China, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, 
Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand and Turkey, 28 June 2002, TN/RLJW/10 (Friends of Anti-dumping Submission 2). 
192 Kerr and Loppacher (n 1) 216. ('Anti-dumping in the Doha Negotiations') 
"I Friends of Anti-dumping Submission 2 (n 190). 
194 For example, FAN made the following proposals on public interest: TN/RUW/45, TN/RL/W/174/Rev. 1, 
TN/RUGEN/53, TNIRUGEN/142. Hong Kong. China made a further submission, namely Further Explanation of the 
Public Interest Proposal (TN/RUW/194) on 17 November 2005. Hong Kong, China and the Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu made a proposal on 6 June 2006, entitled Economic Effects of Anti- 
dumping Measures (TN/RUGEN/142). 
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"prohibition of zeroing 99195 . 
"constructed normal value" 196 and "lesser duty rule" 197 , are 
on the top of their negotiation agenda. These issues normally fell into the scope of the 
second and third groups of provisions identified in previous sections, which imposed 
unspecific obligations with implicit conditions or contingent obligations to the competent 
authorities. For example, in one of Friend of Anti-dumping group's submissions, Article 
2.2.2 was accused of lack of clear guidance for the use of information used to calculate 
constructed normal value. 198 They argued that this failure to elaborate on a general 
principle leads on "anomalous results" and therefore proposed more comprehensive and 
representative criteria for the calculation of constructed normal value. 199 
On the other side, the US and the EU paid much more attention to "transparency, 
predictability, and adherence to the rule of law" in order to maintain the confidence in the 
200 
system. The discretion enjoyed by the national authorities when deciding major 
substantive issues, such as what information to include in determinations, should not be 
taken away, in their view. 201 Procedural issues, such as Article 6.4 maintenance of a 
public record, Article 6.5 protection and disclosure of confidential information, Article 
6.7 and Annex I conduct of verifications, took a large proportion of the US's 
submissions. 
It is worth noting that although there is a contradictory general position between the 
developed countries and the developing countries, each Member was concerned about 
some special issues in the negotiations. For instance, apart from the general procedural 
issues, the US has submitted proposals on major substantive issues such as the 
interpretation of domestic production on Article 4.1, causation on Article 3.5 and 
cumulative assessment of injury on Article 3.3 . 
202 The Friend of Anti-dumping group also 
addressed the problem of the expansive use of the exception of sunset review to continue 
195 For example, Friends of And-dumping Submission I (n 192) and TN/RLIW/45. 
19' For example, Friends of Anti-dumping Subinission I (n 192). 
197 For example, the issue of lesser duty rule has been discussed by Members in documents TN/RUW/4,13,22,25,26, 
28,29,34,45,47,54,55,56,62,65,66,73,74,79,86,94,99,101,106,110,118,119,121,134,170 and 
TN/RIJGEN/1,32,43,58,99. 
"' Friends of Anti-dumping Submission I (n 192) 2. 
199 Ibid. 
200 WTO 'Basic Concepts and Principles of the Trade Remedy Rules', Communication from the United States, 22 
October 2002, TNMJW/27, at 2. 
201 Kerr and Loppacher (n 1) 216. ('Anti-dumping in the Doha Negotiations') 
202 For example, 'Identification of Additional Issues under the Anti-dumping and Subsidies Agreements', Paper 
submitted by the United States, 6 May 2003, TNIRLIW/98, at 1-2. 
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the AD duty (Article 11.3) 203 and the arbitrary introduction of rules, procedures, and 
methodologies in the reviews (Article 9.3,9.5 and 11.2)204 on their submissions. In 
another word, in the Doha Round negotiation, AD is not exactly a south-north question. 
Every Member has some little issues in the ADA that they felt very strong about, which 
may or may not always link to their general position to the whole rule negotiations. 
As a reflection on the collective effort of Rules negotiations so far, on 30 November 
2007, the chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules circulated to WTO Members his draft 
consolidated texts on AD and subsidies and countervailing measures ("the Chair's 
texC') . 
205 As provided in the introduction, the purpose of the Chair's text is "to provide a 
solid foundation for the future negotiation". 206 Therefore, the consolidated draft text has 
allegedly "taken into account the interests of all Participants" and is hoped to be a text 
that "could facilitate the negotiation of a balanced outcome". 207 However, great 
controversies surrounding the Chair's text faithfully reflected the divergent position of 
WTO Members on numerous contentious issues. The most hotly debated one is the 
provision relating to the "zeroing" methodology. In the Chair's text, "zeroing" in original 
investigations is banned if national authorities take weighted average to weighted average 
comparisons. 208 Draft Article 2.4.3 (i) provides that: 
2.4.3 Mien the authorities aggregate the results of multiple 
comparisons in order to establish the existence or extent of a margin 
of dumping, the provisions of this paragraph shall apply: 
(i) when, in an investigation initiated pursuant to 
Article 5 the authorities aggregate the results of multiple 
comparisons of a weighted average normal value with a weighted 
average of prices of all comparable export transactions, they shall 
take into account the amount by which the export price exceeds the 
normal valuefor any of the comparisons. 
203 'Proposal on Sunset', Paper from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, China, Israel, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand and Turkey, 19 March 2003, TN/RL/Wn6, 
204 WTO 'Proposal on Review', Paper from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, China, Israel, Japan, 
Korea, Mexico, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand and Turkey, 25 April 2003, TN/RL/W/83. 
205 WTO Press Release Chair Circulates Draft Text on Rules, 30 November 2007, available at 
httl2: //www. wto. orf-, /enp, lish/news e/news07 etrules draft text nov07 e. htm. C'the Chair's text"). 
206 Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and SCMAgreements, 30 November 2007, TN/RIJW/213. 
207 Ibid, p2. 
209 Ibid, Art 2.4.3. (i). 
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Nevertheless, Article 2.4.3 (ii) and (iii) allow national authority to "disregard the 
amount by which the export price exceeds the normal value for any of the comparison" 
under the circumstances that the authorities take transaction-to-transaction comparisons 
or in review proceedings. Condemning the Chair's text as a "step bacV, 17 WTO 
Members, including Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Switzerland, 
Taiwan and Thailand, circulated their joint statement which criticizing the inclusion of 
certain zeroing provisions in the Chair's text, warning they would "nullify the results of 
trade liberalization efforts" soon after the issuance of the Chair's text. 209 The debate is 
still ongoing and a revised Chair's text is expected to be issued soon. 210 
In sum, the Doha Round negotiation by far has not produced any significant moves 
in term of legalization. The negotiations involve almost every provision of the ADA, 
regardless of the nature of obligations. On the positive side, current negotitiations which 
focus on clarification of relevant provisions may result in the improvement of the level of 
obligation and precision of the ADA. However, it has to be borne in mind that lack of 
precision and consequently less specific obligation in the ADA on most issues are due to 
the divergent and frequently contradictory perception of AD rules of different Members, 
rather than a simple failure of draftsmanship. 
3.2 Surveillance Mechanism and the AD Rules 
The surveillance mechanism, which is largely based on the activities of the WTO 
Secretariat, is the most low-profile one among the three pillars of the WTO, as noted in 
Chapter IL The main reason for this is the self-declared status of the WTO -a member- 
driven organization that generally grants no formal powers to the Secretariat. 211 All of the 
powers are vested in the WTO Members and they are reluctant to see the emergence of a 
209 For details and backgrounds of the debate, BNA International Trade Reporter "WTO Rules Chairman Under Fire 
For Zeroing Provisions in Draft Text", 20 December 2007, available at 
httl2: Hpubs. bna. conVNWSSTND/IP/BNA/itr. nsf/SearchAtIView/AE69821877658FC3852573B5007CEDOA? Omn&hi 
0 
ýýMING (last visited 5 May 2008). Fhli ht=ZER 
c 1A D11t% ....... ational Trade Reporter "WTO Members Discuss Services Conference; Doha Rules Chair Promises New 
Revised Text", 20 March 2008, available at 
http: //r)ubs. bna-conVNWSSTND/TP/BNA/itr. nsf/SearchAllView/259E I C65883BD6B 185257411007 1 BOE8? Open&hiz 
hlight=ZEROING (last visited 5 May 2008) 
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supranational organization with constitutional rights. The WTO Secretariat has therefore 
been deliberately kept as "a slim organization with limited resources and formal 
powers". 212 
The "faceless" bureaucracy of the WTO that knows the process inside out, however, 
exercised considerable influence without formal powers. 213 The influence of the 
Secretariat, although rather indirect, over the AD regime is a clear example of this. Major 
daily activities that the Secretariat conducted to upholding international AD rules include 
the support to implement and administrate the ADA, trade policy review, and research 
and analysis on AD rules. 
First, the Secretariat influences the WTO Members' AD practice in its efforts to 
support the implementation and administration of the ADA. This mainly involves the 
reviews of actions taken pursuant to the ADA and reviews of the notifications submitted 
by Members. Under Article 18.5 and 18.6 of the ADA, Members are obligated to inform 
the AD Practice Committee of "any changes in its laws and regulations and in the 
administration of such laws and regulations". The work of Secretariat to facilitate the 
practical operation of the ADA is therefore not a "one-shot" exercise, but a continuous 
struggle. 214 
The TPRM is another tool to regularly monitor Member's trade policies and 
practices. It includes a factual report prepared by the Secretariat's Trade Policy Review 
Division and a policy statement by the Member under review. The factual reports from 
the TPRM are probably "the most comprehensive documents available on the trade 
policies of individual countrieS". 2 15 Nevertheless, in most circumstance, these reports 
were full of optimism and trying to avoid sensitive areas and sharp criticisms. As the 
example mentioned in the pervious chapter, from mid-1990, the US and the EU have 
entered into a sort of "unholy alliance" not to criticize each other's AD actions in their 
public statement. Therefore, even though AD has been considered as the most serious 
21 1H Nordstrom 'The World Trade Organization Secretariat in a Changing World' (2005) 39 JWT 819,819. (1WT0 
Secretariat') 
212 Ibid 849. The WTO so far has only less than 600 staff, including consultants, and the budget is roughly 160 million 
Swiss francs. 
213 Ibid. 
214 Ibid 826. 
215 Nordstrom (n 198) 832. ('WTO Secretariat') 
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protective device after "voluntary" export restrictions, there was no thorough treatment of 
this topic in TPRM reports for a long time. 216 
In-house research and analysis of international AD rules is another way that the 
Secretariat influences the AD practice of Members. In general, in-house research has a 
relatively low priority in the WTO and "little policy advice based on independent (self- 
initiated) research was offered by the Secretariat". 217 In the field of AD, however, the 
Secretariat made numerous efforts on clarifying the practical aspects of international AD 
rules and providing a kind of common or standard practice for investigating authorities. 
An outgrowth of this effort is A Handbook on Anti-dumping Investigations, written by 
three counsellors in the Rule Division of the W170 Secretariat. 218 This handbook can 
naturally be considered as policy recommendations from the WTO. The authors, 
however, make their intentions modest, as only to "foster a great understanding of the 
process related to an anti-dumping investigatioW' and to "assist investigators to conduct 
the required investigation in a manner consistent with the complex multilateral agreed 
rules". They particularly reject the idea of including a critique of the current legal 
framework, or proposals for future improvement. 
This handbook is divided into three parts, plus four Annexes. Part I surveys the 
procedural aspects of the AD investigation. Starting with outlining the multilateral and 
domestic legal frameworks of an AD investigation and defining the key terms in the 
investigation, the main part of Part I gives a full description of the whole process in 
chronological order, from pre-initiation/initiation, preliminary determination, final 
determination, to judicial and administrative reviews. In Part II, the subject moves to the 
calculation of dumping margin. Based on two case studies, this part goes to details of the 
techniques and methodologies applied in a dumping margin calculation, including those 
for definition of the product concerned, identification of models, determination of export 
price, determination of normal value and finally, calculation of dumping margin. The last 
substantive part of the handbook concerns the determination of injury and causation. By 
providing a "checklist" of popular injury factors and causations, this handbook makes an 
216 D Keesing Improving Trade Policy Reviews in the World Trade Organization (Institute for International Economics, 
Washington DC 1998) 5. ('Improving Trade Policy Review') 
217 Nordstrom (n 198) 833. ('YV70 Secretariat') 
218 Czako, Human and Miranda (n 139). ("Handbook on Anti-dumping Investigation) 
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effort to clarify further what elements should be taken into account in the determination 
of injury and causation. 
The first three annexes are also worth mentioning as they appear to be of practical 
importance. They are sample applications for the initiation of an AD investigation, 
sample dumping investigation questionnaires for exporters/foreign producers and sample 
injury questionnaires for domestic producers, importers, foreign producers and 
purchasers. It is worth mentioning that a proposal jointly made by Japan and the EU in 
the Doha Round also suggested the use of Model/Standard questionnaires in 
investigations . 
219 The concern about this issue is therefore more than a coincidence. In 
practice, the excessive collection of information and data in the questionnaires translated 
directly into huge costs for parties concerned. Worse, these excessive costs do not only 
arise in relation to the preparation for the questionnaire reply, but also at subsequent 
stages of the investigation, e. g. the preparation for verification and the actual verification 
visit itself. These sample questionnaires, as well as this whole handbook, are intending to 
explore, in a "soft" way, the possibility of applying more standard rules in investigations, 
which might be more transparent and cost saving to parties involved. 
As has always been emphasised in this handbook, it is not, and does not intend to be, 
an academic book, discussing the "madness" of anti-dumping rules. 
220 Instead, it 
cautiously keeps a distance from those passionate arguments from both supporter and 
critics. 22 1 To some extent, it indicates the attempt of the Secretariat to keep the 
legalization process moving even without major change of "hard law", i. e. the tighten-up 
of obligations. The underlying logic is simple: if it is the fact that the AD proceedings is 
still an attractive option for industries threatened by inexpensive imports, the more 
important question is how to deal with this in a more reasonable way to minimize its cost 
to the parties concerned, and to global welfare in general. 
In a nutshell, although low-profile, surveillance activities of the WTO, including 
overseeing the implementation and administration of the ADA, conducting trade policy 
reviews and producing policy recommendations based on in-house research, have 
219 WTO 'Proposals on Cost Saving in Anti-Dumping Proceedings', Paper from European Communities and Japan 
WTO TN/RIJW/I 38,17 July 2003, available at ht! p: //docsonline. wto. or&GEN searchResult. as2 (visited 21 July 2004) 
220 Czako, Human and Miranda (n 144) 3. ("Handbook on And-dumping Investigation') 
221 Ibid. 
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positive impacts on the development of legalization of the AD regime. In particular, the 
handbook published by the Secretariat demonstrated not only what the rules are, but also, 
in the view of the WTO, how they should work in practice. It implies the idea of 
harmonization of national AD laws and therefore may be of importance to further 
legalization of the AD regime. 
3.3 AD in the Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
AD is no doubt one of the most contentious and litigious areas in the multilateral 
trading system. Some US commentators depicted the picture as "WTO panels are 
'making law' as if they were Platonic Guardians of trade sitting in secret in Geneva and 
nowhere is this clearer than in the area of trade remedies. " 222 The number of AD cases 
filed during the past decade, the ratio of AD cases versus other types of cases and the 
bitter criticisms condemning the panel and AB decisions, all manifest the significance of 
AD in the DSM - in terms of not only the quantity but also the quality. The section 
focuses only on the factual and quantity side of the picture, which should be read together 
with the discussion of delegation of the ADA in previous sections. 
The first two statistical indicators of the importance of AD are the number of AD 
cases filed by Members during the past ten years and the ratio of AD cases versus other 
types of cases. Of the 333 cases filed in the WTO from 1995 through 2005, about one 
fifth (62) of them challenged Members' AD measures. The ratio of AD cases filed versus 
other types of cases has generally increased from 1995 to 2000, reaching the peak of one 
third (11 out of 34) on 2000. After that, the figure slightly dropped down to about one 
fourth. However, 2004 witnessed a new historical height of the numbers of AD 
complaints -8 out of 19, as shown in Figure 1. The statistics of original panel reports 
have been circulated to Members from 1995 to 2007 shows almost the same ratio: 30 out 
of I 10 cases are AD cases. 223 
222 1 Ragosta, N Joneja and M Zeldovich VTO Dispute Settlement: The System is Flawed and Must be Fixed' (2003) 
37 international Lawyer 697,75 1. ('WTO Dispute Settlement') 
223 R Yerxa and B Wilson Key Issues in WTO Dispute Settlement - the First Ten Years (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2005) 289 (Annex V). The panel and AB reports do not include Art 21.5 compliance panel reports or 
appeals. (Key Issues in WTO Dispute Settlement) 
124 
Chapter IV 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
10 All other WTO Case 0 AD Cases 
Figure 1 Total Number of WTO Cases versus AD Cases Filed Per Year, 1995-2007 
Source: Worldtradelaw. net Dispute Settlement Data 
Given the considerable proportion of AD cases in the total WTO cases, some argue 
that the panels and the AB have invalidated a large number of AD measures, stripping 
away much needed protection for domestic industries. 224 The actual data, however, 
presents a different picture. As of 31 December 2007, of 3,097 AD measures in force 
worldwide, only 72 of them have triggered the modest initial step of a request for 
225 consultation. Of all these consultations on AD measures, only 30 of these disputes 
have gone to final panel decisions. Fewer panel decisions ever faced an appeal. Overall, 
Members have challenged a relatively small share of the AD measures that their fellow 
Members imposed, while the vast majority of AD measures have never been challenged 
at all. 226 
224 J Durling 'Deference, But Only When Due: WTO Review of Anti-dumping Measures' (2003) 6 HEL 125,127. 
(IWTO Review of Anti-dumping Measures') 
21 Statistics from Worldtradelaw. net dispute settlement pages. 
226 GAO Report (n 178) 8. 
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The next indicator demonstrated the importance of AD in the DSM is the wide- 
ranging participants of the AD cases. In comparing WTO Members' participation in the 
AD cases, the US by far has been the most frequent defendant, followed by Argentina 
and the EU, while on the other hand, the EU filed the largest number of complaints, as 
shown in Figure 2 and 3. 
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Figure 2: Most Frequent Complainants in WTO AD Cases, 1995-2005 
35 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
n 
United Argentina European Mexico Brazil Guatemala Peru 
States Union 
10 Number of cases filed 
Figure 3: Most Frequent Defendants in WTO AD Cases, 1995-2005 
Although the traditional users, such as the US, the EU, Canada, are fairly active 
players in this field, the variety of both complainants and defendants illustrated the 
popularity of AD rules. When Indonesia complained about Korea's AD measure on 
paper 227 and Bangladesh complained about India's measure on batterieS228, it is quite 
227 WTO Korea- Anti-dumping Duties on Imports of Certain Paperfrom Indonesia -Report of the Panel (28 October 
2005) WT/DS3121R. 
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clear that AD is moving from a politically sensitive south-north question to a rather 
technical device, or indeed, a legal game. 
Economic empirical research indicated that there are a number of factors which 
would determine the Members' decision whether to formally challenge AD measures 
imposed by fellow Members. 229 Given the huge amount of AD measures imposed, 
Members "have to undertake a calculus and only pursue actions in which the expected 
benefit to a WTO dispute will outweigh the expected CoSev. 230 'Me expected benefit 
would be jointly determined by the size of import market access and the probability of 
restoration of market access. On the other hand, the expected cost to pursuing a case 
could include the resource costs associated with litigation, as well as the political- 
economic costs associated with challenging the importing country through the formal 
DSM. Moreover, the complaints also need to consider the cost "associated with the 
establishment of a precedent": if "the litigation were to establish a precedent that would 
also require the complainant to change the way in which it pursues AD in its own 
markee', they might decide not to pursue the case further. 231 
The final indicator of the significance of AD is the overall high success rate of 
complaints, i. e. panels or the AB found in favor of the complainants in almost all cases 
(with the expectation of US - Corrosion - resistance Steel Sunset Review) on at least one 
ClaiM. 232 Ile statistic alone may give an impression that "exporting countries challenging 
the imposition of AD duties by other countries have prevailed in every case, so that the 
panel and AB decisions significantly changed the way that Members operate their AD 
laws". 233 The reality seems more complex. The following three factors mentioned in 
literature may explain the high chances of success of AD cases and portray a more 
comprehensive picture of the AD jurisprudence, rather than drawing on the specious 
conclusion that the WTO jurisprudence has dramatically changed national AD practices. 
228 WTO India - Anti-Dumping Measure on Batteries from Bangladesh - Request for Consultations by Bangladesh, 
WT/DS306/1,2 February 2004. India and Bangladesh reached a mutually satisfactory solution on this case. 
229 C Bo, n 'Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement: Why are So Few Challenged? ' (2005) 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3540, available at http: //ideas. repec. org/p/wbktwbrwps/3540. html, 2. 
ffrade Remedies and WTO Dispute Settlement') 
230 Ibid. 
231 Ibid 3. 
232 Data from worldtradelaw. net. E Vermulst and F Graafsma 'WTO Dispute Settlement with Respect to Trade 
Contingency Measures' (2001) 35 JWT 209,210 ('Trade Contingency Measures'); also, Durling (n 226) 131 ('WTO 
Review of Anti-dumping Measures'). 
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The first issue in assessing the WTO AD jurisprudence is "self-selection bias at 
worV i. 234 The time, efforts, cost of bringing a case and the potential embarrassment 
associated with losing a case means that Members only bring those cases which "they 
believe that they have the highest possibility to win". 235 This explained why only a tiny 
fraction of AD measures faces the panel or AB scrutiny - only "major and meritorious 
disputes" will proceed in the DSM. 236 It also provides a reasonable explanation to the fact 
that half of the time the losing parties essentially concede the claim of WTO 
inconsistency. Since the decision to appeal largely reflects the losing party's self- 
assessment of the strength of the legal claim and the significance of the loss, it is sensible 
to assume "either that the losing party recognizes a WTO problem with its action, or that 
the WTO inconsistency can be easily changed in most of these case". 237 
Second, even in these narrowly self-selected strong cases, the individual claims of 
exporting countries are not always prevailed. The second factor indicating the complexity 
of the picture is the success rate of individual claims of WTO inconsistencies. If the panel 
decision of each case has been broken down by claim within the case, i. e. each separate 
provision raised and addressed is treated as a separate claim, "a different picture emerges 
contrary to the rhetoric that importing trade authorities always lose". 238 As argued, "it is 
true that in many cases, the panel found at least one WTO inconsistency; but the overall 
ratio of successful claim is only about 50 percent". 239 
The third factor discussed in the literature, namely the different nature of claims that 
the panels or the AB normally uphold or reject, is closely related to the success rate of 
individual claims in assessing the AD jurisprudence. It is well documented that while the 
AD rulings completed from 1995 to 2005 generally rejected domestic authorities' 
determinations supporting AD measures, the rulings upheld a vast majority of the AD 
laws and regulations that were challenged . 
240 The major exceptions are three US laws: the 
233 TarUllo (n 184) 114. ('The Hidden Cost') 
234 Bown (n 231) 2 and Durling (n 226) 129. (VTO Review of Anti-dumping Measures') 
235 Ibid. Also, Vermulst and Graafsma (n 234) 2 10. ('Trade Contingency Measures') 
236 Ibid. 
237 Durling (n 226) 13 1. ('VvrTO Review of Anti-dumping Measures') 
239 Ibid 130. 
239 Ibid. 
240 Data from worldtradelaw. net. 
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Anti-dumping Act of 1916 241 and two sections of US Tariff Act of 1930 - Section 754 
(US Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, or commonly referred to as 
'Byrd Amendment" )242 and Section 735 (c) (5) involving calculation of the "all other" 
rate. 243 As the US GAO Report stated, "very few other rulings so far resulted in many 
changes to WTO Members' laws, regulation or even uncodified methodologies and 
procedures of competent authorities". 244 Instead, "most of the rulings resulted in the 
onetime/case-specific revision to, or removal of, AD measures, i. e. majority of domestic 
agency determinations involved in these cases were rejected by panels or AB" . 
245 The 
overall WTO rulings therefore normally affects the way a national AD legislation was 
applied in a specific investigation rather than national AD laws themselves. Even the US 
authorities, the most frequent defendants in the WTO AD cases, admitted that panel and 
AB decisions did not "significantly impair their ability to impose AD duties", since "most 
rulings did not question US methodologies for determining whether to impose AD duties 
but have required them to provide fuller explanations and justifications for their 
decisionS99.246 The US approach, indeed the approach for most of WTO Members, 
therefore has been to "appeal those cases that require a change to a statute or have serious 
impact on domestic industries", and to work with the panel decisions in those case when 
"the WTO loss having only modest impacf t. 247 In this sense, in spite of the normative 
depth of enormous commentaries on AD jurisprudence, most issues at AD cases are 
straightforward, concerning only case-specific arguments. The appeals often "reflected 
the political need to continue fighting, as opposed to any controversial arguments about 
the legal merits of the claims". 248 
In sum, the magnitude of AD in the WTO DSM was manifested by both the 
frequency of challenges to national AD measures and the variety of participants of AD 
cases. The AB and panels in general have established an impressive record of stringent 
241 US - 1916 Act (n 176 and n 177). 242 VnO United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 - Report of Panel (16 September 2002) 
WT/DS217/R, WT/DS2341R. 
243 US -Hot-rolled Steel (n 179). The "all othee'rate is the rate used to calculate AD duties for exporters and producers 
who are not individually investigated. 244 GAO Report (n 178) 16. 
245 Ibid. 
246 Ibid. 
247 Dufling (n 226) 133. (VTO Review of Anti-dumping Measures') 
249 Ibid, 146-147. 
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and thoughtful reviews of AD measures taken by Members. The AD jurisprudence so far 
arguably indicates "an irrevocable trend to progressively standardizing the use of AD 
rules", through establishment of both substantive and procedural rules. 249 Given the fact- 
intensive nature of most AD cases, the actual impact of WTO rulings on overall national 
AD practices is, however, limited, rather than far-reaching as suggested by the number of 
AD cases. In this regard, the DSM dramatically contributes to the increase of precision of 
international AD rules by identifying WTO-inconsistency in individual cases and 
promoting "standard" interpretations of the ADA. Nevertheless, how the AD 
jurisprudence affects the level of obligation and delegation in the AD regime remains 
controversial. In other words, although the DSM significantly contributes to the 
development of legalization, its efforts to push the value of legalization to a higher level 
have been severely criticized. 
4. The Uneven Expansion of Legalization" in the AD Regime 
4.1 The Uneven Expansion of Obligation 
In addition to the discussions above concerning the current status of legalization in 
the AD regime, this section focuses on the uneven expansion of legalization in this area. 
Although certain topics discussed in the section has been touched upon in the previous 
sections, the purpose of this section is to identify the "broken links" where uneven 
expansion of legalization prevents the AD regime to move to a higher level of 
legalization and creates long lasting tensions in the system. 
Obligation is central to the framework of legalization in this study on the ground that 
the WIFO is a treaty-based regime. The obligations in the treaties are the foundations of 
the system and these obligations substantially determine the level of precision and 
delegation. A close analysis of obligation, which takes into account both the evolution of 
the formal legal instrument, the ADA, and the "broader" obligations brought by other 
activities of the WTO, however indicates that the development towards a higher level of 
obligation in the AD regime is imbalanced. 
249 Vermulst and Graafsma (n 234) 225. ('Trade Confingency Measures') 
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In the AD regime, the evolution of legal instruments, from GATT Article VI, the 
1967 Code, the 1979 Code to the ADA, marked the major turning points which obligation 
in international AD rules was moving towards the "hard" law side of commitments. The 
level of obligation after the ADA has been "frozen" until the completion of the Doha 
Round. 
As noted in previous sections, the ADA in fact included four types of different 
obligations: unconditional and specific, specific with implicit conditions, contingent and 
principle. Given the interpretation and implementation problems caused by the second 
and third types of obligation in practice, there is a general trend to move as much as 
possible of them into the first group, unconditional and specific obligations, as shown on 
the evolution of AD instruments. In the on-going negotiation of the Doha Round, most 
submissions from Members, in particular the Friends of Anti-dumping group, are 
following the footstep of the Uruguay Round negotiation, attempting to clarify the 
meaning of a particular ADA provision or tighten disciplines so that national authorities 
around the world can be clearly instructed. For instance, in the discussion of constructed 
normal value, they suggested to "elaborate clearer, more comprehensive and 
representative criteria when calculations of constructed normal value are made". 250 As the 
existing Article 2.2.2 allows investigating authorities to resort to three alternative 
methodologies for calculating constructed normal value and no clear guideline is 
provided, they went on to propose solutions such as "clarify that the methodology as set 
out under the chapeau of Article 2.2.2 (i. e. actual data) should be used for determining 
the amounts for selling costs and profits; when such amounts cannot be determined on 
this basis, the amounts may be determined only on the basis of the alternative 
methodology provided for under Article 2.2.2 (i).,, 251 One can imagine if proposals like 
this are all included in the new ADA after the Doha Round, very little room will be left to 
national authorities to manipulate the AD proceedings in that the "right" behaviour under 
certain circumstance, is explicitly set out in formal legal instruments so that fellow WTO 
Members and private parties can legitimately expect them. If national authorities cannot 
210 Friends of Anti-dumping Subrnission I (n 192) 2. 
251 )WO 'Proposal on Determination of Normal Value', Paper from Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, China, 
Japan, Korea, Norway. Singapore, Switzerland, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and 
Matsu, and Thailand, 16 April 2004, TNARLAV/150, at 8-9. 
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follow these instructions exactly, their decisions are easily challenged in the DSM and 
they have to change their practice afterwards with embarrassment. 
A new ADA with all these specific obligations appears to be desirable to exporting 
countries which are targeted by AD measures and the WFO institutions, including the 
Secretariat and the quasi-judicial bodies, inter alia, the AB. Two questions have to be 
asked in the context: first, whether the current multilateral negotiations can make ADA 
specific enough to cover all national practices; and second, even if it is plausible, whether 
it is the best solution to the challenges facing the AD regime. 
As to the first question, the reality of Doha Round negotiation, however, does not 
pernidt an optimal answer. The positions of Members are so different that it is almost 
impossible to reach consensus on important technical issues. If we bear in mind the 
broader picture of Doha Round negotiation, AD is definitely a contentious area, but not 
the most politically important one. Therefore, the most possible outcome of negotiation 
will be a compromise or a trade-off rather than a careful drafted legal instrument to cover 
all practical questions, as experienced before in the Uruguay Round negotiations. 
If to create an extremely specific ADA is the only way to improve obligation in the 
AD regime, it would be worth the effort irrespective of how difficult it might be. The 
general legal theory, however, indicated quite the opposite. As discussed in Chapter II, in 
a highly developed legal system, normative directives are frequently formulated as 
precise "rule! ', but many important directives are also formulated as general "standards". 
As argued, in many circumstances, "determinations have to be made ex post, in relation 
to specific sets of facts, rather than to be decided ex ante which categories of behavior are 
unacceptable". 
252 "Standard-like" prescription allows "judicial bodies to take into 
account equitable factors relating to particular actors or situations, albeit at the sacrifice 
v 253 of some ex ante clarity' . In the regard, it is neither realistic nor feasible to propose a 
legal instrument to be specific enough to deprive national authorities of the discretion to 
make decisions in particular circumstances and cover every single practice of these 
authorities. 
252 Abbott etc (n 140) 413. (Toncept of Legalization') 
2" Ibid. 
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The question turns out to be: is the institutional context of the WTO legal system 
sufficiently thick to support the making of obligation beyond the ADA? Two possible 
routes emerge in the existing institutional structure of the VV70: first, the quasi-judicial 
bodies adopt an approach similar to domestic courts to effectively use general standards; 
second, the Ministerial conference and the General Council produce "authoritative 
254 interpretation" under Article IX: 2 of the WTO Agreement. 
The first choice has been widely discussed given the proliferation of judicial 
activities of the panels and the AB in the AD regime. Proponents of the DSM might 
assume the "broader" obligations from panel or AB reports to influence the same 
practices or regulations of other WTO Members in the same issue are in the making. The 
arguments for it are normatively strong as a WTO Member has the general obligation of 
conformity with WTO law and good faith . 
255 It is also argued that in a broader 
understanding of the link between the WTO and general public international law, good 
faith, including the general obligation of states to "refrain from acts which would defeat 
the object and purpose of a treaty to which they are members", has found its way into the 
WTO jurisprudence as a general principle of international law. 256 One can therefore argue 
that if a particular national practice has been outlawed by the panel or the AB, it is a clear 
indication that this practice is VVTO-inconsistent so that a W170 Member has a duty to act 
in good faith by bringing its law and practice into conformity, i. e. "removing it from their 
laws and/or ceasing to apply it as a methodology" . 
257 
The counterarguments are, however, equally strong, if not stronger. The formal 
mandate to the DSM is only to settle the dispute between parties and as such, a report 
only binds the parties, and only with regard to the case that was settled. Article 19.2 of 
the DSU explicitly prohibits the panels and the AB to add or diminish rights and 
254 For more details of authoritative interpretation and general decision-making in the WTO, C Ehlermann and L Ehring 
'The Authoritative Interpretation under Article IX: 2 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization: 
Current Law, Practice and Possible Improvements' (2005) JIEL 803 ('The Authoritative Interpretation'); also C 
Ehlermann. and L Ehring 'Decision-making in the World Trade Organization - Is the Consensus Practice of the World 
Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International TradeT (2005) IIEL 5 1. 
('Decision-making in the WTO') 
255 For general discussion of good faith in the WTO jurisprudence, H Zeitler ' "Good Faith" in the WTO Jurisprudence 
- Necessary Balancing Element or an Open Door to Judicial Activism? ' (2005) JIEL 721. ('Good Faith in the WTO 
Jurisprudence') 
256 Ibid 730. 
217 N McNelis 'What Obfigations Are Created by World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Reports? ' (2003) 37 
JWT 647,657. ('What Obligations') 
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obligations of the Members. 258 In another words, a DS report does not constitute an 
"authoritative interpretation" to impose upon Members obligations to which they did not 
agree. 
A description closest to the current practice is perhaps that the DS reports 
themselves do not create broader obligations based on the argument of good faith, in a 
formal legal sense. A challenge of the same or similar legislation of a WTO Member or a 
boldfaced application of the same practice in a future case, nevertheless, would probably 
be "won" if it came to the WTO. The picture is therefore quite complex, as on the one 
hand, the case at hand does not have the precedent value; on the other hand, nonetheless, 
Gda series of complaints about the same issue would prevail if the cases were broughf t. 259 
A perfect example is "zeroing" cases. After many rounds of challenge by different 
trading partners, including the EU, the original defendant, "zeroing" is commonly 
considered as WTO inconsistent in AD investigations. 260 By far, it is fair to observe that 
the possibility of utilizing "zeroing" methodology in major trading partners has been 
largely obviated even without the amendment of the text of the ADA. 
The second possibility of changing the law as it stands without a new agreement is 
the adoption of "authoritative interpretation7' by the Ministerial Conference and the 
General Council. Article IX: 2 of the VVTO Agreement reads aS261 : 
The Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall have the 
exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this Agreement and of the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements. In the case of an interpretation of a 
Multilateral Trade Agreement in Annex 1, they shall exercise their 
authority on the basis of a recommendation by the Council overseeing the 
functioning of that Agreement. The decision to adopt an interpretation 
shall be taken by a three-fourths majority of the Members. This paragraph 
shall not be used in a manner that would undermine the amendment 
provisions in Article X. 
From a legal point of view, the attribute "authoritative" allows distinguishing this 
interpretation from the kind of interpretation performed by panels and the AB, as the later 
258 Art 19.2 of the DSU. 
259 McNelis (n 259) 666. ('What Obligations') 
110 Ibid 647. 
261 Art IX: 2 of the WTO Agreement. 
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was prohibited to modify the WTO law in a formal way. 262 Article 3.9 of the DSU makes 
the distinction clear by stating "the provisions of this Understanding are without 
prejudice to the rights of Members to seek authoritative interpretation of provisions of a 
covered agreement through decision-making under the WTO Agreement or a covered 
agreement which is a Plurilateral Trade Agreement". 263 In other words, an authoritative 
interpretation would be binding to all Members and possible to add or diminish rights and 
obligations provided in the covered agreements - the legal effect that the judicial 
interpretations of panels and the AB never have. 264 Even the language of not 
"undermining" the amendment provision in the last sentence does not seem to stand in 
the way of permitting authoritative interpretation to modify the law, but only limit the 
extent to which it may occur - i. e. an authoritative interpretation could not, without 
circumventing the amendment procedure, "replace" a set of provisions in a covered 
agreement with a new or revised legal text, or develop completely new obligations, 
especially if the area in question was not previously covered by the existing 
agreements. 265 It must be linked to the pre-existing rules and cannot create self-standing 
rules without such a connection. 266 
The preceding analysis may give one an impression that an authoritative 
interpretation could be a desirable candidate to "develop" WTO law especially in the area 
such as AD where the existing rules are ambiguous or contain gaps. '6' This tool, 
however, has never been used to date. In practice, the terms "authoritative interpretation" 
are most frequently referred to in a negative sense to specify that some explanations, 
analysis or reports are not "authoritative interpretations". For example, the AB has, on a 
number of reports, referred to the exclusive authority of the Ministerial Conference and 
the General Council to adopt "authoritative interpretation" in order to distinguish it from 
268 
what panels and the AB are entitled to do. The only attempt of Members to obtain an 
authoritative interpretation was the EC's request for an authoritative interpretation related 
211 Ehlermann and Ehring (n 256) 804 and 8 10. CThe Authoritative Interpretation') 
263 Art 3.9 of the DSU. 
264 Ehlermann and Ehring (n 256) 811. ('The Authoritative Interpretation') 
265 Ibid 812. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Ibid 810. 
261 For example, WTO Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages - AB- 1996-2 - Report of the Appellate Body (4 October 
1996) WTIDS I O/ABIR, WT/DS I IIAB/R. WT/DS8/AB/R. para 12. (Japan - Alcoholic) 
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to Article 3.7,21.5,22.2,22.6,22.7 and 23 of the DSU in 1999.269'lbe General Council 
however did not adopt the requested authoritative interpretation due to, inter alia, the 
opposition of the US. 270 This indicates that it would take a lot more effort if the Members 
wish to make the authoritative interpretation more operational under the currently 
consensus-dominated rule-making system. In this regard, it is also of great relevance to 
the discussion of delegation below. 
The above discussion on the ADA and beyond the ADA suggests that it is neither 
effective nor feasible to change all general obligations of the ADA to specific obligations 
and make the ADA an instrument cover every single detail in the practice. There are two 
potential tools available under the existing WTO system to, either formal or informal, 
link those obligations together, fill in the gaps between them and create a network of 
legal obligations with allows coherence application of the rules - through the rulings of 
panels and the AB and the authoritative interpretation. The real effects of both of the 
tools remain controversial, however. 
4.2 The Uneven Expansion of Precision 
To a large extent, the discussion of precision is indispensable to the discussion of 
both obligation and delegation. As stated above, the basic function of a precise rule is to 
specify clearly and unambiguously what is expected of a state or other actor in a 
particular set of circumstance . 
27 1 From Article VI of GA71T 1947, enormous efforts have 
been put in multilateral negotiations to increase the level of precision of international AD 
rules, aiming to detail conditions of application and spell out required behaviors in 
particular situations. In other words, to regulate national AD practices by specifying the 
expected conducts and narrowing the scope for reasonable interpretations of rules is 
always the underlying theme of multilateral endeavors. Hence, the development of 
precision in the AD regime is determined by the combination of two intertwined factors 
... WTO General Council, 'Request for an Authoritative Interpretation Pursuant to Article IX: 2 of the Marrakech 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization - Communication from the European Communities', 
wr/GCjW/133,25 January 1999. 
211 Ehlermann and Ehring (n 259) 814. (The Authoritative Interpretation') 
27 1 Abbott, etc (n 140) 412. ('Concept of Legalization') 
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of obligation and delegation: how specific or precise obligations should be ex ante and 
how the quasi-judicial body would interpret them ex post. 
Precision and obligation are tied together in the sense that the degree of precision of 
an obligation mainly depends on its function. As discussed above, not every single 
obligation in a legal instrument is necessary to be highly elaborated or specific; some 
obligations are intended be general or principal. 
272 Take the example of Article 2.4 of the 
ADA again. If "fair comparison" in the first sentence can properly "inform7' the rest of 
the article, panels and the AB may still be able to establish a framework regarding to 
dumping margin calculation - investigating authorities may have the discretion to choose 
a method, but the method cannot affect "fair comparison" for the overall dumping margin 
of the product concerned. It appears to be no need to elaborate every possible method that 
investigating authorities might apply in a particular circumstance, as the network of 
obligations, instead of every individual obligation, will narrow the scope of reasonable 
interpretations. 
The other indicator that precision closely related is delegation. The reason that 
highly developed legal system is tolerable or even welcome to general principles, such as 
good faith and due process, in a legal instrument is because it includes "well-established 
courts and agencies to interpret and apply them with more much detailed rules, 
developing both technicality-intensive secondary legislations and increasingly precise 
bodies of precedene'. 273 In particular, if the ex post judicial exercises are capable of 
coherently carrying out case-by-case interpretations, certain degree of imprecision in 
some general obligations is not only acceptable, but also necessary. On the contrary, if 
the judicial exercises are unable to rule out disfavoured conducts, drafters would be 
forced to specify as many as possible potential misconducts for reasons of clarity and 
notice. Yet, the improvement of precision because of this reason might not be the most 
effective way of governance for several reasons, including "higher contracting and 
sovereignty costs in negotiations". 
274 With the consensus-based decision-making system 
in the WTO, the promotion of precision and clarification only in technical issues may not 
272 lbid 413. 
2" Jbid 413 
274 K Abbott and Duncan Snidal 'Hard and Soft Law in InternationaI Governance' (2000) 54 International Organization 
421,434-436. ("Hard Law and Soft Law') 
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be an effective solution to resolve the challenges facing the AD regime, as already 
demonstrated in the Doha Round negotiation so far. 
In sum, precision of international AD rules is by nature an impartial part of the 
discussion of obligation and delegation. As discussed above, precision of obligations in 
the ADA cannot be improved by Doha Round negotiations on ADA or other institutional 
tools in the WI70 along, neither can it be improved by the rulings of the panel and AB 
along as to be demonstrated in the next section. Lack of precision is therefore a sign of 
uneven expansion of legalization in the AD regime. 
4.3 The Uneven Expansion of Delegation 
The last dimension of legalization is delegation - the extent to which WTO 
Members delegate authority to its political organs (the Ministerial Conference and the 
General Council) and the judicial branch - the DSB - to interpret and implement the 
275 ADA. Given serious allegations are made against the DSM in that this independent 
quasi-judicial system, in which norms are clarified and thereby developed, "has been left 
out without a political counterweight", 276 it is therefore worth discussing the imbalanced 
delegation in the AD regime. 
At the center of the contention is a special standard of review provision - Article 
17.6 of the ADA. As noted above, it is the only provision in the WTO agreements in 
which panels are called upon to apply different (in fact more deferential) standard of 
review to the interpretation of WFO law. 277 Under this provision, although a panel's 
primary interpretive responsibility is the same as it is under other WTO agreements, the 
broad discretion has been conferred to national authorities and the panel and the AB are 
supposed to defer to their factual determinations, as provided in Article 17.6 (i). 278 The 
word "proper" in Article 17.6. (i) "explicitly carries a considerable margin of discretion in 
terms of national authority's 'establishment' of the facts and its 'evaluation' of the 
275 Abbott etc (n 140) 415. (Toncept of Legalization') 
276 For instance, L Bartels 'The Separation of Powers in the WTO: How to Avoid Judicial Activism' (2004) 53 Int and 
Comparative Law Quarter 861. 
277 C Ehlermann and N Lockhart 'Standard of Review in WTO Law' (2004) 7 JIEL 491,498. ('Standard of Review') 
278 Ibid 499 and 503. 
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facts". 279 It is clear that in AD cases, there is no de novo review and panels cannot 
substitute their own analysis for that of the national authority. 
The locus of debate is the tension between two sentences of Article 17.6 (ii), i. e. 
whether multiple "permissible" interpretations exist in applying the rules in the VCLT to 
interpret the ADA. Although the AB has accepted that there are provisions of the ADA 
which admit of multiple permissible interpretations, the US still criticized the approach of 
panels or the AB as "rendering Article 17.6 (ii) a nullityq% 280 The US believed that panels 
and the AB have not accepted reasonable, permissible interpretations of the ADA and 
used general terms in the ADA to "extrapolate what the ADA has said about a particular 
issue". 28 1 Hence, this approach of panels and the AB itself is inconsistent with the 
customary rules of interpretation. 282 
Behind this criticism the underlying debate is what the balance of commitments 
inherent in the ADA is and what the delegation that Members have really agreed are. The 
real point of disagreement between the US and panels and the AB is the role of the ADA 
and the nature of a panel's review. In the words of Ehlermann, the ADA gives "national 
authorities the responsibility for investigating the facts and making an initial 
determinatiores. 283 The role of panel is, therefore, "confined to reviewing the investigation 
and determinations that have been carried out at the national level". 284 This is obviously 
a top-down view of the ADA and the panel's review, as it emphasized the uniform 
application of the ADA and confirmed that the purpose of more intensive review is to 
make sure that in similar fact situations, the determination of every Member to (or not to) 
apply an AD measure could be the same. 
The US's view is quite different. Its underlying argument is that the ADA is only a 
bottom line for national practices. Beyond that point, i. e. something has never been 
mentioned in the ADA, it is the discretion of a Member to act as it considered as 
appropriate. If one bears in mind the negotiation history of the ADA -a compromise 
between Members with inherent ambiguity which is often the hallmark of consensus- 
279 Ibid 504. 
280 WTO 'Further Issues Identified Under the Anti-dumping and Subsidies Agreements for Discussion by the 
Negotiating Group on Rules' Communication from the United States, 20 June 2003, TN/RLAV/130,4. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Ibid 
293 Ehlermann and Lockhart (n 279) 507. ('Standard of Review') 
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based drafting, it is difficult to argue that the US is entirely wrong at this point. The 
deprivation of panel's discretion, however, decreases the level of delegation. 
Powerful Members, in particular the US, also firmly opposed against another kind of 
delegation: authoritative interpretation by the Ministerial Conference and the General 
Council - delegation to political organs. As previously mentioned, this potentially 
important tool has remained completely unused, partly because of the US's opposition of 
the EC's request in 1999. This signaled that the US is against any kind of further 
delegation in the decision-making of the WTO, even as modest as an interpretation of 
existing provisions requiring three-fourths majority of the Members. The major concern 
of the US was that its sovereignty would be undermined by amendments or authoritative 
285 interpretations forced through by quickly formed majorities. Therefore, it prefers a 
decision-making structure contains an in-built preference for the status quo so that its 
bargaining power would not be reduced in the negotiations. 
The skepticism of delegation of powerful Members could seriously jeopardize the 
development of the WTO in two different aspects. First, without delegation to polifical 
organs, there is no distinction between rule-making and decision-making, i. e. the making 
of primary rules and secondary rules, in the WTO. This will result in, as argued, "every 
single rule has to be made on the basis of consensus, regardless its specificity or 
technicality, and even an overwhelming majority of Members are not able to achieve 
what they want to decide if at least one Member maintains a veto". 286 Under this kind of 
decision-making procedure, the extent to which that deadlock is protracted and whether a 
breakthrough is possible depends on factors such as the political context of the question 
at issue and whether trade-offs are made. Second, the under-use of delegation to political 
organs make the changes of rules have to come from judicial branch in an informal and 
accused "inappropriate" way. 287 This, in turn, raises stronger criticisms to the DSM and 
creates an inherently legitimacy problem for the whole WTO. 
To sum up, although it is commonly recognized that a higher level of delegation has 
been conferred to the WTO DSM, the delegation in the AD regime is imbalanced. Article 
284 Ibid. 
285 Ehlermann and Ehring (n 256) 62. (Tecision-making in the WTO') 
286 Ibid 65. 
287 Ibid 7 1. 
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17.6 of the ADA specially generates considerable controversies in the extent to which the 
panel and AB should defer to national authorities - in other words, to what extent panels 
and the AB are authorized to review the factual determination of national authorities. The 
under-use of delegation to political organs results in stronger criticism to the DSM and 
further imbalances the AD regime. 
Conclusion 
Similar to other regimes in the GATT/WTO, international AD regime has been 
significantly "legalized" over the past sixty years. The development of legalization 
manifested in the AD regime echoes the general trend of legalization of the GATT/WrO. 
The AD rules have been a hotly debated subject of several rounds of multilateral 
negotiations. The evolution of legal instruments highlighted the movements towards 
higher level of legalization in the AD regime. Also, several "soft law" devices were 
developed in the WFO framework to improve the precision of international AD rules and 
the new DSM of the WTO has been actively engaged in filling the gaps in the legal 
instruments. 
The ongoing process of legalization in the international AD regime is nevertheless 
imbalanced in many aspects. A fairly large amount of obligations contain in the ADA are 
unspecific or contingent in nature and this feature of the ADA restrains the development 
of precision and delegation in the regime. Yet, the current negotiation, surveillance and 
dispute settlement mechanisms, cannot support the improvement of obligation of 
international AD rules and therefore also limit the space of the improvement of precision 
and delegation in the regime. Similarly, imbalanced delegation in the AD regime results 
in great controversies and restraints further improvement of legalization. 
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Chapter V Consequences of Legalization: WTO-transposed 
and WTO-plus features of the European AD Regime 
Introduction 
The previous chapter discerned a general increase of legalization in the multilateral 
AD framework, as well as the uneven expansion of legalization in the regime. 
Legalization via different activities of the GATT/WTO greatly shaped the evolutionary 
trajectory of AD, an originally unilateral trade policy. This chapter examines, from an 
institutional perspective, the intended and unintended effects of multilateral legalization 
on domestic systems. 
From Article VI of GATT 1947 to the ADA, the negotiation history of international 
AD instruments displayed the trading partners' general preference of higher level of 
legalization - tightened obligations, greater precision, and stronger delegation to the 
DSM. Surveillance mechanisms, mainly operated by the GATT/WTO Secretariat, 
contributed to greater precision in the AD regime and the harmonization of national AD 
rules, although those activities have limited impacts on obligation and delegation of the 
regime in a formal way. The WTO DSM adjudicated a considerable number of national 
AD measures as WTO-inconsistent in the past decade, and successfully, as well as 
controversially, filled in the gaps between ADA provisions. To a large extent, a high 
level of delegation in the AD regime becomes another engine of legalization in that it 
advanced the level of precision in the regime irrespective of slow multilateral 
negotiations. 
The expansion of legalization in the AD regime is however uneven, as illustrated by 
fruitless Doha negotiations, rather passive activities of the WrO Secretariat and bitter 
criticisms of judicial activism of the WTO DSM. In particular, many worried that the 
predominance of adjudication would result in imbalance and potential instability of the 
system. 
This chapter examines how legalization of the multilateral AD framework fortnally 
affects national AD regimes, including the evolution of national AD legislation, the 
administration of AD policies and the judicial review of AD policies. As advocated in the 
special issue, the understanding of legalization at international level has to be joined to its 
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consequences at domestic level by reflexive processes: domestic politics propels 
legalization at international level, and multilateral legalization, in turn, shapes the 
domestic political process. ' It is widely discussed that the WTO has never had at its 
disposal an overall and coherently regulated process framework capable of sufficiently 
securing the uniform and effective implementation of its policies and the protection of 
individuals. The execution of WTO law is by and large ensured by national authorities 
and primarily framed by the law of WTO Members which enjoy institutional and judicial 
autonomy. 2 As discussed in the special issue, legalization at international level aiming at 
providing predictability and stability in international trade may or may not have sufficient 
intervening effects on domestic policies and pro-trade stakeholders are not always able to 
benefit from the legalization process. 
Following the analysis of the previous chapter on the development of legalization at 
international AD regime, this chapter adopts a bottom-up analysis by enquiring how the 
whole process affects trade policies of individual WTO Members in a formal way. It 
advances the general observation in Chapter 11 by exploring how uncertain economic and 
political environment at the EC level complicates the implication of multilateral 
legalization. 
On the one hand, increased obligation, frequently joined by greater precision and 
stronger delegation, largely changed the landscape of domestic trade policy-making. 
Many norms and principles established by the multilateral framework have been 
transposed into domestic systems and enjoy high authority in the policy making process. 
On the other hand, increased legalization has to interact with other trade-related 
interests of domestic actors in the dynamic trade policy making process. Interest groups 
with different agenda intend to maximize the possible benefit of domestic institutional 
settings by creating "WTO-plus" domestic legal tools. In this study, the "WTO-plus" 
instruments particularly refer to the practices of national investigating authorities which 
are normally in "grey areas" of the ADA where the WTO discipline is either not existing 
or ambiguous and therefore unchallengeable or difficult to challenge under the DSM. It 
1M Kahler 'Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization' (2000) 54 International Organization 661, 
662. ('Conclusion') 
'H Hehl Principles of Administrative Procedure in EC Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1999) 3. ('Administrative 
Procedure in EC Law') 
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does not, however, refer to that national authorities take a further step in implementing 
the WTO ADA. Hence, this study considers that the introduction of WTO-plus 
instruments in national AD legislations enables a WrO Member to fully comply its WTO 
obligations, while it still remains control over its trade policy. 
This chapter examines whether the evolution of the EC AD regime confirms the 
general observation discussed in Chapter II. It discusses the developments of two sets of 
provisions, namely WrO-transposed provisions (including WTO-modified provisions 
which slightly modified the wording of the corresponding WTO rules) and WTO-plus 
provisions, which reflect the unintended effect of legalization. It explores, first, how the 
development of legalization at international level changed substantive rules of European 
AD laws and how EU institutions seek to integrate obligations imposed by the 
GATT/VY1rO into their own practices; and second, how the EU builds up WTO-plus 
features to offer certain degree of flexibility to the Community institutions and balance 
European-wide interests. To address WTO-plus aspects of the EU system, it compares the 
EU's laws and practices with the WTO rules and jurisprudence in the field, if any, and 
analyzes how WrO-plus features may change the result of an AD investigation. 
This chapter proceeds as follows: section 2 is devoted to the evolution of the EU's 
AD regime, by identifying the response of EC institutions and courts towards the 
development of legalization at international level. Section 3 examines three main WTO- 
plus features of the EU system, namely injury margin, Community interest and anti- 
circumvention. Section 4 concludes this chapter. 
2. WTO-transposed Features of the EC AD Regime 
2.1 Evolution of Community AD Instruments 
Pre-ADA Community AD Instruments 
The most striking trend in the evolution of EU AD instruments is that the 
Community always made its intention to abide by the GATT/WrO AD rule very clear. In 
most circumstances, the EU AD instrument essentially repeated basic principles of 
international AD rules and were "constructed by identity of structure and large similarity 
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of vocabulary with international rules". 3 This trend is also evident by the coincident 
appearance of new Regulations or major amendments of existing Regulations with the 
development of new GA'17/WTO AD Code or Agreement. As argued, "[T]he GATT 
negotiating rounds were the principal institutional motor of the periodic changes in EC 
anti-dumping law" and the GATT "served as not only as a negotiating forum, but also as 
a study group, mediator and interpreter of norms" .4 Despite the GATT's "decisive 
contribution to the development of EC anti-dumping law", other factors, such as 
judgments of the ECJ, new accessions to the Community and procedural and substantive 
refinements of the rules, i. e. the previous practice of the Commission, also have played 
"important roles in the amendments or replacements of EC AD instruments". 5 
The initial EEC AD Regulation - Regulation 459/68 on Protection against Dumping 
or the Granting of Bounties or Subsidies by the Countries which are not Members of the 
European Economic CommunitY6 _ was adopted on April 1968. It basically translated the 
1967 Code into the Community law and "allocated the tasks of enforcing the new 
legislation between the Commission, the Council and the Member States". 7 
This Regulation can be considered as a positive response from the EC to the first 
multilateral agreement dealing with AD. In comparision with the long history of national 
AD laws of other major trading partners, the EEC established its framework of AD on the 
basis of multilateral rules at the beginning, instead of amending or modifying the existing 
AD law in light of the 1967 Code. Moreover, the Regulation confirmed that after the 
transitional period, namely since 1968, the Community institutions have the power to 
take actions in this field with exclusive competence. 8 
From 1968 to 1979, i. e. before the birth of the 1979 Code, only minor changes have 
been made on certain procedural points to the initial Regulation9 and with the accession 
of the Ireland and UK, the Commission has been empowered to amend or revoke national 
3D Pierre WTO Trade Instruments in EU Law (Cameron May, London 1999) 192. ('YVTO Trade Instruments in EU 
Law') 
'F Snyder 'The Origins of "Non-market Economy": Ideas, Pluralism and Power in EC Anti-dumping Law about 
China' (2001) 7 European Law Journal 369. 
5E Vermulst and P Wacr EC Anti-dumping Law and Practice (Sweet&Maxwell, London 1996) 5. ('EC Anti-dumping 
Law and Practice') 
6 Regulation 459/68, [1968] 01 L 93/1, Eng Spec. Ed. Series 1-68 (1), 80. 
71 Van Bael and J Bellis Anti4umping and Other Trade Protection Laws of the EC (4h edn) (KJuwer Law 
International, The Hague 2004) 22. ('Anti-dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws') 
a Ibid 2 1. 
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AD measures of the new MSs. 10 In 1979, the initial Regulation 459/68 was replaced by 
Regulation 3017ng (the 1979 Regulation), as a result of "incorporating the provisions of 
the 1979 Code of Tokyo Round and codifying the practice of Community authorities and 
the judgment of ECY. 11 Moreover, Regulationlognowhich set the rule for state-trading 
countries was repealed by Council Decision 905ng. 12 
Corresponding to the significant modification of the determination of injury in the 
1979 Code, the 1979 Regulation introduced new rules which required an indication that 
dumped or subsidized imports were causing material injury, instead of proving that they 
are the principal cause of injury. More detailed provisions on confidentiality and 
publication requirements also have been added into the 1979 Regulation, in the same 
manner as amendments of the 1979 Code. Moreover, by codifying the practice of the 
Commission, the rule was also changed with respect to the determination of normal value 
13 
of imports from non-market economy countries , the construction of export price, sales 
made at a loss on the domestic market and allowances to be taken into account in 
comparing the normal value and the export price. 14 71be amendments also reflected the 
Court's ruling in the Ball Bearings case 15 , the first judgment in the AD field, especially in 
terms of transparency of AD proceedings. In this case, the opinion of Advocate General 
Warner that private parties should be given the right to have access to the information 
used against them was accepted by the Court. 16 Accordingly, this principle was included 
into the 1979 amendments. 
Before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the EC AD rules experienced two 
more major amendments in 1984 and 1988. In July 1984, Regulation 3017n9was 
replaced by Regulation 2176/84.17 A "sunset clause" was inserted into the text, providing 
for the automatic termination of measures five years after the imposition of measures, or 
five years after last modification or confirmation of measures. Other revisions included a 
9 Regulation 201m [19731 OJ L 206/3 
10 Regulation 141in7. [19771 OJ L 160/ 4. 
11 Van Bael and Bellis (n 6) 22-23. ('Anti-dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws') 
12 Regulation 965nq [ 19791 OJ L 277/10. 
13 For details of the origin of non-markct economy provisions in the EC, Snyder (n 4). 
14 Van Bael and Bells (n 6) 23. ('Anti-dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws') 
15 Case 113n7. NTN Toyo Bearing Company Ltd and others v Council of European Communities [ 1979] ECR 1185, 
(Ball Bearings) 
16 Ibid 1212. 
17 Regulation 2176/84 [1984] OJ L 201/1, corrected at [1984] OJ L227/35. 
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clarification of the meaning of production costs for the purpose of calculating constructed 
normal value, and the treatment of sales not in the ordinary course of trade. 18 In 1988, 
Regulation 2423/88 replaced Regulation 2176/84. Although no fundamental changes 
were made to substantive rules, additional rules were introduced to clarify or modify the 
prior practice of the Commission. For example, the anti-absorption duty, i. e. "the 
possibility of increasing the duty where it was proven that the exporter bore the cost of 
it", was introduced. 19 The provision concerning the treatment of discounts and rebates 
when normal values and export prices were determined on the basis of prices actually 
paid was clarified. 20 
At the time that the ADA was bom, the EC first amended Regulation 2423/88 at the 
points of decision-making procedures and time-limits and then replaced it by Regulation 
3283/94 21 , which consolidated all previous amendments to Regulation 2423/88 and 
incorporated provisions of the ADA. The 1994 Regulation was further amended by 
Regulation 1251/95 to incorporate changes related to time-limits of the investigation. A 
consolidated version, incorporating amendments to Regulation 3283/94 as well as certain 
linguistic changes, was published in March 1996 as Regulation 384/96, the Basic 
Regulation which is currently applicable. 22 The adoption of the Basic Regulation marked 
the establishment of the first completely separate AD framework in the Community law 
from the anti-subsidy legislation. 
Most commentators agreed that the Basic Regulation closely followed the text of the 
ADA. 23 It basically follows the scheme and provisions of the ADA as far as to adopt 
most of its terminologies. The EC approach was "to transpose the language of the 1994 
Agreement into the Community legislation to the extent possible and for this purpose the 
Agreement, rather than the existing Community legislation ... has been taken as the basis 
for the proposed Regulation", as the Commission stated in its Explanatory Memorandum 
18 Ibid. 
'9 Van Bael and Bellis (n 6) 24. ('Anti-dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws') 
20 Ibid. 
21 Regulation 3283/94 [1994] OJ L 349/1, as amended by Council Regulation 355/95 [1995] OJ L 41/2. 
22 Van Bael and Bellis (n 6) 25. ('Anti-dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws') 
23 For example, Pierre (n 3) 18-19 ('WTO Trade Instruments in EU Law'), and Van Bael and Bellis (n 6) 25. ('Anti- 
dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws') 
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24 
to the proposal. It is obviously different from the US approach to incorporate the ADA 
into its Tariff Act of 1930 - the US legislators only modified the existing law where 
necessary for the transposition of the ADA. 25 
There are, however, a number of areas that the Commission considered as necessary 
to make additions to the ADA text to meet EC policy demands, which are referred to as 
"WTO-plus" provisions in this study. 26 They have been described in the Commission's 
Explanatory Memorandum as: 27 
Additions to the Agreement are few and they have, for the most part, 
been described to: clarifications where the Agreement is unclear; 
incorporation of existing provisions on EU' rather unique procedures and 
decision making, amended to take account of Court judgments; and the 
amendment or incorporation of EU specific rules on issues such as 
negligible import volumes, absorption, circumvention and Community 
interest, on which the Agreement is silent, imprecise or where it merely 
gives and indication of minima. 
Many therefore observed that the Basic Regulation has "not faithfully transpose the 
WTO rules", such as issues concerning the computation of SG&A and profit constructed 
in normal values and the issue of duties as a cost. 28 The Basic Regulation also did not 
entirely follow the ADA at the point of de minimis as its threshold is lower (one per cent 
instead of three percent), but has to be computed as a percentage of consumption in the 
Community rather than as a percentage of imports. 
The main character of the Basic Regulation - transposition of the ADA in most 
issues, but not necessarily faithful at all points - can be better understood in the context of 
the process which led to the adoption of these rules. Within the Community, the 
legislative process of the Basic Regulation can be divided into two stages. 29 In December 
1994, the Council unanimously approved the results of the Uruguay Round negotiations 
24 Proposal for a Council Regulation (EQ No /94 of 1994 amending Council Regulation (EQ No 40/94 of 20 
December 1993 on the Community trademark for the implementation of the agreements concluded in the framework of 
the Uruguay Round, COM (94) 414 final. 
25 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, II. R. 5110,103rd Congress, 2d session, 807. 
26 M Clough and F Randolph 'Recent Developments in EC Anti-dumping Practice and the GATT' in N Emiliou and D 
O'Keeffe (eds) The European Union and World Trade Law - After the GATT Uruguay Round (John Wiley & Sons, 
Chichester 1996) 226. ('Recent Development in EC And-dumping Practice') 
27 COM (94) (n 23). 
" Van Bael and Bellis (n 6) 25. ('Anti-dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws') 
29 W Maller, N Khan and 11 Neumann EC Anti-dumping Law --- A Commentary on Regulation 384196 (John Wiley& 
Sons, Chichester 1998)20. ('EC Anti-dumping Law') 
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including the new ADA 30. The adoption of the WTO ADA, nevertheless, was followed 
by two additional measures: the introduction of statutory time limits for investigations 
and a reform of the decision making procedure in the Council - from qualified majority 
to simply majority, although the reform on the decision-making process did not follow 
the adoption of the ADA immediately. Both conditions reflected the wish of a number of 
more protectionist MSs to strengthen the efficiency of the Community's trade deference 
instruments. 31 Southern MSs, in particular France, considered that the requirement of a 
qualified majority "excessively heavy" - after the accession of Scandinavian countries in 
1995 they were concerned that "the free-trade camp comprising the UK, the Netherlands, 
Germany and Denmark would be reinforced and that an increasing number of AD 
measures would be defeated through lobbying MSs". 32 France therefore "made its 
approval of the Uruguay Round package conditional upon this amendment of the 
decision-making system" and its desire finally made its way in the 1994 Regulation. 33 
In the second half of 1994, the discussion of the Commission's proposal for a new 
Basic Regulation again drew the attention of both sides. This time "the new formula for 
the Community interest test and the reformulated anti-circumvention provisions" proved 
34 to be the most controversial. On the issue of the Community interest, MSs were divided 
into two camps again: southern MSs was concerned that the adoption of the Community 
interest rules could "lead to a general paralysis of AD actions"; whilst northern MSs 
opposed amended provisions given the silence of the ADA in this area. 35 Therefore, the 
final Commission proposal was a trade-off and a solution full of compromises. 
In sum, from 1968, the evolution of the EC AD law could be characterized by the 
mixture of the transposition of multilateral rules and compromises between interests of 
different MSs and the Community institutions. Corresponding to the development of 
multilateral rules, a high degree of obligation and precision in substantive rules and a 
strong emphasis on procedural requirements can be identified in the evolution of EC AD 
30 Council Decision (of 22 December 1994) concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, as 
regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations 
(1986-1994), OJ L 336,23.12,1994,1-2. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Van Bael and Bellis (n 6) 24. ('Anti-dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws') 
33 Ibid. 
34 Moller etc (n 28) 20. ('EC Anti-dumping Law') 
35 Ibid. 
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Regulations. The Community decision-making process has been strengthened and the 
Community institutions, in particular the Commission, has been vested with greater 
powers and finally taken the "driving seat" in AD proceedings, 
2.1.2 An Overview of Regulation 384196 (the Basic Regulation)36 
As indicated in the previous section, the Basic Regulation has an identical structure 
with the ADA. The Basic Regulation's alignment over the ADA was, on the one hand, 
generally considered as "an improvement against the practice prior to the Uruguay 
9 37 Round'. On the other hand, it is worth noting that in the Uruguay Round (indeed all 
past GATT/WTO rounds), the EC, as one of the most powerful trading partners, has 
essentially succeeded in molding multilateral rules to legitimize its own system, i. e. 
successfully multilateralized various EC practices. 38 Therefore, many practical problems 
of the EC AD system are directly linked to the insufficiency of the ADA itself. 
The first 11 articles of the Basic Regulation were essentially reproduced from the 
ADA, with slight differences in titles and wordings. These articles, referring to as "WTO- 
transposed", include rules concerning the determination of dumping, the determination of 
injury, the definition of Community industry, the initiation of the proceeding, the 
procedure of investigation, provisional measures, undertakings, retroactivity, the duration 
of the measure, reviews and refunds. From Article 12 to Article 24, the Basic Regulation 
established additional rules, such as non-market economy (Article 2 (7)), anti-absorption 
(Article 12), circumvention (Article 13) and the Community interest test (Article 21), 
which are rather unique for the EC, the "WTO-plus" provisions. 
In this section, an example on how the Community rule determines selling, general 
and adn-dnistrative costs (SGA) in constructed normal value (CNV) is offered to illustrate 
how WTO-transposed or WTO-modified provisions work in practice. As illustrated by 
36 Council Regulation (EQ No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not 
members of the European Community, OJ L 56/1,6 March 1996, as amended by Council Regulation (EQ No 2331/96 
of 2 December 1996, OJ L 317/1,6 December 1996; Council Regulation (EQ No 905/98 of 27 April 1998, OJ L 
128/18,30 April 1998; Council Regulation (EQ No 2238/2000 of 9 October 2000, OJ L 257/2,11 October 2000; 
Council Regulation (EQ No 1972/2002 of 5 November 2002, OJ L 305/1,7 November 2002; Council Regulation (EQ 
No 461/2004 of 8 March 2004, OJ L 77/12,13 March 2004 and Council Regulation (EQ No 2117/2005 of 21 
December 2005, OJ L 340/17,23 December 2005. ('Basic Regulation') 
37 Pierre (n 3) 33. (VTO Trade Instruments in EU Law') 
31 E Vermulst 'The 10 Major Problems with the Anti-dumping Instrument in the European Community' (2005) 39 JWT 
105,107. ('The 10 Major Problems') 
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this example, even a tiny dissimilitude between the Basic Regulation and the ADA can 
make a huge difference in practice. The literal transposition of the ADA in the EC AD 
rule does not necessarily represent a faithful implementation of multilateral rules. 
As a subsidiary means of establishing the normal value, the CNV can be calculated 
if neither the exporter's own domestic prices nor the domestic price of other producers in 
the exporting country concerned can be used . 
39 A CNV of the like product consists of 
unit costs of manufacture (fixed and variable) in the country of origin plus a reasonable 
amount of SGA and profits. Alternatively, instead of CNV, the Commission is allowed to 
use export prices to a third country as the basis of normal value. 40 In practice, the 
Commission rarely uses third country exports to determine the normal value. 41 Instead, it 
routinely establishes very detailed product control numbers (PCNs) in order to compare 
identical models or types for the purpose of dumping and injury margin calculation. As a 
result, in virtually every EC AD investigation, the CNV will be calculated for one or 
more PCNs. The methodology utilized by the Commission in the calculation of CNV is 
thus of significant importance to exporters as it can make great difference in dumping 
margins and final AD duties. 
Article 2(6) of the Basic Regulation sets out the rule governing the calculation of 
one element of normal value - the amount of SGA and profits. It outlined four different 
methods for calculating SGA expenses and the margin of profit. First, as a general rule, 
the amount of SGA and profits "shall be based on the actual data pertaining to production 
and sales, in the ordinary course of trade, of like product, by the exporter or producer 
under investigation". 42 If such amounts "cannot be determined on this basis", the second 
method may be applied - referring to "the weighted average of the actual amounts 
determined for other exporters or producers subject to the investigation in respect of 
production and sales of the like product in the domestic market of the country of 
origiW9.43 If both of the above approaches are not feasible, a third method can be applied 
by resorting to "the actual amounts applicable to production and sales, in the ordinary 
course of trade, of the same general category of products for the exporter or producer in 
39 Pierre (n 3) 84. (VTO Trade Instruments in EU Law') 
40 Art 2 (3) of the Basic Regulation. 
"' Pierre (n 3) 84. (VTO Trade Instruments in EU Law') 
42 Chapeau of Art 2 (6) of the Basic Regulation. 
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question in the domestic market of the country of origin". 44 Finally, "any other 
reasonable method" can be used, provided that "the amount of profit so established shall 
not exceed the profit normally realized by other exporters or producers on sales of 
products of the same general category in the domestic market of the country of origilf t. 45 
Article 2 (6) is essentially based on Article 2.2.2 of the ADA, while several changes 
have been made in the text of this Article compared to that of Article 2.2.2.46 The first 
one is the different order of alternative methods. Article 2.2.2 of the ADA listed four 
methods as well, but putting the third method before the second. This change in the Basic 
Regulation is considered as "a signal of the preference for the method, since although no 
strict legal hierarchy is imposed, in practice". 47 The order set out in the Basic Regulation 
is followed, unless there exists good reasons to the contrary. This codification of previous 
practices of the Commission is justified on the ground that there is no hierarchy of the 
four methods set out in Article 2.2.2, so that "a degree of flexibility was deliberately 
reserved for implementing authorities to choose the method which most accurately 
reflects the expenditure incurred". 48 
Other changes of the text, however, raised more controversial issues. For example, 
whilst Article 2.2.2 of the ADA refers to "actual costs incurred and realized by other 
exporters or producers" in question, Article 2(6)(a) uses the words "actual amount 
determined for other exporters or producers", clearly indicating that the amount to be 
used is the same as those which have been determined by the Commission for such 
exporters. Ibis change in the wording is less innocent than it looks: "the amount of SGA 
and profits determined by the Commission for other exporters will normally be computed 
on the basis of sales made by the exporters in question 'in the ordinary course of trade', 
i. e. on the basis of profitable sales only", whilst Article 2.2.2 (ii) does not contain such a 
discrimination . 
49 This issue has been addressed by the AB in EC- Bed Linen. 50 The AB 
ruled that an investigating authority could not exclude sales which were not made in the 
43 Art 2 (6) (a) of the Basic Regulation. 
44 Art 2 (6) (b) of the Basic Regulation. 
45 Art 2 (6) (c) of the Basic Regulation. 
46 Van Bael and Bellis (n 6) 73-74. ('Anti-dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws') 
I Pierre (n 3) 97. CWTO Trade Instruments in EU Law') 
43 Ibid. 
49 Van Bael and Bellis (n 6) 74. ('Anti-dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws') 
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ordinary course of trade when calculating the amount of SGA and profit pursuant to the 
51 
weighted average method. 
Also, Article 2(6)(b) adds the word "in the ordinary course of trade" to the text of 
Article 2.2.2. Apart from being inconsistent with the text of Article 2.2.2 (i), this addition 
makes "little sense" since the provision refers to SGA and profits related to the 
production and sale of the "same general category of products" in the domestic market of 
the country of origin. In the absence of detailed model by model cost of production data 
for the general category of products comprising the like product (detailed cost of 
production information will only be available for the like product), "it will be impossible 
to identify which sales of products within that general category are or are not in the 
ordinary course of trade". 52 Consequently, the calculation of CNV is arguably 
"unpredictable and arbitrary". 53 
This example indicates that one of the EC's approaches is to codify the previous 
practice followed the Community institutions into the Basic Regulation by slightly 
altering the wording of the ADA. 
2.2 The Administration of Community AD Rules 
2.2.1 The Commission and the Administration of AD Proceedings 
The above discussion of the evolution of the Community AD rules confirmed the 
rise of the Commission as the central player in AD proceedings. As most commentators 
recognized, the role of the Commission is "much greater and more political than a normal 
executive body". 54 Indeed, the Commission's attitude more and more determined the 
result of an AD proceeding. 
The profound changes in the way EC AD rules have been administrated during the 
past half century can be analyzed from two different perspectives. Outwardly, the 
Commission's practice has always been regulated and constrained by multilateral rules. 
50 WTO European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Ldnenfrom India - AB-2000-13 
- Report of the Appellate Body (I March 2001) WT/DS 141/ABIR. 51 Ibid, Para 6.20. 
52 Van Bael and Bellis (n 6) 74. ('Anti-dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws') 
" Vermulst (n 37) 108. ('The 10 Major Problems') 
54 For example, C Stanbrook and P Bentley Dumping and Subsides: The Law and Procedures Governing the Imposition 
of Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties in the European Community (3rd edn) (VJuwer Law International, The 
Hague 1996) 13. ('Dumping and Subsidies') 
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The Commission, while following requirements set out in the GATT/WTO rule, 
constantly compared its practices to its trading partners and justified them on the ground 
that other trading partners were practicing the same. 55 Ibis approach has been described 
as "playing the GATT/WrO game", which "safeguarded the European Market by taking 
instruments allowed in the GATT/WI70 agreement instead of publicly granting 
protection in the form of AD duties, but developing its methodologies to the 
maxirnimý9.56 Inwardly, the Commission has to balance divergent interests of different 
Community institutions, MSs and economic operators involved. 57 There are three 
different layers of balance that the Commission has to achieve: first, under the 
Community interest test, the Commission has to balance different interests with the 
Community industry, importers, and users; second, EC AD measures have to pass the 
control of MSs, in the Anti-dumping Committee (the ADC) and in the Council voting; 
and finally, the Commission administration process is also subject to the security of 
European Courts. The focus of this section is the outward looking review of the 
Commission9s practices, while the next section deals with the inward control by 
Community institutions, MSs and private actors within the EU. 
After the adoption of the 1968 Regulation, during most of the 1970s, the primary 
goal of the Commission in initiating AD proceedings appeared to be "to secure price- 
revision undertakings from foreign exporters", a practice closely linked to then popular 
"voluntary restricted exporting". 58 It is therefore observed that "the majority of cases 
were concluded by the execution of undertakings without having any official 
59 determination of the existence of dumping and injury". The absence of decisions made 
it very difficult for interested parties to determine how the AD rule was construed by the 
Commission. Consequently, foreign producers were under heavy pressure to consent to a 
55 For example, HWenig 'The European Community's Anti-dumping System: Salient Features' (2005) 39 JWT787,794. 
('The EC's Anti-dumping System') The author, as the leader of the Trade Defence Service of the European 
Commission's Directorate General for Trade, frequently referred to the practice of other investigating authorities and 
concluded that "the EC system scores very well in this respect, as evidenced by the extremely low rate of Panel cases 
brought against the EC in Geneva7'. 
51 C Molyneux Domestic Structures and International Trade --- The Unfair Trade Instruments of the US and the EU 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford 2001) 4. ('Domestic Structure and International Trade') 
57 Wenig (n 55) 787. ('The EC's Anti-dumping System') 
51 Van Bael and Bellis (n 6) 41. ('Anti-dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws') 
" Ibid. 
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price undertaking even "where the substantive conditions for applying AD measures were 
9 60 not met'. 
The Commission significantly improved its procedure and brought more 
transparency after the 1979 Regulation due to both the criticism from the ECJ, such as the 
judgement of Ball Bearing 61 , and the tightening up of procedural rules in the 1979 Code. 
Exporters and importers subject to investigation were provided the right to request to be 
informed of "the essential facts and considerations" on the basis of which the 
Commission intended to "recommend the imposition of the definitive duties or the 
definitive collection of amount secured by way of a provisional duty". 62 Publication 
requirements imposed upon Community authorities also significantly stepped up as "the 
Commission was required to include a summary of the information received in the notice 
of initiation published in the Official Journal (OJ) and a summary of the reasons for the 
termination in the notice of termination of proceedings, or where appropriate, information 
63 on any undertaking accepted by the Commission". Moreover, no undertaking is given 
unless the Commission has established, at least provisionally, the existence of dumping 
and injury, corresponding to Article 7 of the 1979 Code. 
The last ten years, i. e. after the establishment of current EC AD framework 
according to the ADA, have seen a more rigorous enforcement of the Basic Regulation 
and a massive increase in the Commission staff, "from no more than five officials in the 
64 early 1970s to around 120 officials in 2003" . Facing both strong domestic interests for a 
more diligent application of AD rules and the criticisms that EC AD proceedings were 
seized by protectionism interest, the Commission always defended its position as "in 
strict conformity with the GATT/WTO requirements" and made restrictive interpretations 
of the Basic Regulation in practice. 65 The practice of the Commission, however, has still 
been condemned for lack of transparency by leading practitioners such as Vermulst. 66 Ile 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ball Bearings (n 13). 
62 Van Bael and Bellis (n 6) 4 1. ('Anti-dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws') 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid 42. 
65 VerMUISt and Waer (n 4) 3. ('EC Anti-dumping Law and Practice') 
66 Vermulst (n 37) 106. ('The 10 Major Problems') 
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identified the following II characteristics of the EC system as symptoms of lack of 
transparency: 67 
Complaints are treated as confidential until initiation of the proceeding; 
Powers of attorney and details of legal representation are treated as 
confidential; 
- Questionnaires are made available only to interested parties; 
- The public has no access to the non-confidentialfile; 
- Non-confidential questionnaire responses and other submissions often are 
so vague that they are virtually meaningless 
- Verification reports prepared by Commission officials are not provided to 
interested parties; 
- Hearings are ex parte and no official transcripts or reports are provided 
to interested parties; 
- At the stage of provisional measures, the MSs are informed before the 
interested parties; 
- Commission guidelines for applying the AD legislation are considered 
"internal " and therefore confidential; 
- When disclosure is provided, calculation formulas are normally removed 
because they are considered as "confidential", and 
- The decision-making process of the Council and its committees is 
confidential. 
The excessive power of the Commission has been criticized as "the monopoly of all 
factual information" and it invites "leaks and abuse". 6' For example, it happens often that 
"prior to initiation of a proceeding or prior to publication of provisional measures (but 
after consultation of the MSs by the Commission), information about complaints, 
respectively provisional findings, leaks oUfq. 
69 rIbiS might considerably disadvantage 
foreign exporters and Community importers in that they are normally less well-organized 
and well-represented in Brussels than Community industries. Vermulst, however, also 
admitted that "most of the intransparencies in the EC system result from insufficient 
ADA regulation, rather than the deliberate breach of the ADA rules by the 
COMMiSSiOW9.70 For example, the EU practice of keeping complaints confidential until 
the initiation of a proceeding is the preferred option in the ADA, even though it 
invariably leads to leaks and abuse, as experienced by the EU and other jurisdictions. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
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To sum up, over years, along with the increasing degree of obligation and precision 
in the multilateral rules, the Community's AD practice has become more and more 
legalistic and judicialised. However, insufficiencies of the ADA give the Commission 
considerable room to manoeuvre the rules in order to produce favourable results and 
maximize the benefit from alternative methodologies. 
2.2.2 Control of Administration within the EC 
Although enjoying considerable discretion in administrating AD proceedings, it is 
fair to observe that the Commission still has to pass three different layers (ex ante and ex 
post) of control, or put differently, achieve three layers of balance, within the EU 
framework. These three layers of control in the AD regime largely illustrate a broader 
picture of the relationship between the Commission, MSs and private actors in the EU 
trade policy-making. 
The first layer of balance is the interest of different Community industries under the 
Community interest test. Article 21 of the Basic Regulation is entirely dedicated to the 
notion of "Community interest". It provides for a detailed procedural and substantive 
framework in which the Commission may consider whether it is the Community's 
interest to call for intervention before imposing a definitive duty, even where dumping 
and resulting injury have been determined to exist. The discussion here focuses on the 
dynamic of interested parties in the Community interest test, whilst the next section 
provides more details of procedural rules and substantive criteria of the Community 
interest test. 
Paragraph I of Art 21 established the general principle that a determination shall be 
based on an appreciation of all the various interests taken as a whole, and all the parties 
shall be given opportunities to make their views known. 71 Subsequent paragraphs set out 
a formal procedure and certain rights of interested parties, including the right to an oral 
hearing and the right to certain infon-nation. 72 Finally, the result of the Commission's 
analysis for properly submitted information, together with an opinion on its merits, must 
71 Art 21 (1) of the Basic Regulation. 
72 Art 21 (2) - (4) of the Basic Regulation. 
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be submitted to the ADC. The Commission shall take the views expressed by the ADC 
into account in any proposal. 73 
In practice, this test has been considered as a "non-disproportionate test", i. e. 
"whether the imposition of measures would place a disproportionate burden on economic 
operators other than the Community industry", as argued by the Commission. 74 The 
ultimate intention of this procedure is "to reassure that the result of AD proceeding is a 
balancing of economic interests of different operators on the European market, namely 
exporters, importers, users and consumers" . 
75 It dynamically affects the process of 
investigation in two aspects: first, this test "influences the structure of the investigation in 
a way that user and consumer interests or competition aspects are systematically and 
thoroughly looked into in the course of the investigation"; and second, it has 
"repercussions on injury or causation analysis", as information obtained in the context of 
the Community interest analysis is also relevant there. 76 In this regard, this test is 
particularly related to those aspects of an investigation that confer a certain margin of 
discretion to the investigating authority where the "Community interest" plays a role. 
Although the Commission has tried to "professionalize" and "neutralize" its 
Community interest determination over times, its established tradition of giving 
overwhelming weight to the complainants' interest in applying the criterion has rarely 
changed - "findings counted on the fingers of one hand", as described by Vermulst. 
77 
Three reasons have been identified as relevant: first, complaining industries in AD cases 
are normally well organized and easy to be heard compared to countless end-users or 
t 78 relatively many processors - in AD cases, "organization means powee . Second, even 
in cases where processors are not limited or not well organized, the Commission will 
"typically find that the interests of the EC-producing industry outweigh those of the EC- 
processing industry". 79 Third, where dumping and resulting injury have been found, "the 
momentum of those findings will tend to propel the Commission towards proposing AD 
73 Art 21 (5) of the Basic Regulation. 
74 Wenig (n 54) 791. ('The EC's Anti-dumping System') 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Vermulst (n 37) 112. ('The 10 Major Problems') 
79 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
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measures". 80 The first reason is especially significant if one bears in mind the general 
position of the Commission in the EC policy-making. Compared with other EU 
institutions, the Commission is widely recognized as being "receptive and open to 
interest group representations", in that it is more enthusiastic to seek alliance with 
influential interest groups to strengthen its position vis-ý-vis the Council in the EU 
system. 81 The significant declines towards the interest of concentrated or even 
monopolized community industries in the Community interest test are therefore not 
surprising in that it reflects the emergence of European networks after Europeanization of 
lots of policy sectors and the influence of lobbying. For instance, statistics have shown 
that the number of EC anti-dumping initiations against Chinese products for different 
industry sectors "does not seem to be related to its relative significance in total import 
flows", but indicates "the degree of concentration". 82 The percentage of EU anti-dumping 
cases is highest in the chen-dcal sector, representing 37.8 percent of the total EU anti- 
dumping cases against China during 1979-2000, while the chemicals sector only 
represents 3.8 percent of total EU imports from China. Intensive anti-dumping 
investigations in those concentrated EU industries are the best evidence of "the 
Commission's formalized contacts with organized interests groups". 83 
The second layer of control of AD administration is the balance of interests between 
the Commission and MSs as well as between different MSs. At first, the Commission has 
to confront with MSs in internal Commission procedure. 84 A Commission proposal for 
the imposition of an AD measure is made only after a careful examination of the result of 
the investigation by a number of Directorate-Generals, namely those in charge of 
industry, customs matter and legal affairs. It is then presented to the entire college of 
Commissioners for adoption. After that, the proposal has to pass "a strict tesf' in the 
ADC . 
85 There is a monthly meeting of the ADC in which Commission officials and 
80 Ibid. 
"S George and I Bache Politics in the European Union (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) 296. ('Politics in the 
EU') 
11 X Liu and H Vandenbussche 'European Union Anti-dumping Cases Against China --- An Overview and Future 
Prospects With Respect to China's World Trade Organization Membership' (2002) 36 JWT 1125,1132. ('EU Anti- 
dumping Case against China') 
83 S Hix The Political System of the European Union (Macmillan, Basingstoke and London 1999) 206, ('The Political 
System of the EU') 
" Wenig (n 54) 788. ('The EC's Anti-dumping Systern') 
15 Ibid 789. 
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representatives from all 27 MSs participate. The Commission proposals are discussed and 
scrutinized from a MS's perspective in the ADC. It is only after all aspects (ranging from 
the technical to the procedural) have been discussed "in considerable detail and 
appropriately addressed" that "a measure is finally adopted by the Council which has the 
final say on definitive measures". 86 
In terms of the Council voting, when qualified majority voting was replaced by 
simple majority in the Basic Regulation, it is argued that the Commission has been given 
a better opportunity to "utilize the conflicting interest of MSs and introduce proposals 
representing the Community's interest as a whole". 87 It is more difficult for MSs to 
obtain sufficient votes to constitute a "blocking minority", since in the Community of 27, 
at least 14 votes were needed to successfully block an AD measure. In particular, since 
20 March 2004, abstentions count as support, i. e. unless 14 MSs oppose definitive 
measures, "a Commission proposal to impose AD measure will stand". 88 Consequently, 
the scope for interest groups to lobby different MSs to vote in accordance with their wills 
was very limited. From an inter-institutional perspective, the Council normally only 
rubberstamped the Commission's proposal. This reflected a broader trend in the EU 
decision-making: the Commission's leadership capacity in the European Integration 
process gained on popular recognition. 89 Along with the tendency that more and more 
policy sectors are converted to the European level, the Commission could adopt a so-call 
"package-deal" approach, where "every member state has to agree some undesirable 
policies in return of other favourable measures". 90 As to AD proceedings, although there 
were always some MSs voting against the Commission's proposal, they are no longer 
able to block the Commission's proposal in most cases. 
If one considers there is a general conflict of interest between the Commission and 
MSs in adoption of many AD measures, there are even bigger conflicts between different 
MSs on this issue. The emergence of a north liberal bloc and a south protectionism block 
is clear from the statistics concerning the voting pattern among MSs in the ADC and the 
" Ibid. 
" Vermulst (n 37) 105. ('The 10 Major Problems') 
88 Ibid. 
" George and Bache (n 78) 245. ('Politics in the EU') 
90 Ibid 236. 
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Council. 91 The Northern European states, including Scandinavia, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, and the Netherlands, had tended to vote against the imposition of duties, 
particularly for products which are used as components and/or inputs for secondary 
manufacturing. Conversely, countries of Southern Europe (France, Spain, Portugal, Italy 
and Greece) almost invariably vote for the Commission's proposals. Thus the ADC 
becomes the place where different interests of MSs "clash and are, possibly, reconciled 
with each other". 92 Wherever the forum is, conflicts of MSs have never disappeared. 
The last layer of control is the judicial review from European Courts. As 
characterized as "absence of meaningful judicial review on substantive issues" by leading 
practitioners, the detail of AD cases in the European Courts is to be discussed in the 
following section. 93 
2.3 The Judicial Review of Community AD Rules 
While the discussion of previous two sections demonstrated two basic trends which 
heavily influenced the evolution of the Community AD regime - the development of 
legalization in the multilateral system and the checks and balance within the EC system, 
the same themes can also be found in European Courts' case law on AD. On the one 
hand, the Courts have to address to EC-specific questions, such as locus standi of 
relevant parties and the principle of good administration. On the other hand, the Courts 
have been inevitably engaged in reviewing substantive issues of AD regulations. 
Therefore, most AD cases involved two aspects: an EC law aspect and a GATT/WTO 
law aspect. 
With regard to the EC law aspect, the general impression is that the Courts have 
been "less enthusiastically intervening in favour of parties suffering detriment through 
EC AD initiatives, if compared to the aid given to those who sought to enforce MSs 
commitments to Community objectives". 94 Two possible explanations are frequently 
discussed in the literature: relatively strict requirements concerning the locus standi for 
" European Commission, Information Note on the Community's Anti- Dumping Instrument and Practice (January 
1998), Appendices 7A-7C 
92 Wenig (n 54) 789. ('The EC's Anti-dumping System') 
93 Vermulst (n 37) 107. (The 10 Major Problems') 
94 A Ward Judicial Review and the Rights of Private Parties in EC Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000) 203. 
(, judicial Review and the Rights of Private Parties') 
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an action for annulment of a Regulation and the evident reluctance to intervene in the 
administrative actions involving complex economic judgements of the Community 
institutions. As argued, the Courts adopted "a more liberal and generous approach to the 
standing of private parties and are more prepared to double-check the work of the 
Commission and the Council as far as the observance of procedural rules is concerned". 95 
The first contestable issue under the EC law in the early AD cases is the standing of 
natural or legal persons to challenge AD measures. Since the judicial review of EC AD or 
anti-subsidy measures is most frequently sought through an action for annulment under 
Article 230 EC, the applicants have to prove their direct and individual concerns under a 
particular Regulation in the first place. For many years it was doubtful which party would 
have standings to challenge Community AD measures. Over years, the ECJ's 
jurisprudence has developed to the point where, as a general rule, complaints, exporters 
96 and importers have standings. In each case, it is still necessary to consider whether or 
not the measure in question is of direct and individual concern to the applicant. 
In terms of the standing of complainants, the ECJ confirmed in cases, such as Timex 
and FEDIOL, that complainants would have the right to challenge a regulation imposing 
definitive duties and a decision not to initiate an investigation or terminating a proceeding 
without the imposition of measures. 97 In other words, the ECJ considered that a 
complainant would have standing where it is alleged that the Community institutions 
have disregarded any of the rights conferred to them by the Basic Regulation. Moreover, 
in Timex, the ECJ also admitted the standing of a main domestic manufacture, although it 
was not a formal complainant but one of the Community producers on whose behalf the 
complaint was lodged. 98 
The ECJ also confirmed the standing of foreign exporters and related importers. In 
Allied Corporation, the ECJ ruled that foreign exporters are entitled to challenge the 
imposition of provisional or definitive AD duties regardless of whether or not they are 
specifically named in the challenged regulation, provided that they were concerned by the 
95 Vermulst and Waer (n 4) 161. ('EC Anti-dumping Law and Practice') 
96 Van Bael and Bellis (n 6) 467. ('Anti-dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws') 
97 Case 191/82 EEC Seed Crusher's and Oil Processors' Fed'n (FEDIOL) v Commission [1983] ECR 2913. (FEDIOL) 
Case 264/82 Timex Corporation v Council and Commission [ 1985] ECR 849. (Timex) 
98 Ibid, Timex. 
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preparatory investigation. " Moreover, when the export price is determined on the basis 
of a constructed export price, related importers involved in the construct export price 
determination will have standing. 100 
The situation is less straightforward with respect to unrelated importers and traders. 
Until Extramet, independent importers had no standing to bring a direct action for the 
annulment of AD measures. 101 In Extramet, the ECJ , 
in a departure of its previous case 
law, ruled that an independent importer had standing to bring a direct action against AD 
measure under a very special circumstance of that case - Extramet was individually 
concerned by the contested measure insofar as it established "the existence of a set of 
factors constituting a situation peculiar to it and distinguishing it from all other 
traders". 102 The later development of CH jurisprudence, however, suggested a 
discontinuation and a returning of strict interpretation of the notion of "individual 
concern". 103 
The second issue in the judicial review of Community AD measures under the EC 
law is the standard of review European Courts applied. The Courts have been widely 
recognized as very reluctant to seriously consider substantive challenges to administrative 
determinations -a signal of "excessive deference to the Community institutions". 
' 04 In 
other words, the Courts have generally shown themselves rather unwilling to intervene in 
substantive details of investigation conducted by the Commission, unless there has been 
an infringement of an essential procedural requirement, most of which are related to the 
principle of good administration. Beyond essential procedural arguments, the level of 
review is less clear, i. e. the extent to which the institutional discretion is subject to review 
by the Courts is unclear. The two cases discussed below demonstrate the unclear position 
of the Courts. 
"Case 239,275182 Allied Corporation v Commission [1984] ECR 1005. (Allied Corporation) 
100 ibid. Also, Ball Bearing (n 13). 
101 Case C-358/89 Extramet Industrie SA v Council [19911 ECR 1-2501. (Extramet) 
102 Ibid, para 17. 
101 For example, Case C- 50/00 Union de Pequenos Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR 1-6677. (Union de Pequenos 
Agricultores) 
104 Vermulst (n 37) 107. (The 10 Major Problems') 
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In 1995, one year after AD cases were transferred to the CFI, the CH delivered its 
first judgement in the area, NTN Corporation and Koyo Seiko. 105 In its judgement, the 
CH first repeated the ECJ's funding in Nakajima that "provisions in the basic regulation 
must be interpreted in the light of Article VI of the GATT and the 1979 Anti-dumping 
106 Code" . It went on to look closely at the wording of Article 3 (6) of the 1979 AD Code 
and Article 4 (1) of the Basic Regulation in terms of the determination of injury and the 
facts presented in the contested regulation about injury. 107 After thoroughly examining 
the factors on which the Council based its finding of injury, the CH found several 
paragraphs of the Council's statement were "incomplete, inaccurate or insufficiently 
supported", so that they are "not sufficient to justify a finding of threat of injury within 
the meaning of Article 4 (1) of the basic regulation, a term which must in any event be 
interpreted in the light of the 1979 Anti-dumping Code and in particular Article 3 (6) 
thereof'. 108 The CH referred to FEDIOL and Timex to confirm that it "may not intervene 
in the appraisal reserved to the Community authorities by the basic regulation but must 
exercise its normal power of review over a discretion granted to a public authority". 109 
The CH concluded that because of misleading or inaccurate statements of the Council, 
the contested Regulation should be annulled. ' 10 
Two months later, the CFI delivered another judgement brought by one of the 
applicants in NTN Corporation and Koyo Seiko against the Council, Koyo Seiko. "' The 
applicant again challenged the determination of injury in a provisional regulation. The 
result and the reasoning of the CH was, however, quite different with the NTN 
Corporation and Koyo Seiko. In particular, when the applicant condemned the Council's 
assessment in terms of other factors which might contribute to the injury and the Council 
admitted that its statement on this issue was inaccurate, the CH held that although certain 
parts of the provisional regulation is "indeed inaccurate", "the underlying reasoning 
I' Joint Case T-163,165/94 NTN Corporation and Koyo Seiko Co. Lid v Council [19951 ECR II - 01381. (NTN 
Corporation and Koyo Seiko) 
106 Ibid para, 65. 
107 Ibid para 66,67 and 75. 
108 Ibid para 76,79,82 and 106. 
109 Ibid para 113. 
110 Ibid para 115. 
111 Case T-166/94 Koyo Seiko Co Ltd v Council [ 1995] ECR 11 - 02129. (Koyo Seiko) 
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adopted by the Community institutions in the regulation at issue proved to be correct". 
112 
It then concluded that although the wording of the provisional regulation was misleading, 
"that inaccuracy in no way affected either the lawfulness of the regulation at issue or the 
reasoning underlying iC9.1 13 The application of annulment was therefore dismissed. 
Different results of these two cases indicate certain degree of uncertainty in the 
Courts' review. The CH seems to adopt an approach to examine whether the procedural 
wrongdoing of the Commission results in the unlawfulness of the regulation contested. if 
procedural defects are not manifested, the CH seem unwillingly to annul the regulation in 
question simply because the Commission did not rigidly follow the procedure. 
With respect to WTO law, although the Courts consistently deny the direct effect of 
GATT/WTO rules in the Community legal order, due to the multilateral nature of AD 
rules, it appear that the Courts are more willing to consider the VV70 AD rule and 
jurisprudence in reviewing Community AD measures. In other words, the WTO law has 
been largely used as "an aid in interpretating a range of EC legal instruments", including 
"both EC domestic law, such as secondary legislation and general principles of law, and 
international agreements to which the EC is a party". 114 The ECJ had admitted in 
Petrotub that the Basic Regulations are intended to transpose into the Community law as 
far as possible the rules contained in GATT/WTO AD Codes or Agreement, so when 
they were called to examine those controversial issues, such as the determination of 
dumping and injury, they were obliged to do so in light of the GATT/WTO rules, 
following the Nakajima principle. 115 In this case, the applicant complained Community 
institutions did not provide an adequate statement of reason to its practice of zeroing. 
Therefore, although as Advocate General Jacobs stated, the practice of zeroing was not 
itself an issue in the proceeding, the WTO jurisprudence in this issue, inter alia EC-Bed 
Linen, did provided a broader "multilateral background" for this case., 16 The ECJ held 
that once Article 2.4.2 of the ADA is transposed by the Community, "the specific 
requirement to state reasons laid down by that provision can be considered to be 
112 lbid para 99. 
113 lbid 105. 
"' F Snyder 'The Gatekeepers: The European Courts and WTO Law' (2003) Common Market Law Review 40,313, 
320. ('The Gatekeepers') 
I's Case C-76/00 P Petrotub andRepublica v Council of the European Union [2003] ECR 1-89, para. 54-58. 
116 Petrotub Opinion of Advocate General, para 18. 
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subsumed under the general requirement imposed by the Treaty for acts adopted by the 
institutions to state the reasons on which they are based". 117 The CH effed in law in 
considering that there was no need to take into account Article 2.4.2 of the ADA for the 
purposes of determining whether the Council has fulfilled the obligation to state 
reasons. " 8 As the contested regulation "does not contain even the merest reference to the 
second symmetrical method of Article 2.4.2 or the slightest explanation as to why that 
method would not enable significant differences in the result", the ECJ held that the 
Council did not satisfy the requirements of the obligation to state reasons and the 
contested regulation was declared invalid! 19 
In sum, generally speaking, few challenges to Community AD measures were 
successful due to restricted requirements of standing and the significant deference to 
Community institutions. As the time being, procedural issues, inter alia locus standi, were 
settled and less contestable. The deference to the Community institutions and the respect 
of discretion are still an important baseline of reviewing AD measures, but more and 
more influences from multilateral AD rules and jurisprudence was found in the Court's 
recent rulings, such as Petrotub. In this case, the ECJ, at the first time, linked, or 
"subsumed", a provision of the ADA to an EC administrative principle (statement of 
reason) -a step forward to integate multilateral rule or norms into the "interpretation" of 
the Basic Regulation. 
3. WTO-plus Features of the EC AD Regime 
Although Community institutions always claim that it is their intention to abide by 
GATTIWTO rule, it is commonly recognized that certain WTO-plus features characterize 
the EU AD regime. These VITO-plus provisions enable Community institutions to retain 
certain control over its AD policy. Consequently, they are of practical significance since 
they can change the result of AD investigations. A typical example is that in an 
investigation where dumping and injury are both found, the investigation can be 
terminated without imposing duty on the ground of the Community interest. 
117 lbid 58. 
118 lbid 52. 
119 Ibid 51 and 86. 
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These WTO-plus features are not developed in vacuum. For example, Snyder 
described the development of "nonmarket eonomy", one of the major WTO-plus features 
of EU AD rules, as folloWS: 120 
[T]he principle factors giving rise to this new legal idea were changes 
in the international anti-dumping repertoire, specific European ideas about 
comparative economic systems, and perceived new economic threats during 
the 1970s. 7hey were combined by the European institutions, notably the 
Commission, in an international context marked by a substantial decline in 
previous US hegemony. Taken together, they legitimated a more protectionist 
anti-dumping policy, of which the legal concept of "nonmarket economy" 
was an important part. 
Therefore, in this section, for each WTO-plus feature, an outline of relevant WTO 
rules and jurisprudence is provided to set the background and a detailed description of the 
EC rules and practices is followed in order to demonstrate how these WTO-plus 
provisions allow the Community institutions to achieve the balance among different 
interests within the EU. Three WTO-plus features of EU AD rules, injury margin, 
community interest and anti-circumvention, are examined in detail. Another main WTO- 
plus feature, namely the EC's methodology towards non-market economy countries, will 
be examined in the next chapter, in the context of the EU-China AD disputes. Case laws 
are cited to the extent possible to demonstrate how WTO-plus provisions work in 
practice. 
3.1 Injury Margin 
3.1.1 Lesser Duty Rule in the WTO 
As a general rule, the ADA welcomes investigating authorities to impose AD duty 
less than the margin. Article 9.1 ADA reads as follows: 
... The decision whether or not to impose an anti-dumping duty in cases where all requirements for the imposition have been 
fuUtIled, and the decision whether the amount of the anti-dumping 
duty to be imposed shall be the full margin of dumping or less, are 
decisions to be made by the authorities of the importing Member. It is 
desirable that the imposition be permissive in the territory of all 
Members, and that the duty he Iess than the margin if such lesser duty 
would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry. 
120 Snyder (n 4) 420. ('Non market Economy') 
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In addition, Article 9.3 ADA provides that: "[T]he amount of the anti-dumping duty 
shall not exceed the margin of dumping as established under Article 2". 
Through a combined reading of Article 9.1 and Article 9.3 ADA, it results that the 
absolute maximum of antidumping duties in an investigation is the dumping margin, 
irrespective of the injury suffered by the domestic industry. The minimum is whatever is 
needed to eliminate such injury. It is, however, at the discretion of an investigating 
authority to decide whether to apply the lesser duty rule, given that the application of this 
rule is "desirable". Ibis is even the case when the product concerned is originating in a 
developing country. 
In US - India Plate, India argued that the US Department of Commerce ("DOC") 
should have considering applying the "lesser duty rule" as one form of constructive 
remedies under Article 15 ADA. However, the Panel disagreed with India by stating the 
following: 121 
India suggests that the USDOC should have considered applying a 
lesser duty in this case, despite the fact that US law does not provide for 
application of a lesser duty in any case. We note that consideration and 
application of a lesser duty is deemed desirable by Article 9.1 of the AD 
Agreement, but is not mandatory. 77zerefore, a Member is not obligated to 
have the possibility of a lesser duty in its domestic legislation. We do not 
consider that the second sentence ofArticle 15 can be understood to require a 
Member to consider an action that is not required by the WTO Agreement 
and is not providedfor under its own municipal law. 
Also, as a best endeavours clause, the application of lesser duty rule in an 
investigation does not justify the breach of obligations deriving from other provisions of 
the AD Code, as the GATT Panel concluded in EC- Audio Cassette. 122 The EC in this 
case claimed that certain claims made by Japan were not properly before the Panel 
because of lack of a legal interest on the part of Japan. The EC argued that even there is a 
ruling in Japan's favour on certain points, it would not affect the level of the anti- 
dumping duties imposed on Japanese imports due to the application of the lesser duty 
121 VVrro United States - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate from India - Report of the Panel 
WT/DS206/R and Corr. 1,29 July 2002, DSR 2002: VI, 2073, para. 7.116. C'US- India Plate'). 
122 GATT EC - Anti-Dumping Duties on Audio Tapes in Cassettes Originating in Japan - Report of the panel, 28 April 
1995, unadopted, ADP/136. ("EC -Audio Cassettes"). 
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rule. Consequently, no nullification and impairment had been suffered by Japan. 
123 It also 
argued that revocation of the entire Regulation in question on the ground that part of the 
dumping calculation was conducted in an Agreement-inconsistent manner was 
inappropriate due to the effect of the "lesser duty rule". 124 
The Panel did not directly address the EC's argument that since it had imposed a 
duty pursuant to the lesser duty rule which was far lower than the margin of dumping it 
had determined to exist, the alleged errors of the EC in calculating a margin of dumping 
could have had no impact on the level of duties imposed in this case. 
' 25 Instead, the 
Panel stated that Japan had submitted calculations to the Panel relating to one exporter in 
support of its view that the margin of dumping, calculated in a manner consistent with the 
Agreement, would have been lower than the duty imposed and the EC did not submit any 
counter calculation. The Panel stated that its task was to "review the legal and factual 
bases for the imposition of an anti-dumping duty in light of the obligations of the 
Agreement, and not to reach its own determination regarding the existence and extent of 
dumping". 126 Therefore, the Panel concluded that it was not precluded from considering 
Japan's claims regarding "zeroing" and "asymmetry" on the grounds that Japan lacked a 
"legal interest" in those claims. 
Nevertheless, the application of lesser duty rule has been considered as an example 
of a constructive remedy by the Committee of Anti-dumping Practice. In its 
"Recommendation regarding Annual Reviews of the Anti-Dumping Agreement", adopted 
on 27 November 2002, the Committee made the following recommendation: 
' 27 
Developed country Members should include, when reporting anti- 
dumping actions in the semi-annual report that Members are required to 
submit under Article 16.4, the manner in which the obligations of Article 15 
have been fulfilled. Without prejudice to the scope and application of 
Article 15, Price undertakings and lesser duty rules are examples of 
constructive remedies that could be included in such Members' semi-annual 
reports. 
123 lbid, para. 15. 
124 lbid, para. 282. 
125 lbid, para 342. 
126 lbid, para 345. 
127WTO Committee of Anti-dumping Practice, Recommendation regarding Annual Reviews of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement , 27 November 
2002, available at: 
oksD elan a] ytic - 
index-elanti-dumnin g 05 e. htm. 
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The Panel in EC-bed Linen further confirmed the status of lesser duty rule as one 
form of constructive remedy by stating that: 128 
The Agreement provides for the imposition of anti-dumping duties, either 
in thefull amount of the dumping margin, or desirably, in a lesser amount, or 
the acceptance ofprice undertakings, as a means of resolving an antidumping 
investigation resulting in afinal affirmative determination of dumping, injury, 
and causal link. 7hus, in our view, imposition of a lesser duty, or a price 
undertaking would constitute "constructive remedies" within the meaning of 
Article 15. We come to no conclusions as to what other actions might in 
addition be considered to constitute "constructive remedies" under Article 15, 
as none have been proposed to us. (Footnote omitted) 
In this case, the EC did consider the imposition of a lesser duty, although it 
concluded that such a duty would not be appropriate since the injury margin exceeded the 
dumping margin for each company. 129 Therefore, the Panel did not base its finding that 
the EC failed to act consistently with its obligations under Article 15 ADA on the ground 
that the EC did not apply the lesser duty rule. Instead, the Panel stated "the failure of the 
European Communities to respond in some fashion other than bare rejection, particularly 
once the desire to offer undertakings had been communicated to it, constituted a failure to 
texplore possibilities of constructive remedies"' 130 . 
Hence, WrO rules and jurisprudences establish that, firstly, the application of the 
lesser duty rule is entirely at the discretion of an investigating authority, even in the 
context of Article 15 ADA concerning investigations against imports from developing 
countries; secondly, the application of lesser duty rule does not justify the application of 
methodologies such as "zeroing" which may result in miscalculations of dumping margin 
and finally, the application of lesser duty rule qualifies as one form of constructive 
remedies under Article 15 ADA that a developed country Member could offer to a 
developing country Member. Yet, Article 15 ADA imposes no obligation to any Member 
to actually apply such rule. Instead, the obligation is to actively "consider" the possibility 
"I YvFTO European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linenfrom India - Report of 
the Panel, Yff/DS141/11,12 March 2001, modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS141/AB/R, DSR 2001: Vl, 2077, 
Fara 6.229. ("EC-Bed Linen") 
9 29 lbid, footnote 90. 
130 lbid, para 6.230. 
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of offering a remedy, which can be the application of lesser duty rule, prior to the 
imposition of a definitive duty. 
3.1.2 Injury Margin Calculation in the EU 
The EU incorporated the lesser duty rule in various provisions of the Basic 
Regulation and made it mandatory for the Community institutions to apply this rule in 
provisional measures, definitive measures and price undertakings. Article 9(4) of the 
Basic Regulation provides the legal basis for the application of lesser duty rule in 
definitive AD measures. It states that: 131 
Where the facts as finally established show that there is dumping and 
injury caused thereby, and the Community interest calls for intervention in 
accordance with Article 21, a definitive anti-dumping duty shall be imposed 
by the Council, acting by simple majority on a proposal submitted by the 
Commission after consultation of the Advisory Committee [ ... 1. The amount 
of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping established 
but it should be less than the margin if such lesser duty would be adequate to 
remove the injury to the Community industry. 
Article 7(2) of the Basic Regulation addresses the issue of applying the lesser duty 
rule in provisional measures. The provision reads as follows: 132 
The amount of the provisional anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the 
margin of dumping as provisionally established, but it should be less than the 
margin if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the 
Community industry. (Emphasis added) 
In addition to the application of the lesser duty rule in provisional and definitive 
measures, Article 8(l) of the Basic Regulation requests the application of the lesser duty 
rule in determining the level of a price undertaking. Article 8(l) reads as follows: 
Investigations may be terminated without the imposition ofprovisional or 
definitive duties upon receipt of satisfactory voluntary undertakings from any 
exporter to revise its prices or to cease exports to the area in question at 
dumped prices, so that the Commission, after consultation, is satisfied that 
the injurious effect of the dumping is eliminated. Price increases under such 
undertakings shall not be higher than necessary to eliminate the margin of 
dumping and they should be less than the margin of dumping if such 
increases would be adequate to remove the injury to the Community industry. 
13 1 Article 9 (4) of the Basic Regulation. 
132 Article 7 (2) of the Basic Regulation. 
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According to the above provisions, the level of an AD duty should be equal to either 
to the margin of dumping or to the amount necessary to remove injury sustained by the 
Community industry, whichever is lower. The Community institutions are obliged "to 
calculate an injury margin in order to determine the level of duty that is adequate to 
remove the injury". 133 The same lesser duty rule applies in connection with price 
undertakings. 
Although no guideline has been provided by either the ADA or the Basic Regulation 
to foresee how to determine the level of an AD duty at which injury is removed, the 
Community institutions established in practice the methodologies to calculate this level 
of duty by examining the level of price underselling or price undercutting, as the case 
may be, of dumped imports. 134 
It is now common practice to calculate the injury margin by comparing the price of 
exporter with the price of the Community industry for the product concerned. More 
specifically, the calculation of injury margin is normally based on this formula: 135 
Price of the Community industry - Exporter's CIF price. 
exporter's price 'CIF Community frontier' 
X 100 
The price of the Community industry corresponds to either "the actual selling price" 
(in the case of "price undercutting") or the "target price", namely "the price level at 
which Community producers could sell their product in the absence of dumped imports" 
(in the case of "price underselling"). 136 The exporter's OF price can be the actual export 
price or the export price after adjustment in order to take into account customs duties paid 
for the imported product, SGA costs and profits of imports, difference in physical 
characteristics, etc. The difference between the (target) price of the Community industry 
and the exporter's price, i. e. the price underselling amount, represents the injury amount. 
Such injury amount is converted into an injury margin by expressing such amount as a 
percentage of the exporter's price at a "CIF Community frontier, duty unpaid" level. 
During the last several years, after some investigations in the past where "some 
injury margins were based on the undercutting and some others were based on the 
133 Mallcr etc (n 28) 404 (EC And-dumping Law') 
134 rbid, 405. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Van Bael and Bellis (n 6) 306. ('And-dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws') 
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underselling margin", the practice of Community institutions as a matter of course is "to 
opt for the underselling calculation of the injury margin". 137 This is due to the fact that 
the exporter's price is often not comparable to the actual price of the Community industry 
because the latter have been depressed as a result of dumped imports and are no longer 
made at a profitable or, more accurately, the injury-eliminating level 
The target price is a fictitious price, calculated in order to set the price levels that 
could ensure the complainant industry's long-term viability. 138 In other word, target price 
is an injury-eliminating fictitious price of the Community industry. It is usually computed 
by increasing the manufacturing costs of the Community producer by the selling, general 
and administrative expenses of the same Community producer and a reasonable profit. 139 
The determination of such reasonable profit is linked to the level of profit the Community 
industry could have achieved if imports were not made at dumped prices. However, this 
is a highly theoretical exercise, as no one can really tell at which price levels the domestic 
industry could have been selling in the absence of dumped imports. In addition, non- 
dumped imports may equally bring about price depression on the market, as they could 
be much lower than the desirable price of the Community industry. The existence or not 
of dumping is irrelevant to the level of injury and vice-versa. Furthermore, the target 
price of the Community industry is defined by reference to this industry's own cost data 
and viability prospects (in order to define a proper profit margin ensuring viability) and 
has nothing to do with whether imports are dumped or not. The existence of dumped 
imports causing injury forms the grounds on which an injury margin must be calculated 
within the EC and not a methodological ground for calculating such injury margin. 
In EFMA vs Council, the CFI clarified the level of "reasonable profif' as follows: 
"[... I the profit margin [ ... I must be limited to the profit 
margin which the Community industry could reasonably count on 
under normal conditions of competition, in the absence of dumped 
imports". but "it would not be consistent with Article 4.1 and 13.3 of 
the basic regulation to allow the Community industry a pro it margin 
that it could not have expected if there were no dumping ". 14f 
137 E Vermulst and F Graafsma 'EC Dumping and Injury Margin Calculation Methods: The Major Problem' (2007) 2 
Global Trade and Custom Journal 27.30. ('EC Dumping and Injury Margin Calculation') 
138 Muller etc (n 28) 409. (EC Anti-dumping Law') 
139 Ibid. 
'40 Case T-210/95, European Fertilizer Manufacturer's Association (EFMA) v Council of the European Union [1999] 
ECRII-3291. 
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Apart from the establishment of a "target price", two further questions arise where 
the number of export transactions is more than one (which is invariably the case). The 
first question is how transactions should be treated where their export price is higher than 
the Community industry's target sale price (a fictitious injury-eliminating price) adjusted 
in cases where the injury margin is based on price undercutting, or the Community 
industry's "target price" adjusted, in case of price underselling. The question is similar to 
the problem of "zeroing" in the dumping margin calculation, in cases where export 
transactions are not dumped, i. e. they generate negative dumping. 141 After EC-Bed 
Linen, the practice of zeroing has been slapped by the WTO and as a result, that the EU 
no longer practices zeroing under any dumping comparison methodology. 
Despite the complete abolition of zeroing in the dumping margin calculation, the 
Commission's practice in injury margin calculations remains to zero all transactions 
where the export price is higher than the Community industry's price. Although 
46zeroing" practice in dumping margin calculation has been ruled as VVTO-inconsistent by 
the panels and the AB on various occasions, no WTO report has ever addressed the WTO 
consistency of applying zeroing in injury margin calculations. This is probably due to the 
fact that the lesser duty rule is not a mandatory practice in the ADA and, thus, WTO 
Members' voluntary lesser duty rule practice involving zeroing cannot be judged as 
WTO-incompatible. 
The second question is how the result of all individual transactions concerned should 
be weighted when averaging them in order to calculate a single injury margin. 142 In cases 
where a producer exports only one model to the Community, the weighted average export 
price is normally calculated by dividing the overall value by the overall quantity 
exported. If the exporter exports more than one model of the product concerned, export 
transactions concerning a model for which negative injury was found (i. e. sold at a higher 
price than the EC target price) will automatically be put at zero in the overall weighing. 
This practice is identical to the "zeroing" practice previously practiced by the EC as a 
141 Vermulst and Graafsma (n 137) 3 1. ('EC Dumping and Injury Margin Calculation') 
142 Ibid. 
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comparison methodology in dumping margin calculations that the Commission used to 
conduct before EC-Bed Linen. 
A particular problem arises if the models imported into the Community and those 
produced by the Community industry have different characteristics. Since the 
Commission's practice is to "limit the undercutting and underselling comparison to those 
models produced by the Community producers, which are directly comparable to the 
imported models". 143 In case of complex products involving a variety of different 
characteristics, where it is troublesome to select the Community industry's models that 
are identical to the imported models in order to ensure fair comparison, the Commission 
usually groups the products by closely resembling types and compares on a type-by-type 
basis. Adjustments for differences in physical characteristics are also not to be excluded. 
In order to ensure fair comparison, the Commission will also typically proceed to 
adjustments needed for rendering the prices comparable. 144 For example, selling cost 
allowances should be either deducted or left in the price on both sides: imported products 
and sales by the Community industry. As to the Incoterms applicable, the comparison 
will typically take place as follows: OF price of imports with EXW price of domestic 
sales of the Community industry. The rationale for this comparison is that the customer 
should be located somewhere in between the Community border (cf. CIF price of 
imports) and the factory gates of the Community producers (cf. EXW price of the 
Community industry). 
To sum up, the Community Institutions' methodology on assessing the injury 
amount and calculating injury margins is evolving through its previous practices. Now it 
is a common practice to calculate injury margin by comparing the exporter's prices and 
the target price of the Community industry. Moreover, although "zeroing" practice in 
dumping margin calculation has been abolished by the Community institutions, it is still 
applicable in injury margin calculation where more than one transaction is made or more 
than one model is compared. 
143 Mailer etc (n 28) 407 (EC Anti-dumping Law') 
144 Ibid. 
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3.2 Community Interest 
3.2.1 Public Interest in WTO law 
The term "public interest" has never been used in the ADA. The absence of relevant 
provisions dealing with "public interesC' in the WTO agreements results in a lack of 
consensus among WTO Members on the following three questions: 1) which domestic 
parties' interest should be considered as part of "public interese'; 2) what economic 
factors should be taken into account and how investigating authorities should weight 
them; and 3) what kind of procedure should be inserted into national legislations to allow 
the interest of various parties to be considered. 
Although there is no direct answer for the above three questions in the ADA, two 
ADA provisions, Article 6.12 and Article 9.1, are generally considered to be of relevance 
to the application of so-called "public interest" test in an AD investigation. Article 6.12 
ADA war-rants the opportunity for representations regarding the evidence of dumping, 
injury and causality from industrial users and consumer organizations of a WTO Member 
to be considered by investigating authorities. 
It has to be noted that Article 6.12 ADA contains only procedural requirements to an 
investigation authority. It provides no guideline on how the information submitted by 
industrial users and consumer organizations should be considered and imposes no 
substantive obligation to investigating authorities. 
Another provision, Article 9.1 ADA, has also been frequently cited as the basis of 
the inclusion of a "public interest" test in an AD investigation. 145 Many WTO Members 
who are in favour of including a new "public interest" provision in the ADA consider 
Article 9.1 as the legal basis for such new provision, essentially on the ground that 
Article 9.1 recognises the full discretion of an investigating authority to not to impose a 
definitive measure or not to impose a measure to its fullest extent in the circumstances 
that it deems appropriate. 146 
However, Article 9.1 ADA does not impose any obligation to a WrO Member to 
establish a domestic procedure to consider representations made by those economic 
145 It is common understanding in the WTO/EC literature that Article 9.1 ADA is the basis of the EC's Community 
interest test. See Van Bael and Bellis (n 6) 293 ('Anti-dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws'). 
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actors who are affected by a definitive AD measure. This is to say, similar to the lesser 
duty rule, the "public interest" test is non-mandatory in the ADA and whether and how to 
consider public interest in an AD investigation is entirely at the discretion of an 
investigating authority. 
3.2.2 Community Interest Test in the EU law 
Among the WTO-plus characterizations of the EU AD law, the implementation of a 
public interest test, namely the Community interest test, in AD and CVD investigations is 
one of the most important features of the EU system. 147 This addition test, as is believed, 
makes the EU "the only WTO Member that consistently applies the public interest test in 
an elaborated and systematic way" and has "considerably restricted the use of anti- 
dumping and anti-subsidy instruments in order to balance the interests of various 
economic actors". 148 
With seven sub-paragraphs, Article 21 of the Basic Regulation provides the legal 
basis for the application of a public interest test under the EU law, both in terms of 
procedural requirements and substantive criteria. 
Article 21 (1) sets out the main purpose of the Community interest test, namely to 
decide "whether there are compelling reasons not to impose anti-dumping measures in a 
given proceeding, despite a finding that dumped imports caused material injury to the 
Community industry". 149 It directs the Community institutions to give "special 
consideration" to the need to "eliminate the trade distorting effects of injurious 
dumping", as well as the need to "restore effective competition" in the Community 
market. After the examination, measures are not taken only when the Community 
institutions can "clearly conclude that it is not in the Community interest to apply such 
measures ". 
146 For example, Paper from Hong Kong, China and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and 
Matsu, Economic Effects of Anti-dumping Measures, TN/RLIGEN/142,6 June 2006, and Paper from Canada, 
procedures from Adversely Affected Domestic Interested Parties, TN/RUGEN/1 11,21 April 2006. 
14" A Sinnaeve 'The "Community Interest Test" in Anti-dumping Investigations: Time for ReformT (2007) 2 Global 
Trade and Customs Journal 157,157, ('The Community Interest') 
148. E Vyboldina. 'The Green Paper on Trade Defence Instruments: Anti-dumping' (2007) 2 Global Trade and Customs 
Journal, 411,411. 
149 Sinnaeve (n 147)157. ("rhe Community Interest') 
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Commentators consider that in essence, the test carried out by the Community 
institutions is a negative one, namely measures may not be applied only where it can be 
clearly concluded that it is not in the Community interest to apply such measure. 150 The 
Community institutions are therefore working under the presumption that measures will 
be applied "whenever dumped imports caused material injury to the Community 
industry". 151 Only if compelling evidence leads to the conclusion that the imposition of a 
measure would not be in the overall interest of the Community, the Community interest 
test can provide the legal basis for not imposing duties. The non-imposition of measures 
on the basis of the Community interest is therefore an exception departing from normal 
rules and occurs only in special circumstances. 
Procedural Aspects of the Community Interest Test 
Article 21 (2) clearly defines the parties whose interests should be examined and 
who enjoy various rights in the Community interest test. It provides that complainants, 
importers and their representative associations, representative users and representative 
consumer organizations have the right to make themselves known and provide 
information to the Commission. 152 
It is of the view of some commentators that this list is non-exhaustive and "parties 
with an economic interest in the product under investigation are meant to be part of the 
analysis". 153 Within this logic, it is a standing practice of the Commission to also 
consider the interests of other economic actors, such as the suppliers of the Community 
industry or traders of the product concerned, on a case-by-case basis, although they are 
not explicitly mentioned in Article 21 (2). 
154 By contrast, parties with non-economic 
interests, such as environment organizations, would not be considered as interested 
parties under Article 2 1. 
Article 21 (2), (3), (4) and (6) specifies the procedural rights of the parties 
concerned. Those rights include: right to make submissions, right to consult non- 
150 Ibid and also MUller(n 28) 501. ('EC Anti-dumping Law') 
151 Van Bael and Bellis (n 6) 294 ('Anti-dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws') and Vermulst and Waer (n 4) 370 
('EC Anti-dumping Law and Practice') 
112 Article 21 (2) of the Basic Regulation. 
"I Sinnaeve (n 147) 158 ('The Cornmunity Interest') and Mfiller (n 28) 505. ('EC Anti-dumping Law') 
154 Ibid. 
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confidential files; right to respond to submissions; right to request a hearing; right to 
make submissions on the application of a provisional duty; right to inspect other parties' 
submissions on the application of a provisional duty and responses thereto; and right to 
have a disclosure of final findings. 
Article 21 (2) also lays down that the parties concerned may only submit 
information on the Community interest within the time limit specified in the initiation 
notice. It is common practice that the time limit specified in the notice of initiation of 
AD, an interim review, or an expiry review is 40 days from the date of publication of the 
notice. 
Substantive Assessment of the Community Interest 
With respect to substantive assessments, the Community interest analysis consists, 
first, of an evaluation of the likely consequences both of applying or not applying the 
envisaged measure on the Community industry and other interested parties as defined by 
Article 21 of the Basic Regulation 155 , and second, the weighting and balancing of 
different interests at stake. 156 
To conduct the first step analysis, the Commission normally goes one step up or 
down in the chain of economic operators involved in dealing with the product concerned 
to access the likely effect of taking or not taking the measure to those operators. Hence, 
in addition to relevant interests of the Community industry, relevant interests of the 
upstream industry, users (downstream industries) and sometimes consumers are taken 
into account. 
In comparisonwith other operators likely to be directly and economically affected by 
the measure, such as upstream and downstream industries, the standing of consumer 
organizations in a Cornmunity interest test is less straightforward. For products not 
commonly sold at the retail level, the CH clarified in BEUC v Commission that consumer 
organizations are to be involved only if they can demonstrate an "objective link! ' with the 
product concerned. 157 Consequently, in an investigation not concerning consumer 
product, a customer organization does not automatically qualify as an interested party, yet 
'5' Case T-132/01 Euroalliageset at v. Commission [2003]ECRII-2359, para47. 
156 Sinnaeve (n 147) 159 and 160. ('The Community Interest') 
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not automatically excluded either. An "objective link", for example, by demonstrating 
"the likely effect of a cost increase of the product concerned on the price of further 
processed products which are sold at the retail level", has to be established on a case-by- 
case basis to justify the standing of a consumer organization in a Community interest test. 
158 
In the second step of the analysis, the Commission weights all the interests of 
different parties and balances them against each other. The Commission usually checks 
whether the negative impact on other interested parties would not be clearly 
disproportionate to the advantages that the imposition is likely to bring to the Community 
industry. In practice, as observed by leading practitioners, in the vast majority of cases, 
the Commission considers "the positive effects of measures for the Community industry 
outweigh the possible negative effects on users and consumers". 159 Therefore, unless 
overwhelming evidences suggest that the imposition of a measure would "not bring any 
benefit to the Community industry, for instance, in case where the Community industry is 
not viable anymore and the imposition of measures could not be expected to allow its 
return to viability", the imposition of measures will not be considered as 
disproportionate. 160 
Due to methodological difficulties, the Commission does not quantify each 
economic factor in the process of weighting different interests. Therefore, even though 
various interests are put in balance, they are not weighed against each other in a 
mathematical equation. In other words, "the assessment of Community interest is not a 
cost-benefit analysis in the strict sense and the Commission enjoy a large degree of 
discretion to conduct a qualitative appreciation instead of a quantitative analysis". 161 
Under the current practice, interests that can be taken into account in the Community 
interest test vary from one interested party to anther. For the Community industry, a 
number of factors are normally recognized as relevant by the Commission in a 
Community interest test, such as "to prevent the future aggravation of an already 
precarious situation for the Community industry or even of its disappearances"; "to 
"' Case T-256197 Bureau Europeen des Unions de Consommateurs (BEUC) v Commission [2000] ECR H-101. 
158 Sinnaeve (n 147) 159. ('The Community Interest') 
159 Vermulst and Waer (n 4) 37 1. ('EC Anti-dumping Law and Practice') 
160 Sinnaeve (n 147) 159. ('The Community Interest') 
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prevent investment and rationalization in the sector concerned being put in jeopardy"; "to 
safeguard sufficient earnings of the Community industry in order to fund necessary levels 
of investment"; "to prevent the loss of the Community industry's competitiveness in 
terms of technology"; "to prevent the distortion of competition arising from dumping on 
the Community industry" and so on. 162 
Similarly, certain arguments put forward by upstream industries and users are 
frequently taken into account by the Commission. Protection of upstream industries in 
the Community, especially if a loss of technology is imminent, can be an argument that 
supports the imposition of a measure, whereas the points made by users with regard to a 
potential price increase to be bome by the user industry and difficulties to make sure 
sufficient supply of the product concerned in the Community can put significant weights 
on the argumentation in favour of termination of an investigation without the measure 
imposed. 
For example, in Synthetic staple fibres of polyesters (PSF) case, the Commission 
terminated the investigation due to the strong opposition of the user industry. 163 In 
particular, the Commission considered the following arguments made by users: shortage 
of supply, price increases PSF, cost impact of the proposed measure, price increases for 
downstream products and consequence for employment in the Community market. The 
Commission, after taking into account the submissions made by various interested 
parties, concluded that: 164 
The overall advantages to be gained by the Community industry must be 
weighted against the probable disadvantages, in particularfor users and, to 
some extentfor consumers. The volume and the variety of supply offered by 
Community producers are deteriorating. This is due, among other reasons, 
to the industrial conversion of Community producers from PSF to other 
products (for example la Seda de Barcelona) and the financial difficulties of 
Tergal. 7here is a supply problem in the Community marketfor certain types 
offibres and the Community producers cannot or are not willing to make the 
necessary efforts to meet the demand Furthermore, it is likely that the 
imposition of duties will lead to substantial price increases of certain types of 
161 MUller (n 28) 501. ('EC Anti-dumping Law') 
162 Ibid. 
163 Commission Decision of 19 June 2007 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of synthetic 
staple fibres of polyesters (PSF) originating in Malaysia and Taiwan and releasing the amounts secured by way of the 
provisional duties imposed, OJ L 160/30,21 June 2007. 
W Ibid, retrial 40. 
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PSF which are not available in sufficient quantities in the Community. 
Moreover, account should be taken of the fact that certain users of PSF (in 
particular the bedding industry) have very low profit margins and will have 
to pass on to consumers any price increase in PSF or abandon their activities 
in case competition from third countries would not allow them to increase 
theirprices. 
Other important considerations for the Commission in a Community interest test 
include the elimination of trade distorting effects resulting from dumped imports and to 
restore effective competition in the Community market. In this regard, the Commission 
normally rejects the argument from exporters, users or consumers that the adoption of 
AD measures would exclude producers outside the Community to supply the Community 
market. 
However, in two situations, the Commission examines the competition argument 
with special care. The first one is when "the possible danger of reducing competition or 
even creating an monopolistic market structure as a result of the imposition of an anti- 
dumping measure". 165 The second one is where the Community industry has been the 
subject of measures sanctioning anti-competitive behaviours. 166 Yet, the mere existence 
of these situations does not automatically result in the termination of the investigation on 
the ground of Community interest. 
Reflections on Green Paper 
On 6 December 2006, the Commission adopted a Green Paper for Public 
Consultation on Europe's Trade Defence Instruments in a Changing Global Economy 
("Green Paper") to launch reflections on the application of the EU Trade Defence 
165 For example, in Potassium chloride case, the form of the measure has been changed on the ground of Community 
interest. Council Regulation (EC) No 969/2000 of 8 May 2000 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
potassium chloride originating in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, OJ L 112,4, recitals 123 and 125. 
66 For example, Commission Regulation (EC) No 617/1999 of 23 March 1999 imposing a provisional anti-durnping 
duty on imports of stainless steel wires with a diameter of I nim or more originating in India, OJ L 79,13, recitals 27 
and 76. Also, Conm-dssion Decision of 28 May 1999 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports into 
the Community of certain stainless steel heavy plates originating in Slovenia and South Africa (notified under 
document number C (1999) 1383), OJ L 135,95 and Council Regulation (EC) No 348/2000 of 14 February 2000 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes of iron or non-alloy steel 
originating in Croatia and Ukraine and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, OJ L 45,1, at recitals 30 
and 39. 
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Instruments ("TDr') in the light of "emerging new realities from the application of TDI 
as well as in a context of globalisatioW'. 167 
Two issues related to the concept of "Community interest", namely the weighting of 
different EU interests and the form, timing and duration of AD measures, were raised in 
the Green Paper consultation. These issues were emanated from recent high profile 
investigations involving consumer products, such as footwear 168 , in which the concept of 
"Community interest" took the centre stage. 169 During these investigations, stakeholders 
started to question whether the balancing of interests should be rethought or whether the 
scope of analysis of Community interest should be broadened, in order to reflect the 
reality of the changing global economy. 
For instance, in the footwear case, strong divisions among different stakeholders in 
the EU and among MSs are provoked. The EU leather footwear sector is featured by its 
significant degree of outscoring. Although many EU companies still maintain their 
production in Europe, a large number of them have outsourced their production to China 
and Vietnam, while keeping other functions, such as design, in the EU. These 
outsourcing companies are subject to the AD measures and suffer negative consequences 
from them. Similarly, consumers suffer the price increase as a result of the imposition of 
the measure. Therefore, questions were raised on "whether and how to better reflect the 
interests of those outsourcing EU companies and consumers in an anti-dumping 
investigation". 170 
During the process of the Green Paper consultation, possible changes to the existing 
law and practice of Community interest have been discussed in more than 500 
submissions made by interested parties around the world. 17 1 Three proposed changes, 
which have already been practiced by the Commission in certain cases but have not yet 
been codified, draw most of attentions. 
167 Communication from the Commission, Global Europe: Europe's trade defence instruments in a changing global 
economy -A Green Paperfor public consultation, COM (2006) 763 final, Brussels 6 December 2006. 
161 Council Regulation (EQ No 1472/2006 of 5 October 2006 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting 
definitely the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain footwear with uppers of leather originating in the People's 
Republic of China and Vietnam, OJ L 275,1, recital 301. ffootwear Regulation') 
169 F Graafsma and J Cornelis 'The EC's Green Paper on Trade Defence Instruments: Guillotine on Anti-dumping or 
Smokescreen for More Basic Predicaments? ' (2007) 2 Global Trade and Customs Journal, 255. ('Gree Paper on TDF) 
171 Sinnaeve (n 147)162. ('The Community Interest') 
171 Bulletin Quotidien Europe No 9548, 'Peter Mandelson Gives Himself Extra-time before Submitting His New 
Revision Proposals', 22 November 2007. 
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The first proposed change is to codify the Commission's practice in modulating the 
level of AD measures. The current Community interest test leads to a either positive or 
negative conclusion, namely a measure should be imposed or not. The Commission 
therefore considers that more flexibility might be appropriate in particular for cases 
where the balance of interest is not a clear-cut and a lower level of duties might alleviate 
the negative impact on certain economic operators. 172 
The Commission's practice in footwear case was an experiment on modulation of 
the level of AD measures. In this case, the Commission adopted a new approach to 
incorporate the concept of a non-injurious import volume in the calculation of injury 
margin. 173 The Commission calculated new underselling margins based on the size of 
non-materially injurious import value amounts. For this purpose, the cumulated import 
values of 2003 were regarded as non-materially injurious. These import values were then 
allocated to China and Vietnam on the basis of their share of import volumes during I 
April 2004 - 31 March 2005. These adjusted non-injurious import values were 
subsequently expressed as a percentage deducted from the underselling margin to arrive a 
revised lower underselling margin. Consequently, and also as a result of the lesser duty 
rule, the definitive AD duty was lower than the dumping margin and injury margin 
calculated under "normal" rules. 
Despite potential positive effects of the flexibility to modulate the level of AD 
measures, it is argued that its implementation may reveal a number of difficulties. 174 
Lack of criteria or methods to define the modulation is one of the most serious risks. The 
idea of modulation is criticized as dangerous since it will make the outcome established 
by precise and sophisticated methodology of dumping and injury margin to be modulated 
according to non-precise parameters. 
The second hotly debated proposal is the shorter duration of AD measures. The 
application of AD measures for a shorter period of time than the normal five-year period 
is rare, but not exceptional. For example, in footwear case, the Commission 
experimented with a definitive AD measure for two years instead of the normal five years 
"I Sinnaeve (n 147) 175. ('The Community Interest') 
173 Footwear Regulation (n 168) recitals 301. 
174 Sinnaeve (n 147) 176. ('The Community Interest') 
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as stipulated in the Basic Regulation in order to gain sufficient political support from 
Mss. 175 
This practice of the Commission has been confirmed by the CH in Cecom v. 
Council. 176 In this case, the CH held that a shorter duration of measures provided by 
Article 11 (2) of the Basic Regulation is allowed, since Article 11 (2): 
... [mjust be structured as allowing the Council a discretionary power to fix 
at less thanfive years the period of application of definitive anti-dumping duties 
adopted following a procedure for the review of the measures initially adopted 
if, ... , such a limitation best serves to protect the differing interests of the 
parties to the procedure and maintain the equilibrium between those interests 
which the basic regulation seeks to establish. 
However, the legitimate and long-standing practice of the Commission has not yet 
been codified in the Community law and no guideline has been provided to clarify how 
shorter duration of AD measures can be applied in each investigation. 
The third proposal concerns the possibility of excluding certain product types from 
the application of AD measures in its efforts to balance the interest of producers, 
importers, retailers, distributors and consumers. Again, the case best demonstrated the 
Commission's experiment is the footwear case. In the course of the investigation, the 
Commission excluded, both at the provisional stage and the definitive stage, Special 
Technical Athletic Footwear from the product scope on the ground that STAF has 
distinctive technical features. 177 
The proposal to allow certain flexibility to exclude certain product types from the 
application of AD measures received less criticism than other proposals, as it is easier to 
operate. However, it has been pointed out that the main difficulty of this idea is "to have 
higher risk of circumvention". 178 
In conclusion, the EU's Community interest test is unique among WTO Members in 
the sense that it establishes a systematic and balanced instrument to look into the wider 
economic impact of TDI and consider whether the application of a measure is in the 
"public interest" or not. In applying the Community interest test, the Commission 
175 Ibid. 
176 Case T-232/95, Conunittee of European Copier Manufactures (Cecom) v. Council of the European Union [ 1998) 
ECR U-2679. 
177 Footwear Regualtion (n 164) recital 15. 
185 
Chapter V 
exercises its wide discretion and makes an overall appreciation under the principle of 
proportionality. In general, the practice shows that the current threshold is very high for 
concluding that the negative effects of measures would be disproportionate and an 
investigation should be terminated on the ground of Community interest. However, as 
discussed in Chapter II, the Community interest test provides the Community institutions 
certain flexibility to balance the interest of different economic operators in the EU. The 
proposals discussed in the Green Paper consultation may achieve more transparency, 
effectiveness and workability, but may equally risk opening the door to a politicization of 
TDI. Therefore, it remains to be seen how the Commission will address these challenges 
in its future practice. 179 
3.3 Anti-circumvention 
3.3.1 Anti-circumvention in the WrO 
Circumvention issues arise when an exporter, which is subject to an AD duty, avoids 
the duty by misclassifying or altering the goods, transshipping them through a third 
country as a product of that country or sending components of the subject product to the 
importing country for assembly into a finished product that otherwise would be subject to 
the dumping duty. 180 
Forms of circumvention can include: 
Carrying out the final assembly in the importing country or a third country; 
Altering the product without economic justification so that it falls under a 
different tariff code, which is not subject to dumping measures; 
Transshipment via other third countries; 
Repackaging; 
Re-channelling the sales via exporters with lower duties; 
Incorrect origin declarations; 
Importation of parts or knock-down kits. 
Sinnaeve (n 147) 176. (The Community Interest') 
MLex TDI package slips from comn-dssion agenda, 4 December 2007, available at 
http: //www. n-dex. comAist3. aspx? jobid=5254 
"o Van Bael and Bellis (n 6) 482. ('Anti-dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws') 
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Neither the Kennedy Round nor the Tokyo Round AD Codes contained any express 
provisions on circumvention. The introduction of rules on this subject in the Uruguay 
Round was discussed as one of the negotiation objectives of the EU and the USA but 
finally failed to be adopted. The 'Dunkel draft' contained separate provisions for 
importing country circumvention and third country circumvention. 181 Article 12 
provided that, "under specific circumstances, anti-dumping duties could be extended, in 
the case of circumvention operations consisting of assembling or completing a like- 
product in the importing country from components originating in the country subject to 
the duties". 182 
The USA found these draft provisions insufficient, so they filed a proposal to 
extend AD duty orders in the case of third-country and minor alternation 
circumventions. "' The majority of GATT Contracting Parties rejected this proposal and 
it was impossible to find a compromise in this respect. As there was no strong political 
interest in the adoption of multilateral anti-circumvention provisions, no final agreement 
was reached and Article 12 of the Dunkel Draft was deleted. ' 84 
Nevertheless, the Final Act embodying the result of the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations issued the following decision which stated: 185 
Noting that while the problem of circumvention of anti-dumping duty 
measures formed part of the negotiations which preceded the Agreement on 
Implementation ofArticle VI of GA7T 1994, negotiators were unable to agree 
on a specific text, 
181 GATr Secretariat, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, MTN. TNCfW/FA/F-21 (Dec. 20,199 1) ('Dunkel Draft'). 
182 lbid Article. 12.1. These specific circumstances include cases in which it has been established that: 1. the product 
assembled/ completed had to be a like-product with regard to a product which was subject to a definitive dumping 
measure; 2. the assembly1completion operation had to be carried out by an entity which was related to the original 
dumping exporter; 3. the components used in the assembly/completion operation had to be, directly or indirectly, 
sourced by the dumping exporter; 4. the assembly/completion operation had to have started or expanded substantially 
after the initiation of the anti-dumping investigation; 5. the totally costs of the components used in the 
assembly/completion operation had to be no less than the 70% of the total cost of all the parties used in the operation, 
with the exception that no anti-dumping measure should be extended if the value of the assembly/completion operation 
was greater than 25% of the ex-factory cost of the like-product; 6. there had to be evidence of dumping concerning the 
difference between the priced of the product in the importing country and the normal value of the product when subject 
to the original definitive anti-dumping duty; and 7. there had to be evidence that the extension of the anti-dumping 
measures to the components was within the scope of the definitive anti-dumping duty in order to prevent the injury to a 
domestic industry with regard to the like-product. 
183 Communication for the United States, Proposal for Improvements to the Anti-Dumping Code, 
MTN. GNGING8lW59 of December 20,1989 
184 K Aamantopoulos and D Notaris 'The Future of the WTO & the Reform of the Anti-Dumping Agreement: A Ugal 
Perspective' (2000) 24 Fordham International Law Journal 30,32. 
115 WTO Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations LTIUR/A/l, 15 
April 1994. 
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Mindful of the desirability of the applicability of uniform rules in this area 
as soon as possible, 
Decide to refer this matter to the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices 
established under that Agreementfor resolution. 
3.3.2 Anti-circumvention in the EU AD Law 
Despite the lack of international rules , several VY70 Members have adopted anti- 
circumvention legislation, including the EU. "' These Members interpreted the 
declaration as permitting individual Members to adopt provisions unilaterally, pending a 
multi-lateral solution within the framework of the WTO. The Council stated in 
Polyethylene terephthalatefilm 187 that, as "the Final Act of the Uruguay Round contained 
a Decision on anti-circumvention referring the matter to the Committee on Anti-Dumping 
Practices and as this decision was made knowing that several WTO members already had 
their own anti-circumvention legislation, the European Community interpreted it as 
permitting individual members to adopt or maintain provisions in this respect, pending 
the adoption of multilaterally agreed rules". 
Provisions on anti-circumvention were first introduced by the EC in 1987"' and 
were aimed at covering assembly operations within the Community where a very high 
proportion of components used were from countries whose exports AD measures had 
been imposed. The provision was added as paragraph 10 to Article 13 of Regulation 
2176/84 and it was designed to counteract EC circumvention. Third country 
circumvention was dealt with under the rule of origin. 
Seven anti-circumvention proceedings were initiated between1987 and 1989. All 
of them concerned Japanese manufacturing operations in the Community. Article 13(10) 
fell into disuse, however, after a GATT Panel found that this provision was not consistent 
with the Community's obligations under the GATT, in Panel Report EEC- Parts and 
Components'" 
186 Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, as well as the EU and US have adopted anti-circumvention 
measures. 
'87 Regulation 1975/2004 [20041 OJ L 342/1. 
188 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1761/87 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2176184 on protection against dumped or 
subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Economic Community, OJ L 167,26.6.87,9. 189 GATT European Economic Community - Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components - Report of the Panel, 
("EEC - Parts and Components "), adopted 16 May 1990, BISD 37S/1 32,152. 
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When implementing the result of the Uruguay Round, the EC introduced new 
circumvention procedures into the Basic Regulation that were subsequently amended in 
2004. 
Article 13 (1) of the Basic Regulation provides that: 190 
Circumvention shall be defined as a change in the pattern of trade 
between third countries and the Community or between individual companies 
in the country subject to measures and the Community, which stems from a 
practice, process or work for which there is insufficient due cause or 
economic justification other than the imposition of the duty, and where there 
is evidence of injury or that the remedial effects of the duty are being 
undermined in terms of prices andlor quantities of the like product, and 
where there is evidence of dumping in relation to the normal values 
previously established for the like product, if necessary in accordance with 
the provisions ofArticle 2. 
Article 13(2) expressly deals with cases of circumvention with regard to 
assembly. In accordance with paragraph 2 of the provisions, operations involving 
assembly operations may be caught where"' - 
a) 7he operation started or substantially increased since, or just prior to, 
the initiation of the anti-dumping investigation and the parts concerned are 
from the country whose exports are subject to measures; and 
b) The parts constitute 60% or more of the total value of the parts of the 
assembled product, ý however circumvention will not be considered to be 
taking place where the value added to the parts brought in, during the 
assembly or completion operation, is greater than 25% of the manufacturing 
cost; and 
c) The remedial effects of the duty are being undermined in terms of the 
prices andlor quantities of the assembled like product and there is evidence of 
dumping in relation to the normal values previously establishedfor the like or 
similar products. 
Given the variety of circumvention practice, the EC's practice in the anti- 
circumvention is in fact established by a number of case law, as discussed below, which 
provides meaningful interpretations on the wording of the Basic Regulation. 
"' Article 13 (1) of the Basic Regualtion. 
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'Change in the pattern of trade' 
A change in the pattern of trade is not defined in the Basic Regulation but it is the 
consistent practice of the Commission to interpret it as a decrease in imports of the 
product concerned from the country whose exports are subject to measures and an 
increase in imports from a third country not so subject, or an increase in imports of parts 
of the product subject to measures although it can also cover the alteration of a product 
without being economically justified. The following cases illustrate this interpretation of 
the Commission. 
In Certain tube and pipe fittings of iron and steel (China)". a change in the 
pattern of trade was established on the basis that exports to the Community from 
cooperating exporters in the third country increased by 300% and in relation to the non- 
cooperating exporters, the increase of imports from the third country was substantially 
higher. 
In Tungsten electrodes"', some companies were assigned individual AD duty 
rates, which were significantly lower than the residual duty rate. The Comn-Assion stated 
that where the exports by the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates 
increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measure, such an increase in 
volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to 
the imposition of the measure within the meaning of Article 13(l) of the Basic 
Regulation. 
In Ring binder mechanisms"', AD duties were extended where duties imposed on 
imports of Ring Binder Mechanisms (RBM) from China were being circumvented by 
means of transshipment through Vietnam. The replacement of exports of RBM from 
China with imports of the same product from Vietnam was considered to be a clear 
change in the pattern of trade, irrespective of whether the exports from China were 
replaced immediately or only after a certain time period. The Commission stated that the 
mere fact that exports from China ceased prior to the start of operations in Vietnam did 
191 Article 13 (2) of the Basic Regulation. 
'92 Regulation 763/2000 [2000] 01 L 94/1, rec 12. 
193 Regulation 260/2007 [2007] OJ L 72/1. 
194 Regulation 1208/2004 [2004] OJ L 232/1, recital 23. 
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not have any impact on the conclusion as to whether or not there had been a change in the 
pattern of trade. 
'Practice, process or work' 
A variety of activities may potentially be considered as a 'practice, process or 
work', such activities can range from simple 'operations' such as transshipment, 
repackaging, wrong origin declarations, imports of knockdown kits, reversible product 
alterations, slightly altered goods, to more complex activities. For example, in Ring- 
binder mechanisms'", a contravening 'practice, process or work' was considered to have 
occurred where both machinery and equipment used in Vietnam had been transferred 
from related companies dealing with RBMs which were located in China or previously in 
Indonesia. The transfer of equipment took place immediately prior to the imposition of 
definitive measures. In the original case, the investigation revealed, that during the 
investigation period (IP), the entirety of the Vietnamese exporter's needs for RBM 
components were manufactured in related companies located in the China and in some 
cases the components were imported in sen-d-assembled form, such as half rings 
assembled with the blade. 
Also, in Integrated electronic compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) 196 , the 
assessment of circumvention was undertaken by analysing successively whether there 
was a change in the pattern of trade between the third countries and the Community by 
the consignment of the product concerned via third countries. It was found that imports 
from China more than halved after the imposition of measures in 2001, i. e. decreased 
from 85 million units in 2000 to 37 million units in 2002. Although imports recovered 
partially after 2002, their level in 2004 was still more than 20% below the level before 
the imposition of measures, yet imports from Vietnam, Pakistan and the Philippines, 
which were practically non-existent prior to 2001, increased significantly after the 
imposition of measures. It was also found that the resurge in the Chinese imports in 2003 
and 2004 was mainly due to an increase in exports from companies subject to no or low 
duties. Exports from China to Philippines had increased consistently since 2000 and 
195 Ibid. 
196 Regulation 866/2005 [2005] OJ L 145/1. 
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dramatically in 2003, at the same time import statistics from the Philippines showed 
consistently higher volumes than export statistics from China to Philippines. The 
Commission therefore concluded that the difference between the statistics corresponded 
to the volumes exported from Philippines to the Community, indicating that goods may 
have been transshipped from China via Philippines to the Community. 
'Insufficient due cause or econornic justification' 
The Commission normally investigates the criterion of "insufficient due cause or 
economic justification other than the imposition of the anti-dumping duty" for the change 
in the pattern of trade by examining import patterns, the functions of the product 
concerned, their marketing, packaging, and expected uses. ' 97 
In Counuirin. "' the company stated that the main reason for exporting cournarin 
originating in China was because of the insecurity due to the risk of strikes in India. 
However when the Council considered the facts of the case and concluded that the 
product re-exported to the Community retained its Chinese origin and that the further cost 
of purification was not significant, it did not consider the threat of strikes as a significant 
justification"'. 
The economic justification criterion was accepted in Imports of certain zinc 
oxides originating in the People's Republic of China by imports of certain zinc oxides 
consignedfrom Kazakhstan. 200 In this case, AD duties had been imposed on zinc oxides 
originating in China from 2002. It was alleged that there was a change in the pattern of 
trade shown by a significant increase in imports of the same product from Kazakhstan. It 
was accepted that Kazakhstan showed reasonable economic grounds, other than the 
imposition of definitive duties, for the change in the pattern of trade. 
197 Ibid, recital 15. 
'" Regulation 2272/2004 [2004] OJ L 396/18. 
199 During the IP, the volume of cournarin which was subject to further purification by Atlas (the cooperating Indian 
company) was 75% of Atlas' total production volume, the remaining volume of 25% represented genuine production in 
India. In addition, the CN code used for the coumarin imported from the PRE was the same as the one used for the 
further purified cournarin re-exported by Atlas to the Community. The product re-exported to the Community thus 
retained its Chinese origin. The cost of further purification of cournarin was not high, it consisted of a slight 
modification and the value of cournarin lost in the purification process was incurred at the moment the product was 
purchased, it could not thus be considered as a cost generated by the purification process itself. 
201) Regulation 465/2006 (2006] OJ L 83/6 
192 
Chapter V 
'Remedial effects of the duty are being undermined in terms of prices and/or 
quantities' 
Notwithstanding the existence of circumvention, in order to extend duties to the 
third country exporters, the Commission must also establish that remedial effects of the 
duty are being undermined in terms of the prices and/or quantities of like product being 
exported. The un-dumped export price of the original product (export price, plus customs 
and duties) is compared with the average EC sales price of the new product. An estimate 
is then made of the extent to which imports of the new product have replaced those of the 
original. 
In Integrated electronic compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i)201, in order to assess 
whether the imported products had, in terms of quantities and prices, undermined the 
remedial effects of the measures in force on imports of CFL-i from China, quantities and 
prices to unrelated customers in the Community of imports consigned from the three 
countries under investigation were used where available. The prices so determined were 
compared to the injury elimination level established for Community producers in the 
original investigation. 
'like product' 
The product which is allegedly circumventing the duties must be like to the 
product concerned the measures. The term 'like product' is defined in Art. 1(4) of the 
Basic Regulation as a product that is identical, i. e. alike in all respects, to the product 
under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which has 
characteristics closely resembling those of the product concerned. 
In Polyester staple fibrelpolyester filament tows"' the Conunission noted that 
polyester staple fibre (PSF) and polyester filament tows (PFT) shared the same basic 
physical and chemical characteristics. The only difference between PFT and PSF 
resulted from a simple cutting process. The imported PFT was therefore viewed as a 
product which has been slightly altered in order to avoid the AD measure currently 
applicable to PSF. Differences of this nature, which could be created or eliminated by 
201 Regulation 866/2005 [20051 OJ L 145/1. 
202 Regulation 2513/97 [1997] OJ L 346/1, recital 8. 
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minor alterations, could put into question the fact that PSF and PFr were essentially the 
same product. In any event the import of PFT ultimately end up as a product which was 
not only alike but identical to the imports subject to the original investigation, i. e. PSF. 
Thus, although the alteration process from PFF into PSF was not as such an assembly 
operation, it was of such a nature that it had to be considered as a practice which was 
carried out to avoid the measures in force. 
In Gas-fueled, non-refillable pocketflint lighters and disposable refillable pocket 
flint lighterS203, the Commission found that an ineffectual addition to a product does not 
affect its likeness. In that case, disposable, refillable flint lighters from China were 
identical in all respects to the disposable, non-refillable flint lighters covered by the AD 
duty, except for the addition of a refill valve which was determined to be an ineffectual 
addition for a lighter which in practice was perceived and treated by consumers as 
disposable. It was therefore determined that these were alike to the lighters subject to the 
existing measure. 
The 60% value ofparts test and the 25% value-added test 
In determining the existence of circumvention, the Commission also carries out a 
60% value of parts test and a 25% value-added test. In Electronic weighing scales 
(Japan, Singapore) assembled in the Community' the circumvention consisted of 
imports of parts, which were used for the assembly in the Community of electronic 
weighing scales, for use in the retail trade which incorporate a digital display of the 
weight, unit price and price to be paid, whether or not including a means of printing this 
data (REWS). The investigation established that an assembly operation was conducted 
by three Dutch companies (CTW, Keylard and Digi Nederland) acting in close 
cooperation and belonging to the same corporate group. The value of the REWS parts 
was established on the basis of the purchase price of the parts when delivered to the 
assembler's premises, that is, on an into-factory basis. 
203 Regulation 119197 [1997] OJL22/1, recital 10. 
204 Regulation 984/97 [1997] OJ L 141/57. 
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In view of the fact that CTW, Keylard and Digi Nederland were found to be 
related and functionally interdependent in the assembly of REWS, they were considered 
to be part of a single economic entity, together constituting the assembler. Consequently, 
parts were in principle identified and their value determined when first entering this 
single economic entity. Intra-group transfers of parts and semi-finished or finished 
products were therefore disregarded for purposes of this value added test. 
In this case the Commission established that the prices charged by the exporters 
of REWS parts to the assembler were at arms length, i. e. above cost of production plus a 
reasonable profit for parts produced by the exporter or above the exporters' own purchase 
price and allowing for a reasonable profit. It also established that the value of parts 
originating in Japan and Singapore was found to be higher than 60 % of the total parts 
value of the assembled REWS during theEP. 
In the same case, the average value-added established during the IP was found to 
be above the 25 % threshold and consequently, the assembly operation could not be 
considered to constitute circumvention in the sense of Article 13. The value-added to the 
parts was generally determined as the sum of labour costs and factory overheads incurred 
within the single economic entity,. Selling, general and administrative expenses, profit 
and parts which allegedly acquired Community origin were in principle not considered to 
be value-added within the meaning of Article 13(2) (b) of the Basic Regulation. The 
value-added thus established was then expressed as a percentage of the manufacturing 
cost which consists in essence of the value of all parts, based on the into-factory, at arm's 
length purchase prices of these parts, plus the value-added to the parts during the 
assembly or completion operation.. 
In conclusion, the Basic Regulation allows the Community institutions to extend 
AD duties to third country producers if circumvention is found. Despite the absence of 
multilateral framework, the EU established a comprehensive legal framework to cover 
assembly, third country circumvention and minor modification. 205 The EU is reportedly a 
main user of anti-circumvention rules. For example, the EC initated 13 anti- 
circumvention investigations against Chinese producers from 2003 to 2005, which 
"Y Yu 'Circumvention and Anti-circumvention in Anti-durnping Practice: A New Problem in China's Outbound 
Trade (2007) 41 JWT 10 15,1023. ('Circumvention in AD Practice') 
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represented 76 percent of all anti-circumvention investigations initated by WTO 
Members against China in that period of time. 206 Hence, the anti-circumvention provision 
in the Basic Regulation provide an additional layer of protection to the Community 
industry after the imposition of AD measures. 
4. Conclusion 
The rise of legalization in the international AD regime provides a rich arena for 
examining the intervening effect that multilateral legalization has on domestic systems. 
The evolution of EU AD regime in the past sixty years illustrates how the phenomenal 
rise of legalization in the trade regime interacts with other factors and shapes the AD 
regime of Europe. 
The development of EU AD regime is an illustrative example of both the effect of 
legalization process and the limit of this process. Although most of the EU AD 
instruments essentially repeat the basic principles of GAIT/WTO AD rules, a close look 
of them suggests that those instruments are in fact a mixture of the transposition of 
multilateral rules and the compromise between interests of different MSs, Community 
institutions and economic operators. Similarly, although the administration of AD policy 
in the EC has always been regulated and constrained by multilateral rules, the 
Commission, as the key player, is preliminarily bound by its commitments under the EC 
law and has to balance divergent interests of different institutions, MSs and economic 
operators in the EU. The European Courts, key players in the EU trade policy-making, 
have a more ambivalent attitude towards multilateral legalization - they to a large extent 
admitted the impact of multilateral legalization on the EC's trade policy-making, yet they 
refused the idea to completely substitute European legalization by multilateral 
legalization. Hence, the impact of multilateral legalization on the EC system is complex 
and sometimes unintended. 
Meanwhile, the EU introduces a number of WrO-plus provisions to provide the 
Community institutions more flexibility to handle uncertain economic and political 
situations and balance domestic interests. Injury margin calculation, Community interest, 
206 WTO Anti-dumping semi-annual reports from WTO Members, available at http: //www. wto. org 
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anti-circumvention and non-market economy provisions are representatives of WTO-plus 
features of the EC system. These provisions, although indeed offering additional 
protection to the Community industry from time to time, do not necessarily favour 
domestic protectionists all the time. Instead, the key function of these provisions is to 
give addition flexibility to the system so that the imposition of AD measure can be "a 
balanced act". 
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Chapter VI Consequences of Legalization: China's AD- 
related WTO Activities 
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines another consequence of legalization, namely the 
growing impact of legalization on the utilization of the DSM, in particular in terms of 
the institutional and legal capacity building of WTO Members. The rise of 
legalization in the GATT/WTO, demonstrated by tightened obligations, greater 
precision and stronger delegation, creates strong incentives for WTO Members to 
utilize the DSM for the purpose of protecting trade interests and strategically 
advancing trade claims. One commentator describes the trend as "[W]hen officials 
from different countries disagree about trade policy, some say 'see you in Geneva! ' 
meaning 'see you in court"'. ' Although it is arguable that this formal legal 
representation is just one aspect of the trade regime and there are many other ways 
that the GATT/W70 law affects global governance, it is commonly agreed that 
"[T]he crowning achievement of the WTO, ..., is its codified legal obligations and a 
dispute settlement system more active than any other international tribunal". 2 
It is, however, not an easy task to use the more "legalized", and consequently 
more complicated, DSM to the full extent. Various reasons are propounded for lack of 
effective uses of the DSM by some WTO Members, in particular the developing 
countries. 3 These reasons include "a lack of sufficient awareness of WTO rights and 
obligations; inadequate coordination between the government and private sector; 
difficulty in determining the existence of undue trade barriers and the feasibility of 
legal challenge; financial and human resource constrains in lodging dispute; and an 
oft-cited lack of political will to pursue trade disputes due to fear that trade 
preferences or other forms of assistance will be withdrawn, or some form of 
retaliatory action will be taken, 4 
1R Wolfe 'See You in Geneva? Legal (Mis)Representations of the Trading Systerre (2005) 1 lEuropeanJoumal of 
International Relations 339,339. ('See you in Geneva') 
2 Ibid. 
3 Relevant literature includes, for example, J Lacarte - Mur6 and P Gappah 'Developing Countries and The WTO 
Legal and Dispute Settlement System: A View from the Bench' (2000) 5 JIEL 395; C Bown and B Hoekman 
'WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector' (2005) 8 JIEL 
861; and G Shaffer 'The Challenges of WTO Law: Strategies for Developing Country Adaptation' (2006) World 
Trade Review 177. 
4H Nordstr6m and G Shaffer 'Access to Justice in the World Trade Organization: The Case for a Small Claims 
Procedure -A Preliminary Analysis' (2007) ICTSD Issue paper No 2, v. ('Access to Justice') 
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With respect to resources and institutional arrangements, it is observed that 
under the current DSM, "it can take up to three years to settle a dispute and cost more 
than half a million dollars in legal fees, as well as requiring significant time 
commitment for a bureaucracy that may already be severely under-resourced". 5 With 
the inequality of power and size of WTO Members in mind, it is not difficult to 
understand the rationale behind the claim that "[N]otionally equal litigation rules 
provide unequal opportunity for WTO Members". 6 
Apart from the institutional arrangements, the uneven expansion of 
legalization in covered agreements also presents limitations to the DSM in the sense 
that it is not always feasible to challenge a foreign trade barrier in the DSM, due to the 
low level of obligation or precision in the corresponding covered agreement. . 
Among all potential factors listed above, this chapter discusses two aspects of 
the capacity building which allows a WTO Member to effectively utilize the DSM: 
the institutional capacity building which involves the coordination between 
governments and private sectors and the legal capacity building which involves the 
legal capacity of a WTO Member to challenge undue trade barriers when there is no 
"good" textual basis in covered agreements. As discussed in Chapter 11, the formal is 
referred to as "engaging the private sector" in this study and the latter is as "litigating 
the unlitigatable". These two factors are selected because they are closely related to 
the discussion of legalization in previous chapters. Engaging the private sector 
describes the institutional response of WTO members to a higher level of legalization 
of the GATT/WTO system, in particular in terms of delegation, whilst litigating the 
unlitigatable is a more direct response of tighter obligation and greater precision in the 
GATTIWTO agreements. Moreover, the difficulty that WTO Members experience 
when litigating matters where the degree of legalization in the covered agreement is 
low illustrates, in another way, that the uneven expansion of legalization in the 
GATT/WTO imposes restraints on the effective utilization of the DSM. 
China has been chosen as the example of the empirical study for its unique 
position on AD issues. China has been the main target of AD measures worldwide for 
almost two decades. 7 The WTO Secretariat reported that during the period I July-31 
5 Ibid, 1. 
6 lbid, 3. 
7P Messerlin 'China in the WTO: Anti-dumping and Safeguards' at D Bhattasali. S Li and W Martin (eds) China 
in the WTO: Accession, Policy Reform, and Poverty Reduction Strategies (World Bank and Oxford University 
Press, 2003) 29. (Thina in the WTO') Figures in WTO Reports on Anti-dumping can 
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December 2007, China remained the most frequent target of new investigations 
initiated worldwide, with 40 initiations directed at its exports out of 101 new 
investigations. 8 Economists argue that China as a target of foreign AD measures is 
"much more because of the intrinsic economic features of her exported products 
(differentiation level and oligopolistic markets) than because it was not a WTO 
Membee,. 9 
Legally speaking, the specific, but vaguely drafted, non-market economy 
(NME) provisions in the WTO accession protocol of China (the Protocol) makes it 
even more difficult for China to minimize its exposure to foreign AD measures and 
reduce the damages. 10 As well documented, "starting in the 1960s, the GA7r 
multilateral negotiating rounds began to define more specific international rules of the 
game, but a variety of more localised process played essential roles as forces of 
change". " This describes exactly the evolution of NME methodologies towards 
China. 
At the time that China accessed the WTO, although lack of specific rules in 
the multilateral agreements such as the ADA concerning the NME, major trading 
partners ensured that the methodologies towards NME countries in their national laws 
were legitimated by specifically articulated provisions in the Protocol. These NME 
provisions therefore have a noticeable low level of obligation and precision, which 
grants wide discretions to investigating authorities in AD investigations involving 
Chinese products. In this sense, Chinese exporters have to continue their fights in both 
legal and commercial battles after China's accession to the WTO when import- 
competing industries in a WTO Member use AD instruments to segment the world 
markets and deny the access of Chinese products. 
Against this background, it is no doubt that by the time China was accepted as 
a full member of the WTO, chief negotiator Long Yongtu ranked stricter AD rules 
second among China's priorities in the WTO. China's five years experience in the 
WTO, nevertheless, presents a n-dxed picture. On the one hand, the much-hoped WTO 
9 WTO 'WTO Secretariat reports continued declines in new anti-dumping investigations and new final anti- 
dumping measures', 9 July 2008, available at htti): //www. wto. orp/english/news e1l2res08 e/vr535 e. htm (last 
visited 10 July 2008) 
' Messerlin (n 7) 35. (Thina in the WTO') 
to For details of special rules governing AD investigations against Chinese products, see Paragraph 151 of the 
Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China (I October 2001) WT/ACCICHN/49. fforking Party 
Report') 
11 F Snyder 'The Origins of the "Nonmarket Economy": Ideas, Pluralism and Power in EC Anti-dumping Law 
about China'(2001) European Law Journal 7 369,369. ('The Origins of the Nonmarket Economy') 
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Membership of China does not significantly reduce the number of foreign AD 
measures targeting it for the past five years. The ambiguous language in the Protocol 
concerning NME creates obstacles for China to challenge many of the practices of 
investigating authorities in the DSM. On the other hand, China has taken steps 
forward to build up both institutional and legal capacity in order to strategically utilize 
the DSM to protect its interests in foreign AD investigations. China's story therefore 
tells how a relatively new WTO Member struggles to deprive benefit from the rise of 
legalization in the trade regime, and at the same time fights the restrains imposed by 
the uneven expansion of legalization. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 depicts how the Chinese 
government engages private sectors in AD cases, by examining the Regulation on 
Responding to AD Investigations and ad hoc public-private networks formed in 
previous AD cases. Section 3 outlines the GATTIWTO rules on NME and national 
laws of the EU and the US towards NME. Section 4 examines the legal arguments in 
the US - Coated Paper, the only WTO case initiated by China thus far. Section 5 
concludes the chapter. 
2. Engaging Private Sectors to Build Up Institutional and Legal 
Capacity 
2.1 Background of China's AD Problems 
From the late 1990s, Chinese exporters were becoming formidable 
competitors in the world market, exporting a wide range of products, from 
inexpensive textiles, televisions and micro ovens, to higher priced electronic 
equipment. In 2006, China's trade volume reached $ 1760.69 billion, up by 23.8% 
and trade surplus reached $ 177.47 billion, up by 74 %. 12 The huge trade surplus 
resulted in intense trade frictions between China and its trading partners and increased 
political pressure for trade protection in major trading partners. The Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM), which is responsible for China's trade policy, pointed out in 
its annual Foreign Market Access Report, "[Wlith the rapid growth of China's 
economy and foreign trade, some of our trading partners and industry groups in those 
12 Ministry of Commerce of People's Republic of China (MOC) 'Foreign Market Access Report 2007', 12 April 
2007, available at http: #jzpi. mofcom. %tov. cn/accessoOL/200704/1176368802629. pd 
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countries are increasingly using various trade and investment barriers against Chinese 
products in order to protect their domestic industry and home market. " 13 
Among all foreign trade barriers, the (mis)use of the AD instrument by trading 
partners is one of the first major trade barriers that Chinese exports encountered. 
Since 1979, when the first AD case against China was initiated by the EC, for almost 
two decades, China has been the main target of worldwide AD investigations. 14 After 
China's accession, the MOFOM felt the pressure to take initiatives to actively utilize 
the WrO DSM to address AD issues in order to maintain market access abroad and 
advance China's trade interests. It had two options: first, it can follow other large 
developing countries, such as India and Brazil, to aggressively initiate AD 
investigations against imports; and second, it can minimize its own AD use and invest 
its resources in effectively responding to foreign AD investigations in front of foreign 
investigating authorities and possibly in front of the DSM. With a huge trade surplus 
and strong export dependant industries at home, the Chinese government opted for the 
second one, by reducing the number of new initiations in the past few years and 
putting significant efforts on fighting foreign AD charges. 15 
MOFCOM's efforts focus on two areas: formally, it institutionalizes legal 
mechanisms to support exporters curtailing AD abuse of trading partners. In this 
regard, a Regulation has been promulgated and upgraded to effectively organize 
resources and to improve the response rate and the quality of cooperation of exporters 
in AD investigations targeting China. 16 Informally, it worked closely with trade 
associations, enterprises and their lawyers to increase the awareness of AD rules. For 
example, as early as 2001, Shanghai People's Municipal Government set up a 
professional, non-government consulting institution, the Shanghai WTO Affairs 
Consultation Centre, to provide legal and policy advice on WrO affairs, as well as 
13 Ibid, 2. 
11 For example, X Liu and H Vandenbussche 'European Union Anti-dumping Cases Against China --- An 
Overview and Future Prospects With Respect to China's World Trade Organization Membership' (2002) 36 JWT 
1125. ('EU AD Case against China') The author confirmed that from 1979 to 2002, China has been the most 
accused country in EU AD charges. 
11 For example, as reported by WTO Secretariat, Chile, China, Colombia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Chinese Taipei, 
each of which had reported new initiations during the second half of 2006, reported no new initiations during the 
corresponding period of 2007. 
16 Non-cooperation or not sufficient cooperation in AD investigations was one of the major problems that China 
has in the EC AD cases. Ibid, 1135. 
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WTO related trainings. 17 AD related researches and trainings are one of their main 
activities. 
2.2 Regulation on Responding to Anti-dumping Investigations 18 
As discussed above, the MOFCOM exercises a formally legal tool to solicit 
industry support in advancing its AD agenda, namely "Regulation on Responding to 
Anti-dumping Investigations of Products Exported from China" (the Regulation). To 
help Chinese firms more effectively defend themselves in foreign AD investigations, 
the MOFCOM upgraded the Regulation in August 2006 and replaced the one issued 
in December 2001.19 
With 20 articles, the Regulation is relatively brieL It nevertheless clarifies 
rights and obligations of key players in responding foreign AD charges, including the 
MOFCOM, trade associations, and private firms. Article 2 of the Regulation provides 
that it is an obligation of exporting producers under investigation to actively respond 
to foreign AD investigating authorities. It also emphasizes the role of trade 
associations and gives more respect on market-based decisions of individual firms, 
while limiting the role of MOFCOM to providing key information and guidelines 
pertaining to AD procedures. 20 
Unlike the previous version, the Regulation clearly states that each respondent 
has the right to decide how it wishes to respond to an investigating authority and to 
21 select its legal counsel . If a respondent 
believes it has been discriminated against 
during the investigation, the firm may file a complaint with the MOFCOM. 22 
The MOFCOM, as the authority, is responsible for formulating policies to 
promote effective responses in foreign AD investigations. 23 MOFCOM is also 
responsible for providing information to exporting producers under investigation. 24 
17 Gong Baihua, 'Shanghai's WTO Affairs Consultation Centre: Working Together to Take Advantage of WTO 
Membership'. in WTO Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation: Case Studies, at 
httl2: //www. wto. orelen%! Iish/res e/bookst) e/casestudies e/casel I e. htm ('Shanghai's WTO Affairs Consultation 
Centre') Case study 2: An Early-warning System for Anti-dumping Disputes in China. 
18 This section is reproduced from the author's work, 'Engaging the Private Sector EU-China trade Disputes 
Under the Shadow of WTO Law? % published in European Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 6, November 2007, pp. 800- 
817. 
" MOFCOM 'Decree No. 12,2006 of the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Promulgating 
the Regulations on Responding to Anti-dumping Cases of Export Products', 29 August 2006, at 
htti): //en2lish-mofcom. gov. cn/aarticleti)olicyrelease/eazettee/200608/2006080300994 I. html 
20 Ibid, Art 4 and 6. 
21 ibid, Art 9. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid, Art 5. 
24 Ibid, Art 6. 
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Yet, it does not directly shoulder the responsibility of day-to-day coordination and 
organization of exporting producers in an AD investigation. 
Article 4 and 12 provides that trade associations are playing key roles in 
responding to foreign AD investigations. They are responsible for, among others, 
building up databases to collect export data and trade remedy information; assisting 
firms on issues such as non-market economy, individual treatment and verification; 
organizing firms to participate in hearings and negotiations; providing assistance on 
negotiating price undertaking and making proposals to the MOFCOM if certain kind 
of government involvement is necessary; and finally assisting firms to seek judicial 
remedies in importing country. 25 Trade associations are required to consult with the 
MOFCOM under certain circumstances, such as those involving large amount of 
exports and critical exporting markets or where the investigating authority acted 
discriminatel Y. 26 
The emphasis of trade associations' role serves two purposes. First, by doing 
so, the leverage of individual Chinese firms in AD cases is expected to be improved 
and small- and medium-sized enterprises are allowed to enjoy downstream benefits 
from collaborations spearheaded by larger organizations. Although it is well- 
established in developed countries that firms can enhance their chances of 
successfully challenging foreign trade restrictions when they coordinate their 
activities through a trade association, Chinese firms rarely organized themselves and 
presented a united industry front through trade associations in previous AD 
proceedings. 27 The Regulation aims to change this and brings collective benefits to 
Chinese firms. Second, through trade associations as middlemen playing diplomats' 
role', the MOFCOM can differentiate new public-private networks from state 
interference by not directly involving in a Chinese firm's market-orientation decision. 
2.3 Ad hoc Public-private Networks in Responding to Foreign AD Investigations 
In practice, the Chinese government, Chambers of Commerce (trade 
associations) and private exporters develop ad hoc networks to organize themselves in 
responding to foreign AD investigations. 
25 Ibid, Art 4 and 12. 
26 lbid, Art 16. 
27 Liu and Vandenbussche (n 14) 1125. ('EU AD Case against China') 
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The process of responding to a foreign AD investigation normally starts with 
the publication of the initiation of a foreign AD investigation by the MOFCOM in its 
website, China Trade Remedy Information. 28 The relevant Chambers of Commerce 
then notifies its members who have been targeted in the investigation and organizes 
meetings to coordinate those exporting producers. Normally, the meetings are divided 
into two parts: the exporters firstly hold close door discussions to form a joint defence 
position and then invite outside counsels to make presentation on the legal aspects of 
the case. Exporters who are involved in the investigation are free to hire their own 
legal representatives and make submissions to the investigating authority. However, 
throughout the investigation, Chambers of Commerce and MOFCOM are working 
closely with targeted exporters to provide them with information and guidance. 
In the meanwhile, the MOFCOM frequently involves WTO Affairs 
Consultation Centres to analyze underlying legal issues and "educate' potentially 
targeted exporters. Recognizing that "many Chinese exporters lack the knowledge of 
the trade rules or the financial resources required to defend their interests", VY70 
Affairs Consultation Centres throughout the country develop mechanisms aiming to 
provide "practical assistance to Chinese manufacturers and exporters". 29 One project 
which Shanghai WTO Affairs Consultation Centre developed to help potentially 
targeted exporters is an early warning system. The system is described as follows: 30 
[Iln its first stage, the V 1.0 system covers 189 varieties of export 
goods in eighteen categories (mainly textiles, home appliances, steel 
andfurniture) which are contained in the items accountingfor some 
60 per cent of China's annual total exports to the United States. 
Registered companies receive information on the quantity, future 
prices and dumping margins of Chinese products exported to the 
United States. Companies can also obtain monitoring reports on US 
trade remedy measures, and receive training services to help them 
respond to anti-dumping investigations or charges. 
After several years of effort, Chinese exporters are now more willing to play a 
better legal game in foreign AD investigations. This becomes a new trend of Chinese 
exporters participating in foreign AD investigations. For example, on 6 February 
2006, eight Chinese firms involved in the EC's footwear investigation voluntarily 
28 http: //www. cacs. gov. cn/ 
29 Gong (n 17) (Shanghai's WTO Affairs Consultation Centre) 
30 Ibid. 
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formed an ad hoc association to coordinate their activities and consolidate the 
industry position after the EU refused to give any of the thirteen sampled firms the 
market economy status. 31 The association issued a Position Paper, which especially 
stated that it would support further government actions on this matter. 32 Later, more 
than 200 Chinese firms joined this association and it was still functioning even after 
the final Regulation has been released by the EU. This move of the private sector 
indicates that Chinese firms are increasingly aware of the importance of organizing 
themselves and cooperating with the government in addressing their trade claims, 
echoing the thread of the Regulation. 
In short, China's institutional capacity building, which is represented by the 
emergence of a strong public-private network in responding foreign AD 
investigations, illustrates that the rise of legalization has an impact on the utilization 
of the DSM by, inter alia, mobilizing domestic export groups. As discussed in 
Chapter II, by increasing transparency and information available to domestic export 
groups, the legalization process provides strong incentives for pro-trade industries to 
utilize legal tools available to push the enforcement of trade agreements and maintain 
market access abroad. Chinese exporting industries therefore are keen to support the 
efforts of the Chinese government to tighten up AD disciplines at the WTO level. 
The next section explores another aspect of the impact of legalization, namely 
the overall development of legalization, in particular tighter obligation and greater 
precision, provides strong incentives for WTO Members to litigate a wider range of 
matters in front of the DSM, including matters which are used to be "unlitigateable" 
since there were no "good" textual basis in the GATT/WTO agreements. Non-market 
economy (NME) is one of these "unlitigateable" issues and the next section focuses 
on China's efforts to litigate it in the DSM. 
3. China's Efforts to Litigate the Unlitigatable: Non-market Economy 
(NME) 
3.1 China's WTO Accession Protocol and the Working Party Report 
31 'An Association Established in Guangzhou in Response to the EU's Footwear Anti-dumping Investigation', 
News Release, Bureau of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation of Guangzhou Municipality, at 
http: //www. gzboftec. gov. cn/articies/2006-2/17214. htm 
32 ibid. 
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This section provides a brief account of the origins of NME in the 
GATT/WTO and analyzes the relevant provisions in China's WTO Accession 
Protocol (the Protocol) and the Working Party Report. It particularly discusses the 
scope of the exceptions provided in the Protocol and the Working Party Report when 
handling AD investigations involving Chinese products. 
The special treatment of state-trading and non-market economy in the 
GATT/WTO has a long history - long before China emerged as a major player in 
international trade. 33 Stemming from the idea that "free trade" only exists if trading 
partners operate "free markets", essentially capitalist non-regulated markets, GATT 
Contracting Parties have made the distinction between market and NME since the 
very beginning of the GATT . 
34 The US Department of State defines NME in a 
glossary of trade terminology in The Language of Trade as folloWS: 35 
NONMARKET ECONOMY (NME) -A national economy in which 
the government seeks to determine economic activity largely through a 
mechanism of central planning, as in the former Soviet Union, in 
contrast to a market economy, which depends heavily upon market 
forces to allocate productive resources. In a nonmarket economy, 
production targets, prices, costs, investment allocations, raw 
materials, labor, international trade, and most other economic 
aggregates are manipulated within a national economic plan drawn 
up by a central planning authority. Hence, the public sector makes the 
major decisions affecting demand and supply within the national 
economy. 
GATT Contracting Parties, led by the US, considered that AD rules expressed 
in Article VI of the GATT should not apply to NME countries. 36 This is based on the 
idea that comparing market prices on different markets would be meaningless when 
markets do not actually set the prices. For this purpose, an interpretative note was 
" For background on the legal concept of "non-market economy", Snyder (n 11) and H Deflof and H Fridh 'The 
EU Treatment of Non-Market Economy Countries in Anti-dumping Proceedings' (2007) 2 Global Trade and 
Customs Journal 265 ('EU Treatment of Non-market Economy'). 
11 lbid, Snyder, 381. 
35 US Department of State International Information Programmes, The Language of International Trade, Glossary, 
available at httl2: //usinfo. statc. gov/r)roducts/r)ubs/trade/elossir. htm#nonmarkeco Oast access 15 July 2008) 
36 Snyder (n 11) 381 ('The Origins of the Nonmarket Economy') and Detlof and Fridh (n 33) 268 ('EU Treatment 
of Non-market Economy'). Also, A Polouektov 'Non-market Economy Issues in the WTO Anti-dumping Law and 
Accession Negotiations Revival of a Two-tier Membership' (2002) 36 JWT 1. ('NME Issues in the WTO AD 
Law') 
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added to the first paragraph of GATT Article VI in 1955. The supplementary 
provision to Article VI reads as follows: 37 
It is recognized that, in case of imports from a country which has a 
complete or substantially complete monopoly of trade and all domestic 
prices are fixed by the State, special difficulties may exist in 
determining price comparability for the purpose of paragraph 1, and 
in such cases importing contracting parties may find it necessary to 
take into account the possibility that a strict comparison with domestic 
prices in such a country may not always be appropriate. 
It is argued that despite the fact that this interpretative note, in theory, could be 
applied only to countries where all prices are fixed by the State and it did not affirm 
the use of prices or costs in an surrogate country as the basis of normal value 
calculation, the provision remains the only reference to NME in the GATT/WTO 
38 
agreements (with the exception of protocols of accession). Practitioners therefore 
argue that "[T]here are very few, if any, countries left where the government controls 
'all' prices, thus any WTO Member is entitled to normal MES treatment under the 
WTO Anti-dumping Agreement, unless it has agreed otherwise". 39 
China's accession of protocol is the most recent example that NNM treatment 
is "agreed otherwise". Section 15 of China's Accession Protocol, entitled "Price 
Comparability in Determining Subsidies and Dumpine', reads as follows: 40 
Article VI of the GATT 1994, the Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994 ("Anti-Dumping Agreement") and the 
SCMAgreement shall apply in proceedings involving imports of 
Chinese origin into a WTO Member consistent with the following: 
(a) In determining price comparability under Article VI 
of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the importing 
WTO Member shall use either Chinese prices or costs for the 
industry under investigation or a methodology that is not based on a 
strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in China based on 
thefollowing rules: 
17 GATT Contracting Parties - Ninth Session - Report of Review Working Party III on Barriers to Trade other 
than Restrictions or Tariffs, IJ334, I March 1955, Annex 1, para 10. 
38 Detlof and Fridh (n 33) 268. ('EU Treatment of Non-market Economy') 
31 j Maloney and G Horlick 'Market Economy Status for Ukraine in Anti-dumping Cases in the United States and 
European Union' (2006) 1 Global Trade and Customs Journal 49. ('Market Economy Status for Ukraine') 
' Paragraph 15 of the Protocol on the Accession of People's Republic of China (I January 2002) WT/ U432. ('the 
Protocol') 
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(i) If the producers under investigation can clearly show that 
market economy conditions prevail in the industry producing the like 
product with regard to the manufacture, production and sale of that 
product, the importing WTO Member shall use Chinese prices or 
costs for the industry under investigation in determining price 
comparability; 
(ii) The importing WTO Member may use a methodology that is 
not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in 
China if the producers under investigation cannot clearly show that 
market economy conditions prevail in the industry producing the like 
product with regard to manufacture, production and sale of that 
product. 
(b) In proceedings under Parts A III and V of the SCM 
Agreement, when addressing subsidies described in Articles 14(a), 
14(b), 14(c) and 14(d), relevant provisions of the SCM Agreement 
shall apply; however, if there are special difficulties in that 
application, the importing WTO Member may then use 
methodologies for identifying and measuring the subsidy benefit 
which take into account the possibility that prevailing terms and 
conditions in China may not always be available as appropriate 
benchmarks. In applying such methodologies, where practicable, 
the importing IWO Member should adjust such prevailing terms and 
conditions before considering the use of terms and conditions 
prevailing outside China. 
(c) The importing WTO Member shall notify 
methodologies used in accordance with subparagraph (a) to the 
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices and shall notify 
methodologies used in accordance with subparagraph (b) to the 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
(d) Once China has established, under the national law 
of the importing WTO Member, that it is a market economy, the 
provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be terminated provided that the 
importing Member's national law contains market economy criteria 
as of the date of accession. In any event, the provisions of 
subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date of 
accession. In addition, should China establish, pursuant to the 
national law of the importing WTO Member, that market economy 
conditions prevail in a particular industry or sector, the non-market 
economy provisions of subparagraph (a) shall no longer apply to 
that industry or sector. 
This study considers that this Section is vaguely drafted. It touched upon two 
different but interrelated issues: (i) the establishment of market economy status of 
China as a whole, a particular Chinese industry or a particular Chinese producer and 
(ii) a special methodology to calculate dumping margin, if China as a whole or a 
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particular Chinese industry/producers cannot prove that they are operating under 
market economy conditions. It nevertheless provides clear answers to neither of them. 
It does not offer importing WTO Members any criteria on the establishment of 
"market economy conditions" in an investigation. Moreover, as observed, it does not 
66give any guidance as to which methodology can be used when a strict comparison 
with domestic prices or costs is inappropriate". 41 Instead, it only gives the permission 
to an importing country to disregard Chinese domestic prices and costs in case it 
considers China cannot be treated as a market economy, i. e. if Chinese producers 
cannot demonstrate that market economy conditions prevail in the industry 
"producing the like product". 
Concerned about "past measures taken by certain WTO Members which had 
treated China as a non-market economy and imposed anti-dumping duties on Chinese 
companies without identifying or publishing the criteria used, without giving Chinese 
companies sufficient opportunity to present evidence and defend their interests in a 
fair manner, and without explaining the rationale underlying their determinations, 
including with respect to the method of price comparison in the determinations", 
China tried to tighten up the discipline in the Working Party Report and obtained the 
following commitments from its trade partners: 42 
In response to these concerns, members of the Working Party 
confirmed that in implementing subparagraph (a)(ii) of Section 15 of 
the Draft Protocol, WTO Members would comply with thefollowing: 
(a) When determining price comparability in a particular case in 
a manner not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or 
costs in China, the importing WTO Member should ensure that it 
had established and published in advance (1) the criteria that it used 
for determining whether market economy conditions prevailed in the 
industry or company producing the like product and (2) the 
methodology that it used in determining price comparability. With 
regard to importing WTO Members other than those that had an 
established practice of applying a methodology that included, inter 
alia, guidelines that the investigating authorities should normally 
utilize, to the extent possible, and where necessary cooperation was 
received, the prices or costs in one or more market economy 
"' J Cornelis 'China's Quest for Market Economy Status and its Impact on the Use of Trade Remedies by the 
European Communities and the United States' (2007) 2 Global Trade and Customs Journal 105,109. ('China's 
Quest for Market Economy Status') 
42 Paragraph 151 of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China (I October 2001) 
WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Vorking Party Report') 
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countries that were significant producers of comparable 
merchandise and that either were at a level of economic 
development comparable to that of China or were otherwise an 
appropriate sourcefor the prices or costs to be utilized in light of the 
nature of the industry under investigation, they should make best 
efforts to ensure that their methodology for determining price 
comparability included provisions similar to those described above. 
(b) The importing WTO Member should ensure that it had 
notified its market-economy criteria and its methodology for 
determining price comparability to the Committee on Anti-Dumping 
Practices before they were applied. 
(c) The process of investigation should be transparent and 
sufficient opportunities should be given to Chinese producers or 
exporters to make comments, especially comments on the application 
of the methodology for determining price comparability in a 
particular case. 
(d) The importing WTO Member should give notice of information 
which it required and provide Chinese producers and exporters 
ample opportunity to present evidence in writing in a particular 
case. 
(e) The importing WTO Member should provide Chinese 
producers and exporters a full opportunity for the defence of their 
interests in a particular case. 
(J) The importing WTO Member should provide a sufficiently 
detailed reasoning of its preliminary and final determinations in a 
particular case. 
To a certain extent, Paragraph 151 provides useful guidelines on the 
methodology of price comparability in case China is treated as a NME and reassures a 
few procedural rights of Chinese producers under investigation. Commentators 
consider this paragraph validates the approaches of the EC and the US in terms of 
using analogue country data to calculate dumping margin. 43 
To read Section 15 and Paragraph 151 together, one may reasonably consider 
that in handling cases involving China, an investigating authority is free: first, to 
establish criteria to determine whether market economy conditions prevailed in the 
industry or company producing the like product (NME criteria); and second, to 
establish a methodology to calculate normal value in case the industry or the producer 
cannot prove that market economy conditions prevail (NME methodology). In 
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applying the NME methodology, to calculate normal value, investigating authorities 
are allowed to disregard domestic prices and costs in China, but are required to use 
"the prices or costs in one or more market economy countries that were significant 
producers of comparable merchandise and that either were at a level of economic 
development comparable to that of China or were otherwise an appropriate source for 
the prices or costs to be utilized in light of the nature of the industry under 
investigation". 44 
In other words, Section 15 and Paragraph 151 provide two exceptions which 
give an importing WTO Member the freedom to depart from the normal practice 
under the ADA in cases involving Chinese products. The exception of NME 
methodology is more explicit as Section 15 is entitled "Price comparability in 
determining subsidies and dumping", whilst the NME criteria exception is more 
implicit - Section 15 (d) states that China has to establish itself as a market economy 
"under the national law of the importing WTO Member", which indicates that an 
importing WrO Member can set its own rules to make the NME determination and 
Chinese producers have to follow these rules. 
In order to determine the scope of the two exceptions provided by Section 15 
and Paragraph 15 1, two questions are raised. Firstly, should the interpretation of NME 
criteria be bound by the general interpretative approach of the WTO even if they are 
by nature domestic laws? Second, apart from the two exceptions, namely NME 
criteria and NME methodology, should an investigating authority be bound by general 
rules in the ADA in other parts of the investigation, such as sampling, the treatment of 
export price and the combined imposition of AD and countervailing duty (CVD)? 
There are different views on these two questions. The traditional view, and the 
view taken by investigating authorities such as the US DOC and the Commission, is 
that the establishment of NME criteria and NME methodology are purely matters of 
national law and investigating authorities enjoy the entire discretion offered by 
national legislations. Some commentators conclude that "the WTO does not give 
much guidance on these issues, and member states are not forbidden to set their own 
parameters". 45 So, the answers to both questions are no. 
' Cornelis (n 41) 109. ('China's Quest for Market Economy Status') 
44 Para 151 of the Working Party Report (n 12). 
45 Detlof and Fridh (n 33) 280. ('EU Treatment of Non-market Economy') 
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This study, however, considers that Section 15 and Paragraph 151 can be 
interpreted differently and offer a "yes" answer to the second question, whilst the 
WTO jurisprudence may confirm the wide discretion investigating authorities enjoy in 
interpreting the NME criteria. 
With respect to the second question, the argument in favour of China can be 
that in a NME investigation, although the applicable law to establish the NME criteria 
and the NME methodology is national laws, other parts of the investigation, which are 
not covered by the exceptions provided by Section 15 and Paragraph 151, should be 
conducted in a WTO-consistent way. In other words, the whole purpose of Section 15 
and Paragraph 151 is, in investigations targeting Chinese products, to provide an 
exception to normal value calculation methodologies set forth in the ADA and to give 
a WTO Member the discretion to establish certain criteria in order to determine when 
it can apply the NME methodology. The general rules of the ADA govern other parts 
of investigations. 
The Panel's ruling in US - 1916 Act can support this argument. The Panel 
stated that "Article VI: 1 of the GATI' 1994, interpreted in accordance with the Vienna 
Convention, must be understood as applying to any situation where a Member 
addresses the type of transnational price discrimination defined in that Article" . 
46 
Therefore, unless an exception is provided by other WTO agreements, the general 
rules of Article VI of the GATT and the ADA apply to any AD investigations, i. e. 
"any situation where a Member addresses the type of transnational price 
discrimination defined in that Article". Whether an investigation involves products of 
Chinese origin should not be a factor which can justify the non-application of the 
ADA.. 
Consequently, the two exceptions provided in Section 15 and Paragraph 151 
can be elaborated as follows: the first exception allows a WTO Member to disregard 
domestic prices and costs of Chinese producers under investigation in calculating 
their normal value and the second exception allows a WrO Member to establish its 
own rules to decide when they would like to (or not to) disregard Chinese prices and 
costs. Apart from these two exceptions, which in China's view have to be interpreted 
narrowly, investigating authorities should conduct other parts of the investigation, 
46 WTO United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Complaint by the European Communities - Report of the 
Panel, Wr/DS136/R and Coff. 1, adopted 26 September 2000, upheld by Appellate Body Report, 
WT/DS 1361AB/R, WT/DS I 62/AB/R, DSR 2000: X, 4593. 
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such as the establishment of export price and the determination of injury and 
causation, according to corresponding rules in the ADA and follow the procedural 
rules of the ADA. The conducts of investigating authorities are subject to the scrutiny 
of the DSM in the same way as they do in any other investigation which does not 
involve Chinese products. 
Investigating authorities cannot hide behind the notion of NME and develop 
associated practices which are WrO-inconsistent in "normal" AD investigations. A 
non-exhaustive list of these practices includes the EC's sampling in the MET test, the 
EC's individual treatment (U) practice and the USs double counting in a combined 
AD and CVD case, and so on. This is essentially the reason that China considered that 
it will be able to challenge some NME associated practices in the DSM, although 
Section 15 and Paragraph 151 indeed provide expectations in terms of price 
comparability in AD and CVD investigations targeting China. 
The story of the first question is somehow different and the WTO 
jurisprudence is less favourable to China. The NME criteria of a WrO Member are 
rightly considered as provisions of national laws and these provisions, irrespective of 
their contents, do not breach any WTO rule. Irrespective of how "unfair" China 
consider these NME criteria are, by having its own NME criteria and following these 
criteria in investigations involving Chinese products, a WTO Member does not breach 
its obligations under the ADA and the Protocol. 
Against this background, even if an investigating authority does not adopt the 
interpretative approach followed by the panel and the AB, it does not necessarily 
violate WTO law. China may politically argue that it has been treated less favourably 
or "unfairly". Yet, it is difficult to legally argue that the importing WTO Member, by 
interpreting the NME criteria in its national law less favourable to China, does not 
meet its obligations under the WTO. 
The WTO jurisprudence cannot provide much help to China in this regard as 
well. In previous cases, the WTO panels and the AB indeed examined municipal laws, 
but for a particular purpose, namely "in accessing the conformity of that domestic law 
with the relevant GATF/WTO obligations" . 
47 Moreover, the panels and the -AB 
repeatedly held that they do not interpret national laws "as such", or the way they 
interpret provisions of a covered agreement. Hence, under the assumption that the 
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NME criteria are not inconsistent with the ADA or the Protocol, it is not surprising 
that a panel may decline to rule that an importing WrO Member breaches its WTO 
obligations by interpreting its NME criteria in a way less favourable to China or by 
not following the interpretative approach of the panel or the AB. 
The next section, by taking an example in the EC's NME practice towards 
China, further demonstrates the complexity of the issue discussed above. 
3.2 AD Methodology towards Non-market Economy in National Laws 
3.2.1 The US 
This sub-section describes the law and practice of the US DOC in AD 
investigations involving NME countries. Although China is the most important 
trading partner which the DOC is currently treating as a NME country, the 
methodology of a Normal Value (NV) calculation in a NME case is nevertheless not 
China-specific. The China-specific controversy occurred when the DOC decided to 
depart from its previous practice and apply combined CVD and AD to China, a NME 
country. More details of simultaneous AD and CVD proceedings conducted by the 
DOC and the underlying WTO issues are to be examined in the next section. 
The legal basis for the DOC to use the NME methodology to calculate NV for 
cases involving NME countries instead of the standard NV methodology applicable to 
market econon-des is Section 771 (18) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (Section 771 (18)). 
Section 771 (18) (A) first defined NME as follows: 48 
The term "nonmarket economy country" means anyforeign country 
that the administering authority determines does not operate on 
market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of 
merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair value of the 
merchandise. 
Section 771 (18) (B) provides five criteria on which the DOC can rely to make 
a determination to treat a trading partner as a NME: 
49 
In making determinations under subparagraph (A) the administering 
authority shall take into account 
I WTO India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products - Report of the 
Appellate Body, WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998, DSR 1998: 1,9, para 78. 
48 19 U. S. C. 1677 (18) (A). 
`9 19 U. S. C. 1677 (18) (B). 
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(i) the extent to which the currency of the foreign country is 
convertible into the currency of other countries; 
(ii) the extent to which wage rates in the foreign country are 
determined byfree bargaining between labor and management, 
(iii) the extent to which joint ventures or other investments by firms 
of otherforeign countries are permitted in theforeign country, 
(iv) the extent of government ownership or control of the means of 
production, 
(v) the extent of government control over the allocation of 
resources and over the price and output decisions of enterprises, and 
(vi) such other factors as the administering authority considers 
appropriate. 
In the Code of Federal Regulations, the methodology of NV calculation in a 
NME case is clarffied as folloWS: 
50 
In identifying dumping from a nonmarket economy country, the 
Secretary nonnally will calculate nonnal value by valuing the 
nonmarket economy producers' factors of production in a market 
economy country. (See section 773(c) of the Act. ) 
The "factors of production" approach is codified in Section 773(c) of the 
Tariff Act of 1930, which requires the DOC "normally" to calculate NV using market 
economy (surrogate country) prices to value the NME country "factors of production" 
used to produce the product concerned .51 
The list of factors include, for example, 
hours of labor required; quantities of raw materials employed; amounts of energy and 
other utilities consumed; representative capital costs, including depreciation, etc. 
52 For 
the purpose of the NV calculation, to these factor costs, the DOC also adds amounts 
for factory overheads, general, selling and administrative expenses, profits and 
packing. As a established practice, the DOC measures material inputs in the number 
of physical units used in the production of the product, i. e., tons, pounds, gallons; 
labor in terms of hours and we distinguish between direct and indirect labor; and 
energy in terms of quantities used, e. g., BTUs (gas), kilowatt hours (electricity), 
gallons (fuel oil). 53 
By filing the NME questionnaire, exporters in the NME provide information 
on the quantity of inputs actually used to produce the product concerned. 
5' 19 CFR 351408. 
51 19 U. S. C. 1677 b (c). 
52 US DOC 'Import Administration Antidumping Manual,, 1997 edition, Chapter 8,87-90, available at 
http: //ia. ita. doc. gov/admanual/indcx. html 
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Nevertheless, it is a long-standing policy of DOC that not all exporters in NME cases 
are assigned their individual duties. Only those exporters who can have sufficient 
autonomy over their export activities qualify for individual dumping margin. The 
DOC's practice is to examine whether exporters pass a "separate rate" test in order to 
decide whether they can receive their own, individual dumping margins. 54 
In a number of case law, the DOC set out the elements of this separate rate 
test. It essentially requires that the exporter demonstrates that its export activities, on 
55 both a de jureý_and de facto basis, are not subject to government control. Evidence, 
such as "an absence of restrictive stipulations associated with an individual exporter's 
business and export licenses" and "any legislative enactments devolving central 
control of export trading companies", can support, yet not guarantee, a finding of de 
56 jure absence of government control over export activities. Other evidence, such as 
"whether the export prices are set by or are subject to the approval of a government 
authority", "whether the respondent has the authority to negotiate and sign contracts 
and other agreements", "whether the respondent has autonomy from the government 
in making decisions regarding the selection of management" etc, can be taken into 
account in a defacto determination. 57 
One formal exception to the DOC's standard approach to calculate NV in a 
NME is the market-oriented industry (MOI) standard. Section 773(C)(1) of the Tariff 
Act of 1930 allows the DOC, in certain circumstances, to use the market- economy 
58 
methodology described in section 773(A) to determine NV in an NME case. Under 
the current MOI test, an affirmative finding of a market-oriented industry requires: 59 
For the merchandise under investigation or review, there must 
be virtually no government involvement in setting prices or 
amounts to be produced. For example, state-required 
production or allocation of production of the merchandise, 
whetherfor export or domestic consumption in the non-market- 
53 Ibid, 88. 
54 Ibid, 91. 
'5 For example, Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value: Sparklers from the People's Republic of 
China ("Sparklers"), 56 FR 20588 (May 6,1991), and Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value: 
Silicon Carbidefront the People's Republic of China ("Silicon Carbide"), 59 FR 22585 (May 2,1994). 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
5' 19 U. S. C. 1677 b (c) (1). 
'9 For example, Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value- Sulfanilic Acid From the People's 
Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 9,409,9,411 (DOC., Mar. 18,1992); Notice of Final Determination of Sales at 
Less Than Fair Value and Negative Final Determination of Critical Circumstances: Certain Colour Television 
Receivers From the People's Republic of China, 69 Fed. Reg. 20,594,20,595 (DOC, Apr. 16,2004). 
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economy country, would be an almost impossible barrier to 
finding a MOL 
The industry producing the merchandise under investigation or 
review should be characterized by private or collective 
ownership. There may be state-owned enterprises in the 
industry, but substantial state ownership would weigh heavily 
againstfinding a MOL 
Market determined prices must be paidfor all significant inputs 
whether material or non-material (e. g., labor and overhead) and 
for all but insignificant proportions of all the inputs accounting 
for the total value of the merchandise under investigation or 
review. For example, an input price will not be considered 
market-detennined if the producers of the merchandise under 
investigation or review pay a state-set price for the input or if 
the input is supplied to the producers at government direction. 
Moreover, if there is any state-required production in the 
industry producing the input, the share of state-required 
production must be insignificant. 
If these conditions are not met, the industry under investigation will be treated 
as NME producers and the NV will be calculated under the "factors of production" 
approach. Although consistently used in practice, this test has not been codified in 
DOC's regulations, due to DOC's concerns that "the test did not succeed in 
'identifying situations where it would be appropriate to use domestic prices or costs in 
an NME as the basis for normal value. ' , 60 
Upon China's accession, the US negotiated "the right to treat China as a NME 
country for 15 years from the date of China's accession". 61 Ever since, China has 
started requesting WTO Members to grant it market economy status or at least to 
recognize that some of its industries or producers are market-oriented and thus can 
enjoy market economy treatment. Over years, the DOC has found that the vast 
majority of exporters in China qualify for a separate rate. Nevertheless, no industry in 
China has succeeded in meeting the MOI test in the past fifteen years. 
The US NME criteria and methodology themselves, though having been 
fiercely criticized as "unfair", are difficult to challenge under the WTO since the US 
has pushed China to accept most of its practices in China's WTO Accession Protocol 
60 Antidumping Duties; Countervailing Duties; Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 27,295,27,364 (DOC., May 19,1997) 
(citation ornitted). 
61 The Wbite House Office of Public Liaison 'Summary of US-China Bilateral WTO Agreement', 17 November 
1999, available at: httl2: //www. uschina. orgipublic/991115a. htmi (last access 15 July 2008) 
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and US - China bilateral agreement. 
62 Although practitioners have long been arguing 
that the DOC practices on the selection of surrogate values and calculation of the 
Country-wide rate in NME cases are discriminatory, China for many years did not 
63 challenge the US practices. It was when the US decided to depart from its tradition, 
i. e. not to apply anti-subsidy laws to China, that China considered that the US practice 
can no longer hide behind the curtain of NME and was challengeable in the VV70. 
3.2.2 The EU 
The EU, over years, establishes a similar system with the US to handle AD 
cases involving NME countries. According to Article 2 (7) (a) of Council Regulation 
(EC) 384/96, normal value in a NME should be determined on the basis of " the price 
or constructed value in a market economy third country, or the price from such a third 
country to other countries, including the Community, or where those are not possible, 
on any other reasonable basis, including the price actually paid or payable in the 
Community for the like product, duly adjusted if necessary to include a reasonable 
profit margin". 64 In other words, the EU methodology to calculate NV in a NME case 
also bases on the price or constructed NV in an analogue country. The similarity 
between the US and the EU systems nevertheless ends here. In the EU system, no 
"factors of production" approach is used to calculate NV, i. e. the quantity of inputs 
used to produce the product concerned by an exporter in NME is irrelevant to the 
calculation of NV in an EU investigation. 
Moreover, in 1998, the Basic Regulation was amended to reflect the changes 
of economic conditions in Vietnam and in China so that they were no longer 
automatically considered as NMEs. 65 This amendment significantly changed the EU 
system. Individual companies in China and Vietnam now have the opportunities to 
apply for Market Economy Treatment (MET). A company that is granted MET is 
62 K Tracey 'Non-market Economy Methodology under US Anti-dumping Laws: A Protectionist Shield from 
Chinese Competition' (2006) 15 CurTent: International Trade Law Journal 81,90-91. ('NME Methodology under 
US AD Law') 
63 For example, J Greenwald and G Horlick 'Dumping Margin Calculation Problems in the United States' (2007) 2 
Global Trade and Custom Journal 67,68-69. ('Dumping Margin Calculation') 
64 Council Regulation (EQ No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries 
not members of the European Community, OJ L 56/1,6 March 1996, as amended by Council Regulation (EQ No 
2331/96 of 2 December 1996, OJ L 317/1,6 December 1996; Council Regulation (EQ No 905/98 of 27 April 
1998, OJ L 128/18,30 April 1998; Council Regulation (EQ No 2238/2000 of 9 October 2000, OJ L 257/2,11 
October 2000; Council Regulation (EQ No 1972/2002 of 5 November 2002, OJ L 305/1,7 November 2002; 
Council Regulation (EQ No 461/2004 of 8 March 2004, OJ L 77/12,13 March 2004 and Council Regulation (EQ 
No 2117/2005 of 21 December 2005, OJ L 340/17,23 December 2005. ('Basic Regulation') 
11 Council Regulation (EQ No 905/98 of 27 April 1998, OJ L 128/18,30 April 1998. 
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treated the same way as a company from a market economy, namely their NV will be 
calculated based on their own home market prices and costs. It is therefore different 
from the US system which grants MOI status to industries, instead of individual 
companies. 
Art 2 (7) (c) specifies conditions that must be fulfilled in order for a company 
to qualify for MET as follows: 
(c) A claim under subparagraph (b) must be made in writing and 
contain sufficient evidence that the producer operates under market 
economy conditions, that is if., 
- decisions offirms regarding prices, costs and inputs, including for 
instance raw materials, cost of technology and labour, output, sales 
and investment, are made in response to market signals reflecting 
supply and demand, and without significant State interference in this 
regard, and costs of major inputs substantially reflect market values, 
- firms have one clear set of basic accounting records which are 
independently audited in line with international accounting 
standards and are appliedfor all purposes, 
- the production costs andfinancial situation offirms are not subject 
to significant distortions carried over from the former non-market 
economy system, in particular in relation to depreciation of assets, 
other write-offs, barter trade and payment via compensation of 
debts, 
- the fit7ns concerned are subject 
which guarantee legal certainty, 
finns, and 
to bankruptcy and property laws 
! nd stability for the operation of 
- exchange rate conversions are carried out at the market rate. 
A determination whether the producer meets the abovementioned 
criteria shall be made within three months of the initiation of the 
investigation, after specific consultation of the Advisory Committee 
and after the Community industry has been given an opportunity to 
comment. This determination shall remain in force throughout the 
investigation. 
It has long been argued that although the five MET criteria look 
straightforward, "EC case handlers have broad administrative discretion to interpret 
whether a company meets each of the condition, particularly with respect to the first 
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three". 66 In numerous cases, the Commission has applied these criteria to examine 
hundreds of Chinese companies and rejected the MET for the majority of them. 67 As 
to be discussed below, although Article 2 (7) (c) itself can hardly be considered as 
WTO-inconsistent, over years, the Commission's interpretation and application of 
these five criteria have raised significant controversies. 
Also, the Commission develops a few practices associated with its MET 
methodology, such as individual treatment (IT) and sampling, and frequently applies 
them in NME AD investigations. 
The first established practice associated with MET is IT. As another important 
exception of one-country-one-duty rule, if a company does not qualify for MET, it 
can apply for IT, which allows their own export prices to be used to calculation the 
dumping margin. IT is similar with the US's "separate rate" test, although with 
slightly different conditions. Article 9 (5) of the Basic Regulation stipulates the 
conditions as follows: 68 
Where Article 2(7)(a) applies, an individual duty shall, however, be 
specified for the exporters which can demonstrate, on the basis of 
properly substantiated claims that: 
(a) in the case of wholly or partly foreign owned finns or joint 
ventures, exporters arefree to repatriate capital andprofits; 
(b) export prices and quantities, and conditions and terms o sale are 
freely determined; 
(c) the majority of the shares belong to private persons. State 
officials appearing on the board of Directors or holding key 
management positions shall either be in minority or it must be 
demonstrated that the company is nonetheless sufficiently 
independentfrom State interference; 
(d) exchange rate conversions are carried out at the market rate; 
and 
(e) State interference is not such as to permit circumvention of 
measures if individual exporters are given different rates of duty. 
66 E Vermulst and F Graafsma 'Recent EC And-dumping Practice towards China and Vietnam: The Great Leap 
Backward? ' (2006) 5 International Trade Law Review 124,124. ('Recent EC AD Practice') 
6' Deflof and Fridh (n 33) 276. ('EU Treatment of Non-market Economy') 
6' Basic Regulation, Art 9 (5). 
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The second practice which often surfaces in a NME investigation is sampling. 
In cases where a large number of respondents need to be investigated and the 
Commission does not have the resources to conduct the investigation, it resorts to 
sampling techniques. 69 Yet, as widely discussed, the sampling practice can have 
"peculiar consequences" for the companies not selected in the sample, since their 
status (MET, IT or NME) is unknown . 
70 The Commission therefore introduced a 
desk-check analysis to remedy the problem of sampling. The system is described as 
follows by commentators: 71 
If a desk-check system is utilized, companies outside the sample will 
be checked in detail on the merits of their application, but will not be 
investigated on the spot. 7hese non-selected companies will then, in 
due course, be provided their status and attributed the weighted 
average duty of each status group of companies (MET, IT or NME). 
The practice of the Commission with the desk-check system is that in the 
initial stage of the investigation, the Commission requests exporting producers to 
supply sampling information and MET and IT requests at the same time. After 
examining and verifying both sampling and MEVIT information, it mergers two sets 
of information and makes decisions. The sampled producers which obtained MET or 
IT will normally receive individual dumping margin based on their own data. For 
producers not included in the sample, those that were granted MET after desk-check 
will be awarded the weighted average dumping margin of the sampled MET 
producers and those that were granted IT after desk-check will be awarded the 
weighted average dumping margins of the sampled IT producers. Companies that 
were granted neither MET nor IT receive the country-wide dumping margin. 
The Commission, however, did not apply MET desk-check system in the 
Footwear case, where it granted one MET out of 154 cooperating Chinese exporting 
producers and rejects the MET application from all non-sampled companies, up to 
140 companies. 72 
For more than a decade, Chinese exporting producers and leading practitioners 
criticized the Commission's approach to interpret five criteria in Article 2 (7) (c), its 
"I Vermulst and Graafsma (n 63) 128. ('Recent EC AD Practice') 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
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IT practice and its sampling practice in various AD cases, accusing them as WTO- 
inconsistent, and challenged some of these practices in front of the European courts. 73 
The question in this study is however whether these issues are litigatable in the DSM. 
The following analysis, by taking the examples of the first criterion of Article 2 (7) (c) 
and IT, intends to shed some lights on the question. 
First criterion of Article 2 (7) (c): "state interference' 
The first criterion of Article 2 (7) (c) requires that the "decision of firms 
regarding prices, costs and inputs, ... are made in response to market signals 
reflecting supply and demand, and without significant State interference in this regard, 
and costs of major inputs substantially reflect market values". Although the five 
criteria of Article (7) (c) are cumulative, i. e. the companies applying for MET need to 
fulfil all five of them, statistics show that "the main reasons that MET is refused is 
that companies are either under state influence, or that they do not keep adequate 
accounts", since "[F]ifty eight per cent of the companies who failed MET, failed upon 
each of these grounds". 74 State interference is therefore one of the key reasons that the 
Commission rejects MET applications by Chinese companies. 
In the past, the Commission has for various reasons considered that state 
interference existed in Chinese companies. Among these widely varied reasons, three 
types of freqnently-cited state interference are identified as "direct state ownership or 
ownership by state owned companies", "limitations on sale and export targets", and 
"restrictions on imports and exports". 75 
Due to limited space, this study cannot discuss every type of state interference 
in numerous AD investigations against China. It takes the Commission's 
interpretation of state ownership or ownership by state-owned companies as an 
example. Chinese exporting producers in more than a dozen AD cases argued that 
majority state ownership or ownership by state owned companies should not be a 
"I Council Regulation (EQ No 1472/2006 of 5 October 2006 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and 
collecting definitely the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain footwear with uppers of leather originating 
in the People's Republic of China and Vietnam, OJ 275/1,6 October 2006. ('Certain footware') 
73 For example, Detlof and Fridh (n 33) 281 ('EU Treatment of Non-market Economy') and Vermulst and 
Graafsma (n 63) 129 ('Recent EC AD Practice'). For ECJ challenge, for example, Case T-138/02 Nanjing 
Metalink v Council [2006] ECR 11-4347; Case T- 35/01 Shanghai Teraoka Electronic v Council [2004] ECR 11- 
3663. 
74 Detlof and Fridh (n 33) 276. ('EU Treatment of Non-market Economy') 
75 Ibid, 277. 
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factor which automatically disqualifies the MET status of a company, yet none of 
76 
them was successful. 
Chinese exporters have long been arguing that the first criterion should be 
interpreted as requiring that (1) the company's business decisions are made in 
response to market signals, and (2) that these business decisions are made without 
significant State interference in this regard, i. e., the state interference, if any, are not 
such as to prevent the business decisions from being made in response to market 
signals with respect to price, costs and inputs. Also, this state interference needs to be 
"significant". Therefore, the relevant factors in assessing whether a company fulfil the 
first criterion are: 1) through the state ownership, if any, whether the State has 
interfered with the company's business decisions so as to prevent the business 
decisions from being be made in response to market signals; 2) whether the State 
interference is "significant", although the exact reach of "significanf 'is not defined in 
the Basic Regulation. In other words, evidence of past significant State interference is 
sufficient to disqualify the company's MET application, yet the mere possibility that 
the State may influence the future decision-making of the company is not sufficient. 
The Commission has to verify whether State interference has the effect on business 
decisions so that they do not reflect demand and supply. 
It is nevertheless not the Commission's approach. The Commission considers 
that if the State exercise control over a Chinese company, this company does not fulfil 
the first criterion. Evidences, such as the State has a blocking majority; other 
shareholders are so fragmented that the State as the majority shareholder can exercise 
influence; and several members of a company board were appointed by the State or 
state-owned parent company, can be considered as the proof that the company is 
controlled by the State and operates with significant State interference. 77 
The focus of the debate is whether the first criterion of Article 2 (7) (c) refers 
to past State interference or the possibility of State interference in the future. In 
trichloroisocyanuric acid78, the Commission clearly stated its interpretation: 
76 For example, Commission Regulation (EQ 255/2001 [2001] OJ L 38/8, recital 16; Regulation 950/2001 [2001] 
OJ L 197/4, recital 22; Regulation 1612/2001 [20011 OJ L 214/3, recital 20; Regulation 306/2004 [2004] OJ L 
52/5, recital 60-64; Regulation 538/2005 [2005] OJ L 89/4, recital 46-54 and Regulation 552/2005 [2005] OJ L 
9316, recital 24-25. 
" For example, ibid, Regulation 538/2005 and Regulation 1683/2004 [20041 OJ L 303/1, recital B. 78 Regulation 538/2005, ibid, recital 47-48. 
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The aim of the investigation, is inter alia, to assess to which extent 
the State could interfere in business decisions, and which measures 
were taken by the company to prevent such interference. 
In this regard, it was found that the State held the majority of the 
Director posts on the Board of Directors, and that there were no 
restrictions on the State-appointed Directors' voting rights on the 
Board (minority protection). The companyJailed to demonstrate that 
appropriate measures have been taken to prevent such State 
interference in thefuture. (Emphasis original) 
One Chinese company argued in the CH as folloWS: 79 
[TIthe refusal of MES on the basis of potential State interference in 
the company's business decisions, without any concrete realisation 
of that potential, is not compatible with the provision at issue. Such 
an interpretation is, moreover, contrary to the principles of legal 
certainty and respect for this right of the defence, since it would 
require the exporter to provide evidence not available to it. 
A hypothetical question is raised as whether a WTO panel will support this 
argument of the Chinese exporter in light of the WTO rules and jurisprudence, if 
China brought this matter to the DSM. The answer can hardly be straightforward. On 
the one hand, it has to be noted that the first sentence of Article 2 (7) (c) uses the 
present tense "are". If one intends to strictly follow the general rule of interpretation 
followed by the AB and the panels contained in Artilce 31 of VCIL, the use of present 
sense in the first sentence of Article 2 (7) (c) suggests that the State interference must 
be existing or in progress. By using the present tense, it is arguable that the ordinary 
meaning of the first sentence of Article 2 (7) (c) is that as long as a Chinese firm's 
decision is currently making in response to market signals and without significant 
State interference in this regard, it fulfils the requirement of the first sentence of 
Article 2 (7) (c), unless evidence suggests otherwise. The determination of whether 
the first sentence of Article 2 (7) (c) is fulfilled by a Chinese company should not be 
connected to future action or behaviour of this company. 
On the other hand, a WTO panel may consider that although the Commission 
interprets Article 2 (7) (c) in a different way that a panel or the AB might have, to 
apply different interpretative approach itself does not necessarily constitute a violation 
of the EU's WTO obligation. The fact that Article 2 (7) (c) is not a provision in a 
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covered WTO agreement, and Article 2 (7) (c) itself does not breach any WTO rules, 
creates a different situation from the Panel and the AB's examination and 
interpretation of Indian law in India - Patents (US), where the AB stated as follows: 80 
It is clear that an examination of the relevant aspects of Indian 
municipal law and, in particular, the relevant provisions of the 
Patents Act as they relate to the 'administrative instructions, is 
essential to determining whether India has complied with its 
obligations under Article 70.8(a). There was simply noway for the 
Panel to make this determination without engaging in an 
examination of Indian law. But, as in the case cited above before the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, in this case, tile Panel was 
not interpreting Indian law 'as such', rather, the Panel was 
examining Indian law solely for the purpose of determining whether 
India had met its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. ... 
Previous GAYTIWTO panels also have conducted a detailed 
examination of the domestic law of a Member in assessing the 
conformity of that domestic law with the relevant GATTIWTO 
obligations. For example, in United States - Section 337 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930, the panel conducted a detailed examination of 
the relevant United States' legislation and practice, including the 
remedies available under Section 337 as well as the differences 
between patent-based Section 337 proceedings and federal district 
court proceedings, in order to determine whether Section 337 was 
inconsistent with Article 111: 4 of the GATT 194Z This seems to us to 
be a comparable case. 
The Panel in US - Section 301 Trade Act repeated the AB's finding and stated 
that it would not "interpret US law 'as such', the way we would, say, interpret 
provisions of the covered agreements. " 8 'Rather, the Panel held that it was instead 
82 "called upon to establish the meaning of Sections 301-310 as factual elements". This 
Panel also makes statements with respect to the different interpretations between 
WTO law and municipal law as folloWS: 83 
79 Case T-498/04 Zhejiang Xinan Chemical Industrial Group v Council, Report for the Hearing, para 55. The 
contested regulation is Regulation 1683/2004. 
" WTO India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products - Report of the 
A pellate Body, WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998, DSR 1998: 1,9, para 65-67. 
8T WTO United States- Sections 301-310 of the TradeActof 1974 - Report of the Panel, WT/DS152/R, adopted 
27 January 2000, DSR 2000: 11,815, para 7.18. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid, para 7.20. 
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We note, finally, that terms used both in Sections 301-310 and in 
WTO provisions, do not necessarily have the same meaning. For 
example, the word 'determination' need not always have the same 
meaning in Sections 304 and 306 as it has in Article 23.2(a) of the 
DSU. Thus, conduct not meeting, say, the threshold of a 
'determination' under Sections 304 and 306, is not by this fact alone 
precluded from meeting the threshold of a 'determination' under 
Article 23.2(a) of the DSU. By contrast, thefact that a certain act is 
characterized as a 'determination' under domestic legislation, does 
not necessarily mean that it must be construed as a determination 
under the covered agreements. 
Although abovementioned quotes does not preclude China to argue that by 
interpreting Article 2 (7) (c) in a way that is not consistent with the "ordinary 
meaning" of the provision, the EC breaches its WTO obligations, it obviously 
increases the difficulty of challenging the Commission's practices in the DSM. 
IT practice 
As observed by commentators, "[T]he granting of individual treatment is 
rather exceptional in anti-dumping investigations regarding NMEs, which might be 
84 because the criteria are essentially similar to those for granting MET". The frequent 
rejections of IT application of Chinese companies bring serious question into the IT 
practice. 
The arguments of Chinese exporting producers with respect to IT practice are 
relatively straightforward. The current IT regime, as far as it applies to China, is an 
exception to the general ADA rule governing the calculation of dumping margin. This 
exception, however, is not covered by Section 15 or Paragraph 151. Indeed, as 
discussed in the previous section, Section 15 and Paragraph 151 provides two 
exceptions of the NV calculation in case a company cannot qualify MET. The export 
price of Chinese producers was not mentioned in Section 15 and hence remains 
unaffected by the NME exceptions. Consequently, the determination of export price, 
even in an investigation involving Chinese products, should be governed by Article 
2.3 of the ADA. 
Article 2.3 of the ADA provides that an investigating authority may disregard 
the export price only when there is no verifiable export price or when it believes that 
the export price is unreliable because of an association or a compensatory 
" Detlof and Fridh (n 33) 272. ('EU Treatment of Non-market Economy') 
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arrangement. These are the only two permissible exceptions to the rules of Article 2.3. 
In all other circumstance, namely when an exporting producer's export price is 
reliable, it should be used. 
Under the EU's current IT system, the Commission however will use a 
Chinese co-operating exporting producer's own export price for the purpose of 
calculating an individual dumping margin only if that company demonstrates that it 
meets all IT criteria of Article 9(5) of the Basic Regulation. All other exporting 
producers' individual export prices are disregarded, despite the fact that these export 
prices may be "reliable" in the sense of Article 2.3 of the ADA. 
Consequently, Chinese exporting producers argue that the Commission would 
be required under Article 2.3, Article 6.10 and a contrario Article 9.4 ADA to 
determine individual margin and duty rate for each producer, which provided a 
reliable export price. Only if the Commission were to demonstrate for each company 
that its specific circumstances make the export price unreliable, the export price of 
Chinese companies may be rejected. In such cases, a constructed export price will be 
used as opposed to disregarding completely individual export prices of Chinese 
producers. 
Arguments of this nature challenge the long standing notion that in a NME 
case, if a company/an industry cannot demonstrate it is market-oriented, a single 
country-wide duty should apply to this company/industry unless it fulfils IT criteria, 
in order to "avoid circumvention by channelling exports through the exporters with 
85 the lowest margin". Chinese exporting producers argue that to use IT system to 
prevent potential dumping is unwarranted under the ADA and individual margins 
ought to be established in respect of Chinese producers with reliable export price. 
In sum, the EC and the US methodologies towards NME can be divided into 
three parts for the purpose of this study: the NME criteria, the NME methodology and 
associated practices. The NME criteria, namely the US's MOI standard and the 
66separate rate" test and the EU's MET and IT tests, are to a large extent not 
challengable as demonstrated by the discussion above. The NME methodologies, i. e. 
the US's "factors of production" method and the EUs analogue country method, are 
also difficult to challenge in the WTO DSM. The associated practices, such as the 
EU's IT test, however fall outside the two exceptions provided by Section 15 and 
85 Ibid. 
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Paragraph 15 1. These practices are therefore arguably challengeable in the DSM. The 
next section father discusses one of the associated practices which has been brought to 
the DSM by China, namely double counting in the simultaneous AD and CVD 
investigations. 
3.3 The First WTO Challenge of China: US - Coated Paper 
On 14 September 2007, China formally requested consultations with the US 
concerning the preliminary AD and CVD determinations made by the DOC on 29 
May 2007 and 2 April 2007, respectively, in respect of coated free sheet paper from 
China. 86 As the first complaint filed by China alone after its accession to the WTO, 
China made this move in a hope to stop "a trend" that could develop after the DOC's 
decision to levy preliminary duties of 23.19% to 99.65% on coated paper imported 
from China. 87 Although the case remains inactive since the US International Trade 
Commission (ITC) found on 21 December 2007 that the imports were not materially 
injuring or threatening material injury to the US industry and there is no definitive 
duty imposed, it is a significant step forward by China. 88 Moreover, the debate 
surrounding double counting do not fade away since the ITC's negative injury finding 
in coated paper case did not upset the DOC's policy to impose the combined CVD 
and AD duties to Chinese exports and there are a few similar investigations pending 
against China. 89 
This section examines the GATT/WTO rules on simultaneous AD and CVD 
investigations, the US's law and practice and China's WTO consultation. 
3.3.1 GATr/WTO rules on simultaneous AD and CVD investigations 
The purpose of AD duties is to offset dumping, which is defined in GATT 
Article VI: I as the introduction of products originating in one country into the 
territory of another country at less than the normal value of these products. Dumping 
86 WTO 'United States - Preliminary Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Determinations on Coated Free 
Sheet Paper from China, Request for Consultation by China' WT/DS368/1, G/IJ826, G/SCM/D77/1, 
G/ADP/D72/l, 18 September 2007. ('Request for Consultation') 
97 Competition Law360 'Disgruntled with US Duties, China Goes to WTO', 14 September 2007, available at 
bttl): I/comr)etition law360. cotn/. See also, MOFCOM 'China Seeks WTO Resolution over Paper Disputes with 
US' 17 September 2007, available at 
http: //melbourne2. mofcom. p, ov. cn/aarticle/ýhinanews/200709/20070905127303. html 
11 ITC 'Coated Free Sheet Paper from China, Indonesia, and Korea does not Injury US Industry, says ITC'. 
htti): //www. usitc. eovlext relations/news release/2007/erII20eel. htm 
" Competition Law360 'PRC Imports: Countervailing Duties, US Trade Policy' 19 December 2007, available at 
http: //competition. law360. conV 
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is therefore the amount by which the price of domestic sales of the like product 
exceeds the price of export sales of the product under investigation to a certain 
country. AD measures are imposed in order to offset this difference and the purpose 
of AD duties or undertakings is to increase the price of dumped imports to non- 
dumped levels or to obtain from exporting producers a commitment to sell above a 
minimum price, which is set at a non-injurious level. 
Subsidisation can have an impact on dumping when the subsidies are granted 
upon exportation of products since an export subsidy will enable the exporting 
producer to lower its export price. As dumping is calculated by comparing the 
domestic and export prices, the export subsidy will in effect increase the difference 
between both prices, and hence the amount of dumping. 
In such cases, combining CVD duties (in order to offset countervailable 
subsidies) and AD duties (in order to offset dumping) could result in compensating 
domestic industry twice for the same situation: once through the CVD duty (targeting 
the subsidisation directly) and once through the AD duty (which is higher due to the 
export subsidy). 
GATT Article VI: 5 forbids WFO Members from imposing both AD and CVD 
duties in order to compensate for the same situation caused through dumping and 
export subsidisation. It reads as follows: 
No product of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory 
of any other contracting party shall be subject to both anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties to compensate for the same situation of dumping or 
export subsidization 
In other words, GATT Article VI: 5 was adopted in order to avoid the double 
compensation that could result from the combined imposition of CVD and AD duties. 
This provision, however, has never been applied by the GATT or WTO panels, 
although major trading partners, such as the EU, the US and Canada, frequently 
conduct combined CVD and AD investigations against imports. 
As a consequence, no WTO or GATT panel has ever discussed directly the 
obligations created by GATT Article VI: 5. This provision was only examined, 
indirectly, in Indonesia - Autos, in order to illustrate the panel's argument that the 
230 
Chapter VI 
WTO ASCM was not intended to be the exclusive mechanism for challenging subsidy 
measures. 90 No guidance can therefore be found in panel decisions concerning the 
interpretation of GATT Article VI: 5. 
The reason why no panel ever had to discuss GATT Article VI :5 is probably 
that the text of this provision is quite clear, and therefore is not prone to being 
misinterpreted by WTO members. Yet, when the NME concept enters into the picture, 
it becomes much more complicated as suggested in the analysis of the US practice 
below. 
3.3.2 US Law and Practices of Simultaneous CVD and AD Proceedings 
The provision implementing GATT Article VI: 5 in the US law is Section 
772(c)(1)(C) of the Tariff Act of 1930, which provides that: 91 
(c) Adjustments for Export Price and Constructed Export Price. The 
price used to establish export price and constructed export price shall be 
(1) increased by 
(C) the amount of any countervailing duty imposed on the subject 
merchandise under subtitle A to offset an export subsidy ( ). " 
In accordance with Section 772(c)(1)(C), the US DOC prevents, when dealing 
with imports from market economy countries, the imposition of both AD and CVD 
duties for the purpose of dealing with one and the same situation arising from 
dumping or from export subsidization, by increasing the export price in the dumping 
calculation by the amount of the CVD duty imposed. As the export price is increased 
by the amount of the CVD duty, the dumping margin (i. e., the amount by which the 
normal value exceeds the export price) is reduced proportionately. 
90 WTO Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry - Report of the Panel, WT/DS54/R, 
WT/DS551R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R and Corr. 1,2,3, and 4, adopted 23 July 1998, DSR 1998: Vl, 2201, para. 
5.324. 
"' 19 U. S. C. 1677a(c)(1)(C). 
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The purpose of Section 772(c)(1)(C) is to avoid the double counting of CVD 
and AD duties, as was explained by the US DOC in Cold-Rolled Corrosion Resistant 
Carbon Steel Flat Productsfrom Korea: 92 
Domestic subsidies presumably lower the price of the subject merchandise 
both in the home and the U. S. markets, and therefore have no effect on the 
measurement of any dumping that might also occur. Export subsidies, by 
contrast, benefit only exported merchandise. Accordingly, an export subsidy 
brings about a lower U. S. price, which could be ascribed to either dumping or 
export subsidization, as well as the potential for double remedies. Imposing 
both an export-subsidy CVD and an AD duty, calculated with no adjustment 
for that CVD, would impose a double remedy specifically prohibited by Article 
VI. 5 of the GATT. 7hus, the only reasonable explanation for Congress' 
decision to provide for the [addition to] U. S. price of export-subsidy CVDs is 
protection against double remedies. 
It is a well-established US practice not to deduct AD and CVD duties from the 
export price in calculating dumping margins. This was discussed at length recently in 
Low Enriched Uranium From France. 93 Under Section 772(c)(2)(A), the export price 
or constructed import price must be reduced by "United States import duties". The 
DOC confirmed in Low Enriched Uranium its long-standing practice of considering 
that AD duties and CVD duties are not United States import duties and that, 
accordingly, should not be deducted from the export price or the constructed import 
price under Section 772(c)(2)(A). 
This means that in the dumping margin calculation, when the export price is 
compared to the normal value that contains any AD and CVD duty paid upon 
importation of the product into the US, these duties are not deducted. 
94 In such 
circumstances, any CVD duty paid, whether destined to offset domestic or export 
subsidies, increases the export price, and therefore reduces the dumping margin. 
95 
92 Cold-Rolled Corrosion Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Korea, 62 FR at 18,422. 
93 See for a detailed analysis of this matter, Appendix I (Proposed Treatment of Countervailing Duties as a Cost) to 
the Notice of Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review: Low Enriched Uranium From France, 69 
FR 46501-46508. ('Low Enriched Uranium From France') 
' This is the case for instance if the goods are sold "duty paid", and the price agreed therefore includes duties paid 
by the exporter. It would also be the case if the export price is constructed, in which case the price to a purchaser 
in the US not affiliated with the producer or exporter (that will include any duties paid) is used as the starting point 
for calculating the export price. 
"'This is a significant difference with the EU practice, where countervailing and anti-dumping duties are always 
deducted from the export price when calculating the dumping margin, and therefore have no impact on the margin. 
There is one exception in the EU practice, under Article 1100) of the EU Basic Regulation. This provision 
specifies in the relevant part that: "In any investigation carried out pursuant to this Article [reviews], the 
Commission shall examine the reliability of export prices in accordance with Article 2. However, where it is 
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The DOC commented in this regard in Low Enriched Uranium from France 
that: 96 
With respect to CVDs to offset export subsidies, the 1979 amendments to the 
statute provide a straightforward response to the argument that they should be 
deducted from initial U. S. prices in calculating dumping margins --- they 
require that CVDs to offset export subsidies be added to initial U. S. prices. We 
do not interpret the statute to require CVDs to offset Mort subsidies first to 
be added to initial U. S. prices and then to permit this addition to be negate 
bv their subseauent subtraction. 
Domestic subsidies present a closer question, as the statute does not 
speak directly to them. The fact that the statute addresses CVDs to offset 
export subsidies directly, however, and then remains silent about the plainly 
related issue of CVDs to offset domestic subsidies, is not complete silence --- it 
implies that no adfLustment is appropriate. There is no reason why Congress 
would have provided for the addition of export subsidy CVDs, but not 
considered the plainly related issue of domestic subsidy CVDs. " (emphasis 
added) 
The DOC's view is therefore clear: CVD duties cannot be deducted from the 
export price, whether they offset domestic or export subsidies. Recognising the fact 
that this implies that CVD duties have the effect of reducing the dumping margin, the 
DOC concludes that "to the extent that CVDs may reduce dumping margins, this is 
not a distortion of any margin to be eliminated, but a legitimate reduction in the level 
of dumping. ', 97 
Despite the above well-established methodology, the US has never used it 
against China before 2007. The US has historically not applied its CVD law against 
NMEs. This practice was established in the 1980s in subsidies investigations against 
98 Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia and Poland. 
In these cases the DOC analysed the applicability of the US CVD law in force 
at the time, which did not include a definition of a subsidy, and looked at the actual 
effect a subsidy has. It concluded that a subsidy is by definition an action that distorts 
decided to construct the export price in accordance with Article 2(9), it shall calculate it with no deduction for the 
amount of anti-dumping duties paid when conclusive evidence is provided that the duty is duly reflected in resale 
prices and the subsequent selling prices in the Community. " However, Article I 1(10) only applies to anti-dumping 
duties, and not to countervailing dudes. 
" Low Enriched Uranium From France (n 88) 46505. 
97 Ibid, 46508. 
98 Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia, 49 FR 19370 (May 7,1984) (final negative CVD determination); 
Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland, 49 FR 19374 (May 7,1984). (final negative CVD detem-dnation). 
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or subverts the market process and results in a misallocation of resources. In NMEs, 
however, resources would not be allocated by the market but by central planning. 
There would be no market process to distort or subvert, as misallocations of resources 
would result from central planning, not from subsidies. The DOC therefore concluded 
that subsidies have no meaning outside the context of a market economy. The DOC's 
findings were challenged before the US Court of International Trade (CIT'), which 
reversed the decisions. 99 Upon appeal by the US government, the US Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) reversed the CIT's decision on the ground 
that the DOC's findings were not unreasonable, a violation of the law or an abuse of 
discretion. 100 Georgetown Steel became the landmark case which formed the legal 
basis of the DOC's policy not to apply CVD laws to NME. 
Upon accession to the WTO on I January 1995, the US adopted the ASCM. 
The definition of Article 1 ASCM was implemented by Section 771(5)(B). 101 Section 
771(5)(C) stipulates that the administering authority is not required to consider the 
effect of the subsidy and Section 771(5A) includes the specificity requirement. While 
the old US rule did not define a subsidy and the DOC's interpretation was based on 
the effect a measure had on the market, post WTO-accession law has clearly filled 
that gap. Both the ASCM and the US national law now contain an explicit definition 
of subsidy and add a requirement of specificity. The amended laws therefore allow the 
authorities to distinguish between a specific subsidy and general central planning. 
These changes in the US law complicated the interplay of CVD and AD 
proceedings in NME cases. 102 It is questionable whether Georgetown Steel is still 
applicable and it is widely debated whether Georgetown Steel had established binding 
case law or merely confirmed that the DOC exercised its discretion correctly. 
After China's accession, the situation was further complicated. Section 15(b) 
of the Protocol did not include a similar provision for the application of CVD laws as 
Section 15 (a) did with respect to AD laws. It allows Members to "use methodologies 
of identifying and measuring the subsidy benefit which take into account the 
possibility that prevailing terms and conditions in China may not always be available 
as appropriate benchmarks. In applying such methodologies, where practicable, the 
99 Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 584 (CIT 1995) (Continental Steel). 
100 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F. 2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Georgetown Steel). 
101 19 U. S. C. 1677(5)(E). 
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importing WTO Member should adjust such prevailing terms and conditions before 
considering the use of terms and conditions prevailing outside China. "103 Therefore, 
the concept of NME applies by virtue of Section 15(a)(ii) of the Protocol only to AD 
laws. Although Section 15(b) also allows for specific calculation methods, it does not 
extend the concept of NME to CVD laws. 
This can lead to a double standard. A Member can treat China as NME for the 
purpose of applying AD law, but may consider China as a market economy under 
CVD law. This raises several problems in combined AD and CVD investigations 
against China. 
One practical issue is that where the DOC establishes an AD duty for a 
company on a countrywide basis because its data is deemed unreliable as influenced 
by the NME environment, it might experience difficulties justifying the consequent 
use of company specific data for a subsidy determination, or vice versa. 
Most importantly, the issue of double counting may rise in the case where a 
company receives a countrywide AD duty and a company-specific CVD duty. As 
well-documented by economists, since the surrogate country methodology accepted 
the physical factors of production from the NME respondent, but not the prices paid 
for those factors, the DOC cannot directly observe the firm's subsidized cost. Also, 
the double compensation cannot be remedied by the non-deduction of CVD in the 
export price. In a NME case, when the NV is calculated based on the surrogate costs, 
the increase of export price by the amount of the CVD cannot fully reduce the 
dumping margin as the NV itself has also been inflated by the unsubsidized costs in a 
surrogate country. As a result, "with the CVD countermanding the effects of the 
subsidy, using the surrogate unsubsidized costs in AD calculation penalizes the 
company for the same subsidy". 104 
Instead of challenging the DOC's change of policy in the US courts, China 
decided to bring the issue to the WrO by formally requested consultation with the 
US. Although due to the ITC's negative injury finding, this case is unlikely to proceed 
to the panel stage, this study considers it is still necessary to analyze China's claims 
since there are other combined CVD and AD cases pending. 
"' For more economy discussion on how AD and CVD interplay, B Kelly 'The Law and Economics of 
Simultaneous Countervailing Duty and Anti-dumping Duty Proceedings' (2008) 3 Global Trade and Customs 
Journal, 41,44. ('Simultaneous CVD and AD Proceedings') 
103 Working Party Report (n 40). 
104 Kelly (n 96) 47. ('Simultaneous CVD and AD Proceedings') 
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3.3.3 WTO Consultation of US - Coated Paper 
On May 30, the DOC announced its affirmative preliminary determinations in 
the AD and CVD investigations on imports of coated free sheet paper from Indonesia, 
Korea, and the People's Republic of China (China) and imposed 23.19 to 99.65 
percent of combined AD and CVD duty. 105 
In response to these preliminary determinations, , China made four claims in 
its consultation paper: 
106 
1. the failure of the US authorities to demonstrate specificity under 
Article 2.1 of the SCMAgreement in respect of alleged countervailable 
subsidies identified in the preliminary CVD determination, and to clearly 
substantiate these determinations of specificity on the basis of positive 
evidence, as required by Article 2.4 of the SCM Agreement; 
2. the failure of the US authorities to make a proper determination of 
benefit under Articles I and 14 of the SCM Agreement in respect of the alleged 
"government policy lending program"; 
3. the failure of the US authorities to ensure that the preliminary 
affirmative determination of subsidization, and the imposition of provisional 
countervailing duties, were based on the amount of subsidyfound to exist, as 
required by Articles 17 and 19 of the SCM Agreement; and 
4. the failure of the US authorities to ensure that the preliminary 
affirmative determination of dumping, and the imposition of provisional anti- 
dumping duties, were based on the amount of dumping found to exist, as 
required by Articles 7 and 9 of the AD Agreement. 
The relevant provisions in the WTO agreements are identified as Articles VI 
of the GATT 1994, Articles 1,2,10,14,17, and 32 of the ASCM, and Articles 1,2,7, 
9, and 18 of the ADA. 
While the first two claims are made under ASCM to question the specification 
of alleged subsidies and the calculation for the government loan benefit, the third and 
fourth claims are addressing the double-counting issue discussed in the previous sub- 
section. 
105 72 Federal Register 30,758 - 30,766. 106 Request for Consultations (n 82). 
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Given that no definitive duty has been imposed and thus no panel is requested 
to examine both the factual and legal issues of this case, it is not possible to know 
how exactly China would argue the double counting issue and demonstrate the WTO- 
inconsistency of the US NME practice, how the US would respond to China's claims 
and most importantly, how would a WTO panel rules on the scope of NME 
exceptions and the interplay between AD and CVD in NME cases. Although the 
factual background of this case will be irrelevant in future cases, the legal arguments 
of this case, in particular the matter of double counting, will nevertheless resurface in 
other cases and might be adjudicated by a W70 panel or the AB sooner or later. 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter discusses how WTO members respond to the rise of legalization 
in the GATT/WTO system by making efforts to more effectively utilize the DSM. 
The response of WTO members can be demonstrated in two aspects: to build up legal 
and institutional capacity to utilize the DSM and challenge "unfair" trade barriers 
abroad, by forming public-private networks, and to pursue matters in the DSM which 
traditionally are considered as unlitigatable in the WTO. 
China's efforts to engage private sectors and litigate NME issues in the WTO 
illustrates that WTO members are making efforts to deprive benefits from the higher 
level of legalization in the WTO as a whole. In the meanwhile, the fact that thus far 
no WTO panel has had a chance to scrutinize the WTO-consistency of the NME and 
its associated rules and practices, which govern more than one third of AD 
investigations worldwide, indicates that the ongoing process of legalization has its 
lin-dtations. 
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Chapter VII Conclusion 
From the outset, this study centres on two underlying themes: the proliferation of 
legalization in the trade regime and the unevenness of the ongoing process. 
Separately, both the rule-orientation trend in the trade regime and the uneven 
expansion of judicialization in the GATTIWTO have garnered considerable scholarly 
attention, sparking debates regarding "constitutional" evolution of the GATT/WTO 
and numerous proposals to reform WTO institutions, in particular the DSM. Yet, 
many observers ignore the underlying interrelation between these two themes as they 
assume that the rise of legalization is a single-faceted phenomenon and has a 
straightforward policy path. Few have attempted to break down the legalization 
process into different dimensions and evaluate its complicated consequences. The 
analysis in this study, nevertheless, not only confirms the rise of legalization in the 
trade regime as a whole, as has been widely observed, but also identifies in which 
dimension legalization has increased and explores the complicated consequences of 
the legalization process. 
This study first examines the rise of legalization in the GATT/WTO, one of the 
most cited examples of a successfully "legalized" international institution. It is 
commonly acknowledged that legalization has dramatically expanded in the trade 
regime, especially after the establishment of the WTO. Yet, to precisely analyze the 
phenomenon of legalization, a definition of legalization needs to be offered in the first 
place. Drawing on the International Relations theory, this study builds up its 
theoretical foundation on the assumption that legalization is a particular form of 
institutionalisation characterized along three dimensions: obligation, precision, 
delegation. In the context of the GATT/WTO system, obligation refers to norms set in 
all WTO agreements, agreed Understandings and other binding documents. Precision 
measures not only the clarity of the wording of related WTO agreements, but also the 
extent to which these substantive WTO obligations require (or prohibit) specific 
actions by the Members. Delegation reflects the willingness of WTO Members to 
relinquish sovereignty in terms of both the DSM and other activities of WTO 
institutions. 
Based on this three-factor definition, this study evaluated the dynamic process of 
legalization in the trade regime by further breaking down the trade regime into three 
different parts: decision-making mechanism, surveillance mechanism and the DSM. 
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By reviewing both the current status of legalization in each part and the historical 
developments, this study concludes that as a general pattern, all three parts of the 
GATT/WTO have been significantly legalized and there are certain degrees of 
correlation between the processes. However, the "legalizing" process of each of these 
parts was not always in the same pace and not perfectly balanced. Further increases of 
legalization are therefore coupled with many unsolved controversies. 
The empirical study of international AD regimes provides an illustrative example 
of the significant contribution that legalization made to decades of success in trade 
liberalization as well as the apparent imbalance of the legalization process. On the one 
hand, multiple rounds of trade negotiations generate tighter and more specific 
obligations in the AD regime. On the other hand, a closer analysis of the ADA 
indicates that a fairly large number of obligations contained in the ADA are 
unspecific or contingent in nature. This feature of the ADA also influences the level 
of precision and makes the deference to national authorities a highly contentious 
point. Given the fact that the developments of legalization beyond the ADA, namely 
the judicial activities of the DSM, are heavily criticized, the gaps and discontinuities 
of the ADA can hardly be filled under the current system. 
This study then explores the consequences of legalization at domestic level, both 
in a formal, institutional way and an informal way. The discussion on the EU AD 
regime attempts to exemplify the mixed effects of multilateral legalization on formal 
legal institutions of a domestic regime: on the one hand, increased obligations, 
frequently joined by greater precision and stronger delegation, largely changed the 
landscape of domestic trade policy-making. On the other hand, WTO-plus features 
have been developed to counter balance the impact of increased legalization at 
international level on domestic systems. This is exactly the reason that although the 
EC AD instruments essentially repeat the basic principles of international rules, a 
close look of the instruments and the administration of them suggest a compromise 
between different interests. 
The discussion of China's AD related activities demonstrates the impact of 
legalization on the strategic behaviour of trading partners to utilize the DSM. On the 
one hand, the development of legalization provides incentives for China to effectively 
utilize the DSM and changes the strategic behaviour of China on selecting matters to 
be litigated in the DSM. On the other hand, the fact that China's efforts cannot change 
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the low degree of legalization of NME provisions and the difficulty to challenge the 
practices of trading partners in the DSM, presents the limits of the DSM. 
In conclusion, the phenomenal rise of legalization is one of the most important 
institutional developments of the past half centaury in the trade regime. While it is 
extraordinarily important to acknowledge its significance, it is even more important to 
fully understand the unevenness of the ongoing process and its consequences on 
domestic systems. This study, by using three identifiable variables adopted from 
International Relation, presents one angle to analyze this complicated institutional 
development and its consequences. 
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